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The Fourth Industrial Revolution  
and the Recolonisation of Africa
This book argues that the fourth industrial revolution, the process of accelerated 
automation of traditional manufacturing and industrial practices via digital 
technology, will serve to further marginalise Africa within the international 
community.
In this book, the author argues that the looting of Africa that started with 
human capital and then natural resources, now continues unabated via data and 
digital resources looting. Developing on the notion of “Coloniality of Data”, 
the fourth industrial revolution is postulated as the final phase which will con-
clude Africa’s peregrination towards (re)colonisation. Global cartels, networks 
of coloniality, and tech multinational corporations have turned big data into 
capital, which is largely unregulated or poorly regulated in Africa as the con-
tinent lacks the strong institutions necessary to regulate the mining of data. 
Written from a decolonial perspective, this book employs three analytical pillars 
of coloniality of power, knowledge, and being.
Highlighting the crippling continuation of asymmetrical global power 
relations, this book will be an important read for researchers of African studies, 
politics, and international political economy.
Everisto Benyera is Associate Professor of African Politics at the University 
of South Africa.
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As the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) consolidates and takes effect, 
humanity and other forms of life are undergoing irresistible, irreversible and 
universal social, economic, and legal transformation based on the massive appro-
priation of social life through data extraction. In the 4IR, capitalism took a new 
turn, away from focusing on materials and goods towards services. The 4IR is 
essentially a services revolution brought about by the merging of nanotech-
nology, biotechnology, information communication technology (ICT), among 
others in the process blurring the traditional boundaries between the physical, 
the digital, and the biological worlds. This resulted in new ways of thinking and 
doing, aided by vast amounts of information and data harvested from people’s 
daily lives, hence the Internet of Things among many technology- enabled 
services.
In the 4IR, the evolution of episteme has taken another turn and its relation 
to being which once again excludes the black people, broadly defined. With the 
history of exclusion, slavery, colonialism, and perpetual denial into personhood, 
black people are still struggling to be part of the thinking beings and always 
grapple with how to enter the realm of knowledge production. Stated differ-
ently, black people, the majority of them African, lack the right to rights. The 
4IR will undoubtedly complicate the quest for black people to enter and be 
accepted into the realm of humanity.
In the 4IR, the thinking and cognitive space has new entrants, trans- humans, 
robo- humans, and other forms of enhanced humanity who occupy an onto-
logical position higher than that of black people. The 4IR is therefore another 
sad moment in the life of black people as they slide lower and lower on the 
ontological ladder, whose apex is occupied by white Caucasian males and the 
bottom is occupied by black women.
Knowledge production is shifting from the human being towards online 
entities that are now playing the role of cognitive thinking, imagination, and 
creativity. Intelligence is now artificial, and AI is now responsible for the cre-
ation of a new reality to which we all belong to.
Who are those responsible for creating this new reality? Who are the new 
Philosopher Kings? The new Philosopher Kings are the emerging tech oli-
garchy that is replacing the political oligarchy. They own and control big data, 
 
Foreword ix
artificial intelligence, online communities, and the online economy. They har-
vest data, process it, commodify it, and hence make data capital. Like all forms of 
capital, data extraction is not only unethical but brutal and unforgiving. Data is 
capital, the new gold, and oil. Like oil and gold before it, data is power and like 
all forms of power, it is deployable in political spaces in order to predetermine, 
influence, and pre- empt political decisions. Indeed democracy and many other 
political processes and outcomes are under threat of being subverted courtesy of 
the 4IR and many of its gismos. This, in turn, will result in the entrenchment of 
coloniality especially in Africa where there are weak accountability institutions 
and unethical and unjust leadership.

Preface
Africa must cautiously celebrate the Fourth Industrial Revolution as this will 
not end or lessen its challenges which are a product of centuries of being 
on the darker side of Euro- North American modernity. Africa experienced 
the cumulative effects of what has been wrongly termed the transatlantic slave 
trade (the Atlantic Ocean never enslaved anyone. It is the European and North 
American slave trade, not transatlantic stave trade), colonialism, apartheid, glo-
balisation, and now coloniality. This book was conceptualised against the back-
ground of the mutative nature of colonialism which today presents itself as 
coloniality which thrives on accumulation, misrepresentation, and misrecogni-
tion. The (formerly) colonised people were dispossessed of their land, capitals, 
and humanity. These were accumulated from those who consequently became 
non- human or the Athropos by the Humanitas.
Euro- North American modernity, the slave trade, and colonial economy 
and coloniality constantly accumulate from their victims, from labour in the 
form of the slave economy, to resources through colonialism and now data 
through what is termed coloniality of data. In the same ways in which coloni-
alism outlived decolonisation, coloniality is ahead of its victims in the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution where it is busy (c)overtly mining and harvesting data, 
in the process clamouring to appoint itself as the data custodian for Africa. This 
constitutes the (re)colonisation of Africa which is the main theme of this book.
In the same misrepresented ways in which colonialism was misrepresented as 
a civilising mission to the “dark continent”, coloniality of data is already being 
packaged and misrepresented as data for development (D4D), or as a possible 
panacea for Africa’s perennial problems of poverty, insecurity, lack of human 
rights, development, rule of law among others.
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1  Data coloniality
A decolonial perspective of Africa  
and the 4IR
Introduction
The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR)1 will not positively change the fate 
of Africa and Africans for various reasons outlined in this book. A key factor 
is that courtesy of the merging of nanotechnology, robotics, networked digital 
computation, biotechnology, and information and communications technology 
(ICT), new forms of humanity now exist, and these humanities occupy positions 
above the (formerly) colonised people on the ontological hierarchy. The 4IR 
must not be misconstrued as Africa’s moment to “develop”, that is, catch-up 
with the “developed” world. While post- anthropocentrism is fast emerging and 
consolidating, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that Africa will remain on 
the darker side of the 4IR, accruing the same net negative impact as was the 
case with the past three industrial revolutions. The key issue addressed in this 
book is how and why Africa and other parts of the (formerly) colonised world 
will accrue minimum benefits and suffer maximum consequences in the 4IR. 
That Africa developed the Global West is indisputable, the question is, why is 
Africa not developing itself?
The Global North owes its affluent standards of life largely to the slave 
trade, colonialism, and other iniquitous vices perpetrated upon Africa and other 
parts of the (formerly) colonised world. Africa, especially Africa south of the 
equator, underwrote the economies of what became the “developed” nations. 
“Developed” nations of Europe and North America have a huge incentive in 
keeping Africa in the same conditions of material and epistemological retard-
ation and impoverishment, lack of human rights and dignity; summed up as 
coloniality because if Africa does things differently, the whole global economy, 
especially that of Euro- North America will suffer drastically. Stated differently, 
the affluence of the Global North is funded by the poverty of the Global South. 
Global power institutions such as ideologies and all the “knowledge” that is 
taught in pre- schools, school, and universities are meant to keep Africa in the 
same conditions, so that those that are benefiting will continue to benefit.
One way that the world capitalist system has been maintained is by blaming 
Africans for their conditions. This tactic is efficacious in keeping Africans away 




2 Data coloniality: A decolonial perspective
them preoccupied with self- blame, self- hate, and intra- fighting. Africa today is 
impoverished, and lacks human rights, not because of the faults of Africans, but 
because of the effectiveness of four classes of European men who forerun colo-
nialism. European traders, hunters, missionaries, and explorers laid a solid foun-
dation for Euro- North American modernity, colonialism, and now coloniality. 
These traders, hunters, missionaries, and explorers who came to Africa and 
became part of the colonial project are still useful in maintaining the colonial 
asymmetrical relationship with Africa more than 50 years after the end of offi-
cial colonialism.
There is a matter of life and death incentive for Western Europe, North 
America, China, and other countries benefiting from and looting Africa to keep 
Africa in its present state of appearing to be benefiting from these countries 
through aid and foreign direct investment, yet the opposite is the true. Africa 
supplies the world with the bulk of its raw materials almost for free thereby 
funding the luxurious lives of those in the so- called developed countries. They 
are developed because they are pilfering Africa and affording those lives because 
of their ability to keep Africa as a source of their material needs. If Africa is to do 
something differently such as to unite and form one currency, one central bank, 
have a unified foreign policy, the result will be that the standards of living in the 
so- called developed countries will fall because the resources that underwrite their 
high standard of life will no longer be available at the same prices. This necessitates 
the subjugation of Africa which I argue in this book will continue into the 4IR.
The subjugation of Africa is maintained through various ways such as the pro-
duction and deployment of Western knowledges and ways of knowing in Africa. 
When Africa’s brightest intellectuals are given scholarships and fellowships to go 
and study in the Global North, the rationale will be for them to learn predom-
inantly Western ways of managing Africa and Africans so that Africa remains as a 
source of cheap raw materials, inter alia, for the Global North. Not only would 
Africa have been deprived of its brightest minds, but also these brightest minds 
will come back and act as native informants and informers, actively leading their 
own people astray and in the process keeping Africa subjugated and impoverished. 
Having been schooled in the Global North and on Western epistemologies, these 
African intellectuals will look at Africa from a Western perspective and will act as 
deployees of the Global North in the Global South. Together with other forms 
of Western “benevolences” such as aid, development, and foreign direct invest-
ment, the Global South is locked in a perpetual cycle of hope which emanated 
from one of the greatest myths in the history of politics, decolonisation. The 4IR 
is yet another point in the Global South’s cycle of hope of autonomy. The pair 
of decolonisation and development locked the Global South in perpetual hope, 
depositing their dark side there, while benefiting the Global North.
Decoloniality: Affirming a concept
The notion of coloniality denotes the continued asymmetrical power relations 
between the (former) colonisers and their (former) colonised. From its Latin 
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American origins, the term “coloniality” has found much favour and usage in 
Africa, especially among African scholars (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013a, 2013b, 2016; 
Mpofu, 2014, 2017a; Nimako, 2015b; Sithole, 2016b, 2016a; Tafira and Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni, 2017; Benyera, 2018d, 2020a; Benyera, Mtapuri, and Nhemachena, 
2018; Jazbhay, 2019). In this chapter, the notion of coloniality is deployed in the 
field of data, data harvesting, and broader datafication, to denote the continued 
asymmetrical and abusive extraction of Africa’s technology- based resources by 
predominantly Euro- North American multinational corporations and their 
networks. Other networks from Asia are also active and these include those 
from China and Japan, South Korea, and other Asian Tigers such as Samsung, 
Huawei, Baidu, Toyota, Sony, Panasonic, China Mobile, Tencent, Alibaba, and 
other tech companies.
Decoloniality denotes the continued asymmetrical power between the 
(former) colonisers and (former) colonised after the end of official colonialism. 
There are systems, norms, and structures that have maintained the colonial 
status quo and three of these were synthesised as power, knowledge, and being. 
Coined and developed by Anibal Quijano, coloniality of power denotes the 
structures of power, control, and hegemony which emerged from Euro- North 
American modernity to colonialism and started with the Spanish conquest 
of al Andalucía and the “discovery” of the Americans (Quijano 2000). These 
systems, mechanisms, institutions, and legacies of colonialism which remain 
highly efficacious against the former colonisers and in favour of the (former) 
colonised include debt servitude, misaligned economies, ungovernable colo-
nial states, and extroverted economies which are too integrated into those of 
the (former) colonisers. The (former) colonisers continue to reap the benefits 
of their “colonial investments” while the (former) colonised continue to suffer 
the consequences of being first enslaved and then colonised.
The impoverished state of Europeans before their conquest of the Americans 
and the Iberian peninsula, their colonisation of Africa, Latin America, and Asia 
was well captured by Simon Martinot who wrote,
In the time prior to the conquest, Europe was a poor, rural peninsula on 
the western edge of Asia, with little of value to offer the world economy. 
At the centre of the world economy, between India and Baghdad, Europeans 
found themselves hopelessly outcompeted, or ignored. The only means 
they were able to imagine to gain access to this world economy was con-
quest: the crusades of the middle ages, the 15th century slave trade from 
west Africa, the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain, and the con-
quest of the Americas in the 16th. The project to enslave the American 
peoples enters the thinking of Columbus on his first voyage among the 
islands of the Caribbean.
(Martinot, 2016, p. 2)
Euro- North American modernity is anchored in the year 1614 when 
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world to European epistemicides, genocides, enslavement and colonialism. 
An important year in the development of coloniality is the year 1700 which 
marked the consolidation of the Atlantic economy, the intensification, com-
mercialisation, and commodification of slaves, especially in the English colonies 
of North America and Africa (Martinot 2016, p. 2). During the year 1700 the 
Dutch and English also took full control of the shipping trade routes to the east. 
The year 1700 is a cardinal moment in Africa’s history because it impoverished 
Africa through the enslaving of its most economically productive and repro-
ductive citizens, in the process created unprecedented wealth for Euro-North 
America. This period also marked the final seizure and transformation of land 
in Africa, the Americas and India from being communal assets into European 
private property with a market value. It must also be noted that by 1900 the 
indigenous populations of the colonised places of Mexico and Peru and the 
Caribbean and other parts of Latin America were decimated and replaced by 
African slaves. These events marked the shifting of the global power from the 
Orient and towards Europe, thereby inaugurating Europe as the centre of the 
world and the rest as the periphery. This was achieved through sheer power, 
brutality, genocide, plunder, and barbaric warfare.
Coloniality of power is efficacious in understanding how colonialism was 
inscribed into the body and mind of the (formerly) colonised. A key aspect of 
coloniality of power is the use of a hegemony to establish and maintain colonial 
relations. Colonial inventions such as ethnicity, national identity, the state and 
concomitant hierarchical sub- colonies such as sexism, racism are all constituted 
by and constitutive of coloniality in general and specifically coloniality of 
power, where every aspect of life is hierarchised, racialised and follows the pre-
script of Euro- North American morality and normative order. Coloniality of 
power explains the seemingly puzzling phenomenon of (former) colonisers’ 
self- appointed entitlement to African natural resources, bodies, and public assets.
Geographically, the notorious region which the empire predominantly occu-
pies is known as Euro- North America and is relatively small. It comprises not 
all of the Americas and not all of Europe. The empire sits in the United States 
of America, Canada, and Europe excluding Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. 
This region is the primary focus of this book as this region tries to recolonise 
Africa as a survival tactic for the many challenges it is facing at home. These 
manifold challenges include the American sub- prime lending rate (Moyo, 2009; 
Russell Sage Foundation and Jung, 2016), other various economic crises (Bond, 
Chitonge and Hopfmann, 2006; Sutcliffe et al., 2010; Bond, 2011; Xaba, 2011; 
Chatterjee Partha, 2012), and the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic (Filatov 
et al., 2020; Peeri et al., 2020; Sahin et al., 2020; Tanne et al., 2020; Millán- Oñate 
et al., 2021); Euro- North America is obviously turning to its trusted strategy, 
which is to (re)colonise Africa.
According to Martinot, the coloniality of power operates through a matrix 
of control which operates through the control of hegemony, authority, labour, 
sexuality, subjective, and most importantly African resources which include but 
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Multinational corporations, also referred to as transnational corporations, 
operate in many countries, but have one predominant centre of power, that is, 
the Global North.
But the curious thing about these, so- called, “multinational corporations” 
is the fact that almost all of them are controlled by the capitalist- imperialists 
of one or another single country. Thus, we have American MNCs, such as 
IBM, Microsoft or GM; Japanese MNCs such as Toyota and Sony; British 
MNCs such as BP; and so forth. All multinational corporations are multi-
national in their sphere of operation, but very few are “multinational” with 
respect to the bourgeoisie that controls them. This is a very important dis-
tinction to keep in mind.
(Baran, 2007, p. 5)
The multi in multinational corporations denotes their operations and not 
beneficiaries. MNCs have evolved to become very important tools of both 
diplomacy and foreign policies of their home countries. The French petroleum 
MNC Total was at the forefront of supporting the “democratisation” of Libya, 
with the resultant assassination of its sitting President Colonel Gadhafi, and 
rendering of the once thriving country into a failed state. MNCs work in 
tandem with their home countries from where they get political support and 
protection as well as financial support when needed. Data is no longer just a 
tool of informed policy decisions, but the latest weapon of mass destruction – 
a smart weapon to maintain the asymmetrical power relations between the 
Global North and the Global South.
Coloniality of data
Coloniality of data refers to the asymmetrical power relations resultant from the 
(ab)use of data generated from the various online platforms. In the coloniality 
of data, data is weaponised and used to initiate, maintain, routinise, and nor-
malise asymmetrical power relations between the (former) colonisers and their 
agents and the (former) colonised. As a nefarious (mal)practice, it involves the 
broader data economy’s constituent sectors such as, but not limited to, data 
mining (Nhemachena, Mlambo and Kaundjua, 2016; Staunton and Moodley, 
2016), data farming (Horne and Meyer, 2005, 2010; Wolfert et al., 2017), data 
harvesting (Richmond, Kappler and Björkdahl, 2015; Nhemachena, Mlambo 
and Kaundjua, 2016; Thatcher, O’Sullivan and Mahmoudi, 2016), data colo-
nialism (Thatcher, O’Sullivan and Mahmoudi, 2016; Couldry and U. Mejias, 
2019; Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias, 2019; Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019; 
Halkort, 2019; Hicks, 2019; Couldry and Mejias, 2020; Mejias and Couldry, 
2020; van der Spuy, 2020), and data/ digital slavery (Chisnall, 2020).
Data coloniality is the control over the flow of information and how it is 
transmitted. It is concerned with the acquisition of data, just like colonialism 
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territory and resources from which economic value is then extracted. The 
extraction, processing, and redeployment of data ensures the asymmetrical 
power relations and injustices which started with the slave trade and continued 
through colonialism and are now being reproduced under coloniality. Like all 
forms of Euro-North American modernity, data coloniality represents the dark 
side of the data revolution. It denotes the transformation of data into capital 
and its resultant use in controlling, influencing, and undermining autonomous 
decisions by individuals, states, corporations, and other entities that (forcibly) 
rely on data to make everyday decisions, execute and evaluate them.
Prima facie, there is a transfer of business from Africa to the Global North 
courtesy of the 4IR. Local media is facing dwindling readers, viewers, 
subscribers, advertisers as these are migrating to western multinational tech 
giants such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WeChat, Instagram, and so on. The 
same is happening in the taxi transport with e- hailing services such as Uber 
and Bolt crowding out local taxi operators. Amazon is doing the same through 
its online shopping experience, though it is facing competition from African 
online retailers, notably from Takealot. Local industries will be decimated by 
western multinational corporations as they cannot compete with these well- 
established, well- funded, and well- protected Western firms.
The movement of business, revenues, and taxes from Africa to the Global 
North represents the bigging of the consolidation of coloniality. The data- 
coloniality nexus exists by virtue of African countries becoming increasingly 
digital, in the process rendering data as a source of economic power and gov-
ernance (Mann, 2018, p. 3). Western economies are being superimposed on 
Africa through the use of technology. The models and ideas of a future digital 
economy are being framed from the Global North and projected into Africa 
with little or no African meaningful input. The same way in which a handful of 
European men: the hunters, missionaries, traders, and explorers came to Africa 
in small numbers and slowly increased their stronghold on Africa’s land and 
other resources is the same way in which a handful of Western multinational 
corporations are slowly increasing their grip on Africa’s digital economy.
Africa’s digital economy does not belong to Africa anymore. It can be argued 
that it never belonged to Africa. The world is increasingly being run by tech 
companies with the biggest five exerting the most influence and projecting 
the most power. These top five global companies are all involved in the digital 
ecosystem and are referred to as Gafam (Google/ Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, 
Amazon, and Microsoft). Together, they constitute the new technological oli-
garchy that controls the bulk of global critical functions. Gafam is now the 
de- facto global government. A single platform like WhatsApp has over 2 billion 
subscribers in over 180 countries. With a global population of 7.8 billion, Mark 
Zuckerberg has access to the data of one quarter of the global population from 
just one of his many social media platforms. This makes him not only rich but 
most importantly powerful as he can anticipate, engage, pre- empt, and influ-
ence the lives of 25% of the world’s population just from WhatsApp alone. No 
government or any multilateral institution has this amount of power.
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Courtesy of the 4IR, the global economy is concentrated in the hands of a 
few individuals and their companies, yet the functions they play are central to 
humanity, and the influence they exert is impactful to global governance. The 
increase in the power of the world’s richest 1% of the population is attested 
to by the growth in the personal wealth of these super- rich people such as 
Amazon’s Jeff Bezos whose net worth increased from US$6.8 billion in 2009 
to US$184 billion in 2020. Similarly, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg’s net worth 
increased from US$2 billion to US$103 billion in the same period. Jeff Bezos’ 
wealth increased by 2606% in 11 years. For Mark Zuckerberg, his net worth 
grew by 5050% in the same 11 years. In contrast, the average global minimum 
wage remained at US$7.25 for the same period. The conclusion is that the 4IR 
is working for the world’s 1% and not the majority whose bulk is in Africa. This 
view is affirmed by Kwet who noted that,
Gafam and a few other Big Tech corporations now control most of 
the critical functions that can be performed in the digital world: social 
networking (Facebook, Twitter), smartphone messaging (Facebook, which 
owns WhatsApp), internet search (Google), desktop and laptop operating 
systems (Microsoft Windows), smartphone and tablet operating systems 
(Google, Apple), online advertising (Google, Facebook), Cloud com-
puting (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM), transportation (Uber, Lyft and, 
in South Africa, Taxify), lodging (Airbnb) and streaming video (Google, 
YouTube, Netflix, Hulu).
(Kwet, 2018)
None of the above companies are from Africa, yet they operate in Africa where 
they extract huge profits. The 4IR has thus, in both principle and practice, (un)
intentionally facilitated the undermining of democracy and human rights by 
concentrating power in the hands of a few capitalists. Data coloniality is being 
misrepresented in various ways, the major one being data for development.
Decolonisation as a myth and the elusiveness of  
epistemic freedom
Decolonisation as a myth’s genealogy is traceable to the 28th US President, 
Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine espoused in the Fourteen Points plan 
tabled before the Congress on 8 January 1918, and subsequently codified 
in the United Nations Charter 27 years later. Decolonisation is another phase 
in the continuum colonial project wherein the colonisers outsourced the (mis)
administration of their colonies to local elites, most of whom masqueraded as 
nationalists. This partly explains why France willingly initiated the decolonisa-
tion processes for some of its colonies; in some cases even forcing its colonies 
to be independent. Not surprisingly, 14 (former) French colonisers pay a colo-
nial tax to France for the loss of its colonial investments into these colonies. 
According to Koutonin, the (former) colonies signed to several obligations as 
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part of the independence deal. These included (1) surrendering all national 
reserves to France, (2) France awarded itself the right of first refusal to any raw 
materials or any other resources to be discovered in these countries, (3) the 
prioritisation of French companies and French national interests in all public 
procurement and bidding, (4) the exclusive right to supply military equipment 
and train the country military officers, (5) the right to pre- deploy French 
troops and subsequently to intervene in these (former) colonies to protect 
French national interests, (6) an obligation to make French the official language 
to be used especially in commerce and education, (7) the obligation to use the 
French currency, the French CFA, (8) the responsibility to report to France the 
(former) colonies’ annual balances and reserves as a precondition for accessing 
their money “safeguarded” by France, (9) an undertaking never to enter into any 
military alliances without France’s approval, (10) an obligation to be France’s 
ally in case France is to fight any war (Kotounin, 2014).
The above relationship between France and its (former) colonies epitomises 
coloniality at its best. France is obsessed with looting its (former) colonies 
because without the looting, France as we know it will collapse. To survive, 
France needs its (former) colonies’ money, military support, markets, raw 
materials, gold reserves, and labour. Because of its poverty, the Global North 
must ceaselessly loot the Global South, a condition and practice which will be 
entrenched in the 4IR.
Decolonisation and development are products of the United Nations Charter 
and are understandably inflicted by the same problems and vices committed by 
those who championed the formation of the United Nations and the subse-
quent penning of its Charter. With capitalism and liberalism as the mantra of 
the post- World War II dispensation, there was never going to be room for an 
autonomous and self- reliant Africa.
As products of western liberal thought, decolonisation and development are 
products of Western liberal thought and initiatives and there is little to no pos-
sibility that the African elites could seize these two concepts and use them for 
the benefit of their people. By buying into the narratives of decolonisation and 
development, the African elites bought into the myth of these two Western- 
centric liberal principles that were meant to perpetuate Africa’s marginality and 
subjugation. With decolonisation and development, Africa remained a perennial 
cash- cow for sustaining the affluence of the Global North. That development 
as a paradigm was somehow going to transmogrify Africa and was one of the 
greatest acts of marketing in world history. In development and decolonisa-
tion, Africa was sold as the proverbial dummy and this is evident in the even 
more asymmetrical relations between the (former) colonisers and the (former) 
colonised.
Once sold the double myth of decolonisation and development, Africans 
relaxed thinking that they had gotten independence and self- determination 
and that their (former) colonisers had suddenly met their Damascus moment, 
hence they were willing to assist Africa with development aid to Africa. On 
the contrary, the (former) colonisers were busy Nicodemusly increasing their 
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stranglehold on Africa through what is termed coloniality. Most African coun-
tries still celebrate non- existent independence and freedom. This attests to the 
strengths and efficacy of the twin myths of decolonisation and development.
As rightly argued by Achille Mbembe, colonialism and by extension devel-
opment are not unidirectional phenomena, but they are binary in that they 
produce the colonised and the colonisers (Mbembe, 2021), beneficiaries and 
losers, subjects and citizens, Anthropos and Humanitas, and so on. As for devel-
opment, Walter Rodney argued eloquently that the development of the Global 
North was at the direct expense and underdevelopment of the Global South 
(Rodney, 1973). This thesis was further developed and updated by Nkwazi 
Nkuzi Mhango (Mhango, 2018). The affluence of the Global North is at the 
expense of the impoverishment of the Global South. The same argument can 
be made at the subset level such as the Francophone and the Anglophone 
relationships with their (former) colonies. This is why Franz Fanon argued that 
decolonisation was, in reality, the provincialisation of Europe, which in itself is a 
form of coloniality. This form of coloniality will be more profound in the 4IR 
as multinational corporations from the Global North reap the benefits of both 
the slave trade and colonialism by acting as the self- appointed data custodians 
of Africa. Big data’s malleability and ductility into economic and political power 
will result in Africa losing its sovereignty to multinational corporations and not 
multilateral organisations.
As a provincialised product of colonialism and decolonisation, the 4IR 
presents and organises another scramble for Africa, this time for its data. There is 
very little possibility that Africans who failed to protect themselves from being 
enslaved and colonised will be able to protect their data.
The 4IR renders Africa terra nullius, terra inhabitabilis, and tabula rasa whose 
data sovereignty is up for grabs by those with the most military, economic, 
and technological power. Without a sizable uncolluding African bourgeoisie, 
Africa’s data will suffer the same fate being suffered by Africa’s mineral wealth, 
human resources, humanity, inter alia, which is looting, misappropriation, mis-
representation, and misrecognition.
Coloniality has been sustained through the deployment of various myths 
such as but not limited to development, the invisible hand of the market, 
market forces, state sovereignty, universal human rights, and so on. There is 
nothing called development, the market is not impartial, the invisible hand is 
very visible. The invisible hand is the power of the elites who determine global 
affairs. By presenting themselves as the “market”, or the “invisible hand”, these 
elites are hiding behind institutions to pursue and preserve their hegemony. 
Development is akin to a soccer match without goal posts. Africa plays per-
petual catch-up with those that are looting Africa.
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni rightly pointed to epistemic freedom as the right 
type of freedom for Africa to seek first ahead of all others such as but not limited 
to political and economic freedoms (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2018, p. 1). The idea of 
sequencing freedoms such as that political freedom is acquired first, followed 
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autonomy to Africa such that hence the conviction that epistemic freedom must 
be sought urgently and immediately if Africa is to mitigate the negative impact 
of the 4IR. For Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Epistemic Freedom in Africa is about the 
struggle for African people to think, theorize, interpret the world and write from 
where they are located, unencumbered by Eurocentrism’, Ndlovu-Gathseni 
2018, p. 1). Epistemic freedom will help Africans reverse some of the effects 
of Euro- North American modernity, slave trade, and colonialism. Africans have 
been conditioned to think from a Euro- North American perspective when 
trying to solve African problems. The result has been the many failures at rem-
edying the African problem. Instead of aiding in solving the African problem, 
the Euro- North American mindset in the African only serves to exacerbate the 
problems while the problems multiply. Jack Goody locates the genesis of this 
problem in what he termed the theft of African history (Goody, 2009).
The epistemic freedom being advocated was defined by Ndlovu- Gatsheni as 
cognitive justice. This type of justice will allow African knowledge systems to 
be reactivated. He argues,
Thus, epistemic freedom speaks to cognitive justice. Epistemic freedom 
is fundamentally about the right to think, theorize, interpret the world, 
develop own methodologies and write from where one is located and 
unencumbered by Eurocentrism. …. Epistemic justice is about liberation 
of reason itself from coloniality.
(Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2018, p. 3)
With epistemic freedom, Africans can better unpack, analyse, and solve most of 
their problems and annul dead aid, and development aid, and the in vogue data 
for development which is a new form of coloniality.
The myth of D4D: Data for Development as coloniality 
of data
As the 4IR consolidates, data has been paraded as a new hope for Africa’s devel-
opment (Kshetri, 2014). On the contrary, and in the words of Mark Nelson, 
the Director of Stanford’s Peace Innovation Laboratory, data has the potential 
greater than a nuclear bomb. He asserts that,
If you can measure something, you can design for it; if you can design 
for it, you can create new value; if you can create new value, you can mon-
etize it. Our aim is to create peace businesses.
(Mann, 2018, p. 11)
The above portrayal points to the efficacy of big data not only in altering 
people’s lives negatively, but also in its ability to determine and influence 
people’s thought processes, decisions, diets, governments, and many other 
aspects of life. People’s data is mined, and harvested through manufactured 
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and experimental design, and analysis, the results are used to inform and 
influence the decisions of individuals, organisations, and countries. In short, 
humanity is losing its agency to the emergent tech oligarchy. These processes 
are being misrepresented as, inter alia, data for development. Argued to be smart 
farming, data farming has resulted in tech multinational corporations engaging 
in a dog fight to become data custodians of Africa’s emerging economies.
To fully comprehend the notion of D4D, it is imperative to define data. The 
notion of data has undergone many conceptual transformations from its innocent 
characterisation as an amalgamation of analyses, statistics, and facts to its current 
status as the new oil and a public good. According to Mann, data has two main 
characteristics: (1) it is an abstract concept, (2) it is a public good, a resource which 
can be mined, farmed, locked and unlocked, harnessed, tapped, and trapped. 
Coloniality of data refers to the asymmetrical power relations resultant from the 
(ab)use of data generated from the various online platforms. In the coloniality of 
data, data is weaponised and used to initiate, maintain, routinise, and normalise 
asymmetrical power relations between the (former) colonisers and their agents 
and the (former) colonised. As a nefarious (mal)practice, it involves the broader 
data economy’s constituent sectors such as but not limited to data mining, data 
farming, data harvesting, and data colonialism. According to Mann data is:
… an abstract concept, … a “public good” and as a “re- source” that just needs 
to be “unlocked”, “harnessed” and “tapped”, rather than as discrete sources of 
information circulating within specific contexts and bureaucratic systems.
(Mann, 2018, p. 9)
The questions which arise from the above definition are numerous and they 
include the following: (1) If data is a public good, who is the public? (2) If data 
is a resource, who owns it, is it the one generating it or the one harvesting and 
storing it? (3) If data must be unlocked, who locked it, and what will happen to 
the unlocked data? (4) If data is trapped, who trapped it and why?
When unlocked, data from Africa is politicised and deployed in Africa as 
a form of power. Data as power emanates from its ability to be trusted as an 
impartial source of policy direction, and many other otherwise complex and 
important decisions. The “benevolence” of the West in assisting Africa is aided 
by the misrepresentation of the West’s colonial agenda as development partners, 
foreign direct investors, exchange scholars, peace corps volunteers, and many 
other “aid” and development partners. In a typical coloniality fashion, “ …, data 
must therefore be ‘unlocked’ from organizations based in Africa and provided 
to experts based in advanced economies” (Mann, 2018, p. 9).
The notion of data for development (D4D) is a nascent one which by def-
inition is the political economy angle of the data economy. The main thrust 
of data for development is how Western aid organisations that work in Africa 
are involved in the extraction of data from Africa which is then exported to 
the Global North for analysis, politicisation, and redeployment back to Africa 
as part of the devolvement tool kit. The justification for D4D is that the 4IR 
must result in more evidence- based, targeted interventions which will enhance 
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the pace, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of development, justice, 
and human rights in Africa (Mann, 2018). In a way, D4D advocates for the 
centralisation and globalisation of data. Africans’ personal information which 
would have been (c)overtly harvested will be used for various purposes such 
as pharmaceutical research and development, surveillance, targeting vulner-
able population groups, intentional discrimination by companies and govern-
ment agencies, targeted political manipulation through fake news, and other 
social media platforms (Joanna Redden, 2017). D4D can be used to manipu-
late public opinions and sentiments within and across countries. The work of 
Cambridge Analytica and other lobby consultancy firms working in the spheres 
of political outcomes determination and manipulation are cases in point. The 
work of Montreal- based political and lobbyist consultancy firm Dickens and 
Madison in manipulating political events in Zimbabwe by generating a false 
video of the late opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai in conversation with 
Ari Ben- Menashe is an example of the manipulation of political outcomes, 
events, sentiments, and opinions in Africa through the (ab)use of data (Taylor 
and Meldrum, 2002; Chikukwa, 2004, p. 67; Coltart, 2016, p. 235; Tendi, 2016, 
p. 219).
D4D will give rise to a new oligarchy which is not a political oligarchy but 
a data oligarchy. Multinational corporations are no longer interested in Africa’s 
water, but in Africa’s data. By becoming Africa’s data custodians, they invari-
ably control Africa because in the 4IR, who controls the data will also control 
the economy. The question to be asked is if data is owned by Africans and is 
efficacious for Africa’s and Africans’ benefit and development, why are multi-
national corporations so invested in becoming the data custodians for Africa? 
The answer lies in what Hardt and Negri argued is the forced shifting of sov-
ereignty away from the individual and the nation- state and towards the multi-
national corporations and these emerging technology oligarchies (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000). The bottom line is that as the global economy is increasingly 
becoming digitalised, African economies are also not being left behind; this 
makes data a source of economic power which is malleable and ductile into 
other forms of power.
At another level and given that the notion of development is a myth, as 
the so- called underdeveloped countries will always play perpetual catch- up to 
the so- called developed economies, the notion of D4D does not therefore arise. 
In the 4IR, for Africa, “development” will not get closer but even further for 
the reasons outlined and argued in this book.
“Development” is a form of coloniality meant to capture and channel the 
“underdeveloped” countries into perpetual subjugation, marginalisation, and 
being dictated upon by those who consider themselves to be “developed”. 
The “developed” countries do not want the “underdeveloped” countries to be 
“developed” like them because those that are “developed” were ‘developed’ at 
the expense of those that are “underdeveloped”. “Underdevelopment” is a con-
struction by the “developed”. Otherwise, how do you enslave, colonise, perpet-
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atrocities how to “develop” when you “developed” because of enslavement, 
colonialism, plunder, and other imperial vices? D4D is, therefore, part of the 
coloniality of data and Africa will be captured more using big data and other 
related technologies and applications that constitute the practice of D4D. While 
there will be some positives that will accrue from D4D, the cost benefit analysis 
suggests that Africa will emerge as net loser courtesy of D4D.
The 4IR and the resilience of colonialism
So what is the 4IR? The 4IR is the technologically aided coming together of 
many aspects of life, and in the process blurring the lines between humans and 
machines, the physical and the biological (Schwab, 2016; Nhemachena, 2019). 
Essentially, the 4IR is the amalgamation of many technologies such as, but not 
limited to, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and information, technology and 
communication (ICT), in the process blurring not only the traditional distinc-
tion between these technologies but also the resultant technological products.
A characteristic of the 4IR is the notion of the internet of things (IoT). The 
internet of things has broadened and blurred the boundaries between the bio-
logical, the spiritual, the electronic, and the human. In the broadest sense, the 
term IoT encompasses everything connected and connectable to the internet. 
The IoT also describes the ability of objects to communicate with each other. 
It is the sum of devices connected together. For Nhemachena, there is a direct 
link between the 4IR and colonialism wherein the IoT is a sign of the resili-
ence of colonialism, that is, a form of coloniality. For him, colonialism was 
about the establishment of what he termed networks of coloniality to which 
the IoT belongs. He argues,
The resilience of networks is evident in the Internet of Things – an emer-
gent idea that defines ways in which things, including human beings, are 
technologically connected in a world that is increasingly possessed of 
sensors, sapience and sentience ... the Internet of Things which supports 
connections not only between human beings but also between human 
being and research objects that are increasingly becoming sentient and 
sapient.
(Nhemachena, 2018, p. 2)
Euro- North American modernity inaugurated networks, which commenced 
with the visit to Africa by missionaries, hunters, traders, and explorers, and are 
the ones which mutated into networks of coloniality that are developing, con-
trolling, and owning the IoT. In the radar of these networks has been the body 
of the African and the Africans’ resources. The African is a raw material to be 
shipped as a slave, to be traded as a commodity, to be used in the plantations like 
the tractors, and now to be mined for data like the coltan and diamonds in the 
minefields of Walikale and Kimberly. The IoT is, therefore, the technological 
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Klaus describes 4IR technologies as having the potential to propel digit-
ally ready countries into an age of unprecedented economic prosperity, as the 
“fusion of technologies … blurs the lines between the physical, digital and 
biological spheres” (Schwab, 2018, p. 1). The key is that in order for a country 
to benefit from the 4IR, it must be digitally ready. What does it mean to be 
digitally ready? It means that the country must have adequate and sufficiently 
functional ICT infrastructure, especially internet connectivity. Functional, reli-
able, and affordable internet connectivity is a prerequisite for benefiting from 
the 4IR. In other words, it is a necessary and enabling pre- existing condition 
for a country to benefit from the 4IR. Countries such as South Africa, with a 
sufficient ICT infrastructure are regressing as inputs such as electricity are now 
in erratic supply. Hence, if a country lacks just one of the ICT infrastructure 
such as reliable and stable electricity supply as in the case of South Africa, bene-
fiting from the 4IR becomes hugely compromised as investments in alternative 
sources and forms of power will need to be availed first.
Organisation of the book
The book comprises eight chapters whose outline is as follows: Chapter 1: Data 
coloniality: A decolonial perspective of Africa and the 4IR. In this chapter, I develop 
the coloniality of data as an analytical framework. I build on the work of 
Monika Halkort, Nick Couldry, and Ulises Ali Mejias, to develop the notion 
of coloniality of data (Couldry and U. Mejias, 2019; Couldry and Ulises 
A. Mejias, 2019; Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019; Halkort, 2019; Mejias, 
2019; Couldry and Mejias, 2020; Mejias and Couldry, 2020). The notion of 
coloniality of data is later deployed in the book as the analytical framework 
together with the broader notions of decoloniality, coloniality of power, know-
ledge, power and being.
Chapter 2: Historicising Africa’s subjugation. In Chapter 2, I trace the history of 
Africa’s subjugation. I historicise and contextualise the colonial project in Africa 
by exploring Africa’s problematic relationship with what is termed Euro- North 
America plus China. I also outline the reasons why Africa was colonised in the 
first place, arguing that the first industrial revolution which propelled mainland 
Europe to massive production levels also propelled steam engines that came 
to transport African slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. The positives accrued in 
Euro-North America from the first, second, and third industrial revolutions 
also led to negatives being accrued in Africa. Euro- North American modernity 
deposited its ugly side and toxic by- products in Africa. These negatives are 
summed up as slavery, colonialism, and coloniality.
Chapter 3 isi titled Contextualising the colonial project in Africa. Here I offer 
more background to how Africa became vulnerable to plunder, enslavement, 
and pilferage. This part of the arguement contextualises the colonial project in 
Africa by noting the role played by mainly European hunters, traders, explorers, 
and missionaries not only in aiding and abetting the slave trade and the colon-
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I argue that these four classes of predominantly white European men were the 
forerunners of Euro- North American modernity and were efficacious in cre-
ating captive, ready- made victims for the colonial project. They partnered local 
“bad men” in creating the matrix (culturally, religiously, socially, economically, 
and politically) where slavery, colonialism, and coloniality would thrive.
Chapter 4: Data mining, harvesting, and datafication. I deploy the coloniality of 
data to analyse how Africans are dispossessed of their social resources through 
data mining and harvesting. Building on the notion of the coloniality of data, the 
chapter demonstrates how big data generated by citizens during their everyday 
social interactions is processed, priced and traded, and then weaponised for 
(re)colonisation. The commodification of data leads to its mining from unsus-
pecting, unwilling, and never consenting Africans. This data is then used for 
many purposes such as the development of electronic human doubles. Without 
ICT infrastructure of its own, and generating massive amounts of big data, 
and being the weakest member of the international community, this chapter 
argues that Africa is ripe for coloniality of data which will enhance the (re)
colonisability of Africa. Coloniality of data is not an end in itself but a means 
towards an end the (re)colonisation of Africa and Africans.
Chapter 5: Networks, big data, and data coloniality: Whither Africa’s sovereignty? 
I predict Africa’s fate in the hands of coloniality, predicting the consolida-
tion of coloniality. I argue in this chapter how networks that started during 
Euro- North America’s modernity operated nefariously in Africa. Missionaries, 
hunters, traders, and miners mutated into today’s cartels and “networks of 
coloniality”. They are conceptually linked to big data, data colonialism, and 
how this will lead to the (re)colonisation of Africa. The thesis by Hardt and 
Negri (Hardt and Negri, 2000) that the empire rescaled and redirected sover-
eignty away from the state and individual human beings towards globalisation, 
multinational corporations, and multilateral organisations is used as a tool of 
analysis in this chapter. In a way, the chapter traces the genealogy of Africa’s 
colonialism and how this comes back full circle to a colonisable, a sovereignty- 
less Africa.
Chapter 6: The 4IR as the mother of all destructions and accumulations. I proffer 
that the 4IR is responsible for the consolidation of coloniality in Africa. I char-
acterise the 4IR as the mother of all destructions and accumulations. by arguing 
that industrial revolutions underline capitalism in the form of accumulation, mis-
recognition, misrepresentation, appropriation, and decentring for others while 
centring Euro- North America. The chapter traces the various destructions (of 
knowledges, power, and beings) and the concomitant accumulation over the 
past three industrial revolutions and maps a trajectory of how the 4IR will not 
bring reprieve for Africa and Africans.
Chapter 7: Mapping Africa’s destiny in the 4IR. I formulate and map out 
Africa’s trajectory and destiny in the 4IR. Having historicised the negatives 
that Africa experienced in the past three industrial revolutions, this chapter 
maps Africa’s destiny in the 4IR which is given as that of (re)colonisation. The 
chapter positions how and why Africa will be (re)colonised.
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Chapter 8: Africa’s eunuch condition and the omnipresent footprints of the 4IR. 
I build on the argument presented in Chapter 7 that Africa will be (re)colonised 
by proposing that Africa was rendered a permanently marginalised continent 
because if Africa is to do things differently, the Global North will lose its lux-
urious, first- world status which it enjoys courtesy of pillaging Africa. Africa 
underwrites the economies of the Global North and the Global North must 
keep it that way as any change in favour of Africa will seriously alter the lives 
of those in the Global North. A eunuch state owns and looks after what it 
cannot consume. The chapter traces the reasons which made the state in Africa 
a eunuch, powerless and absolute. These factors are traced to the earlier indus-
trial revolutions. With the first industrial revolution, Africa lost its human capital 
through slavery. With the second industrial revolution Africa lost its sovereignty 
and natural resources through colonialism. With the third industrial revolution, 
Africa lost whatever was resilient to coloniality as “corporations started ruling 
the world”. Through coloniality of data, Africa will lose its political sovereignty 
which it had painfully gained after the various decolonisation processes. The 
last part of this chapter is a call to all concerned to start mapping how Africa 
can repel these negative consequences of the 4IR. Because this book is pre-
dominantly an exploration and a trajectory mapping intellectual exercise, the 
final chapter hopes to arouse African scholars and their friends into beginning 
to think how Africa can turn the 4IR from being a curse into being a resource.
Note
 1 On numerous occasions, I asked myself whether the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
is actually an industrial revolution. The more I looked at this issue, the more I was 
convinced that the Fourth Industrial Revolution is a misnomer as the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is not an industrial revolution in the strictest sense but one that 
is very close to a technological or a services revolution. I continue to use the term 
Fourth Industrial Revolution for two reasons: (1) the term is the generally accepted 
way of identifying the phenomenon under discussion and (2) the technology and 
services sector can be classified as an industry thereby qualifying the 4IR as a revolu-




2  Historicising Africa’s subjugation
Introduction
The story of Africa’s problems, challenges, and opportunities – past, present 
and future – has been largely told from a perspective which blames Africa and 
Africans for their circumstances. In this process Africa is variously labelled as a 
place of perennial lacks, lacking, inter alia, development, history, human rights, 
manners, laws, democracy, and even the will to succeed (Grosfoguel, 2007a). Yet 
Africa is a product of millennia of external plunder, subjugation, pillage, and 
strategic and sustained colonialism whose latest stage I refer to as (re)colonisa-
tion in this book. (Re)colonisation of Africa is the consolidation, routinising, 
and maintenance of Africa’s inferior position in the world. Africa is subjugated 
because it has to remain as a cheap source of materials (black bodies and raw 
materials) needed for the developed world to afford and sustain their luxurious 
lifestyles.
But the story of the four industrial revolutions, slave trade, colonialism, and 
the effect they had on humanity will always be told from different perspectives 
depending on the teller’s lived experiences and motives. This book expresses 
African perspectives and from those who experienced the dark side of Euro-
North American modernity, that is, slave trade, colonialism, and the past 
three industrial revolutions in Africa. Global imperial designs are exposed 
and explored as the reason and drivers of Africa’s (re)colonisation. Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world systems analysis is efficacious in deploying the globe as the 
unit of analysis in understanding what sustains global power structures which 
in turn perpetuates Africa’s marginality (Wallerstein, 1974, 2007). Global power 
structures, institutions, norms, and practices do not only sustain the Global 
North’s superiority but they also routinise, normalise, and maintain Africa’s 
inferior position in the capitalist global political economy.
Enslavement, slave trade, colonialism, the operations of extractive indus-
tries in Africa, and the data economy are very complex and multifaceted phe-
nomenon. Coloniality, coloniality of data, the 4IR, and the reality of the (re)
colonisation of Africa are equally contested and multifaceted. I am aware of 
the existence of many alternative, competing, and at times opposing narratives 
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I do not expect those in London, Paris, New York, and Brussels to have the 
same views on colonialism as those in Juba, Nairobi, Lusaka, Lilongwe, or 
Nyasaka, Dambamazura, Gandavaroyi in Gokwe. When the colonisers left the 
United Kingdom destined for Africa as an example, what their families in the 
United Kingdom saw departing were brave men and women going to civ-
ilise a “dark continent”, making a huge sacrifice in the service of humanity. 
What our forefathers and parents received was not a civilising mission but the 
complete opposite. They received colonialism, brutalisation, humiliation, sub-
jugation, commodification, and utter thingification, that is, the darker side of 
Euro-North American modernity. The views expressed in these pages are what 
we experienced and continue to experience in Africa. These views on the 
industrial revolutions and their impact on Africa and Africans are not the only 
narrative, I am simply stating one of the many views on the impact of the past 
industrial revolutions and the potential impact of the fourth industrial revolu-
tion (4IR) on Africa, from Africa. In essence, this book produces a decolonial 
epistemic perspective on the potential impact of the 4IR on Africa.
In this book, I extensively deploy the notion of slaves and slavery. The prac-
tice of slavery goes against every aspect of human rights and justice. Human 
rights are taken as being born, living, and dying in dignity (Shivji, 2019, p. 7). 
In simple terms, and from an African perspective, human rights is living a life 
devoid of humiliation.
Since the term slave and its derivatives are used quite extensively in the book, 
framing the institution of slavehood is proper in laying the foundation for my 
arguments. A slave is a person who lives a life of humiliation, a life characterised 
by an alienation from the self, usually enforced by violence. Besides being 
alienated from oneself, a slave is usually owned by another, wholly or partly, as 
a property of the powerful other. In a way, the slave owner will be in possession 
of double persons, the enslaving self and the enslaved other. On the other 
hand, the enslaved other will have lost their humanity to the enslaving other. 
Enslaved persons are thingified. To thingify is to remove the humanity from a 
person by rendering them through violence the property of the powerful other. 
Enslavement is a product of power relations and exists today in various forms 
and geographies.
A slave is owned by the powerful other because they would have lost their 
agency, that is, the capacity to determine their own will and make free choice. 
Slaves do not govern or run their own lives. A slave does not have the agency 
to determine what happens in their lives. The loss of agency is very central to 
the practice of slavery and to the notion of data slavery, the subject of this book. 
There are modern digital practices that are occurring as a result of the 4IR that 
are resulting in data slavery. At the centre of the practice of slavery in general 
and data slavery in particular is the capitalist mantra of profit by any means.
Africans have been enslaved for the past millennia. Initially, they were enslaved 
in order to provide manual labour, for example in the plantations of South 
Carolina, Haiti, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi. In the current 
dispensation they are being enslaved in order to provide data which is the new 
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gold and oil of the 4IR. What changes is the form of slavery that Africans will 
be undergoing, slavery as a capitalist endeavour merely mutates and adapts and, 
in the process, manages to remain both effective and omnipresent.
This book problematises, explains, and rationalises the (re)colonisation of 
Africa in the 4IR owing to four main factors. First, the conditions which 
necessitated the initial colonisation of Africa by Euro- North American states 
still exist and are even more amplified than they were in the 17th/ 18th cen-
turies. Instead of looking at the conditions which necessitated the colonisa-
tion of Africa in Africa, I look for them in Euro- North America where the 
colonisers came from. In other words, why did the colonisers leave the “com-
fort of their homes”, risking their lives in the venomous snake and malaria- 
infested African tropics? Euro- North America is more trouble now than it was 
when Africa was initially colonised.
Second, the conditions which enabled the initial colonisation of Africa still 
exist and are even more amplified in Africa. The conditions in Africa that made 
it relatively easy for the colonisers to colonise Africa still exists. Third, the 4IR 
will further entrench Africa as the weakest member of the international com-
munity and fourth, global cartels, networks of coloniality, technology- related 
multinational corporations have turned big data into capital. This new oil exists 
“unguarded” in Africa and will be mined as Africa lacks strong institutions to 
regulate data mining.
The main theme of the book is the (re)colonisation of Africa. The objective 
is to demonstrate how Africa will remain on the marginalised/ darker side/ 
underside of the international political economy. The looting of Africa con-
tinues unabated the way it occurred courtesy of the first industrial revolu-
tion. Developing on the notion of Coloniality of Data (Couldry and Ulises Ali 
Mejias, 2019, p. 83), the 4IR is postulated as the final phase which will con-
clude Africa’s peregrination towards (re)colonisation. The 4IR will lead to the 
theft of individuals’ and nations’ sovereignties. Four factors are singled out and 
unpacked: (1) Africa will suffer the most because it has the largest proportion of 
the digitally deprived, (2) Africa has the rarest earth’s natural resources needed 
to drive smart devices, (3) Africa does not have strong institutions and ethical 
leadership, to manage the extraction of its rare earth minerals, and (4) Africa and 
Africans lack the power to enforce their rights at home and away.
The various past industrial revolutions brought many innovations and 
technologies which enhanced the lives of humanity (Cipolla, 1976; Crafts, 
1977; Fukuyama, 2014; Satia, 2018; Fomunyam, 2019). These developments 
commenced with the first industrial revolution where various machines and 
technologies were invented giving rise to industrialised mass production. The 
culmination is the 4IR which gave rise to unlimited possibilities of inter-
connectedness between billions of people, mobile and immobile devices, in 
the process giving rise to a lot of data, massive processing power, storage cap-
abilities, and knowledge access (Schwab, 2016). The innovations, efficiencies, 
and comforts brought about by the various inventions cannot be questioned. 
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continent. What was the cost of the first, the second, the third, and the current 
fourth industrial revolutions to Africa? The short answer is that the past three 
industrial revolutions and the current 4IR did not bring much sustainable 
development, human rights, and dignity to Africa. They brought dehumanisa-
tion, thingification, subjugation in the forms of the slave trade, colonialism, and 
now coloniality.
While depositing many positive aspects in Euro- North America, the indus-
trial revolutions deposited their toxic waste, negative and darker side in Africa 
and other parts of the (formerly) colonised world. Euro- North American mod-
ernity works in a dialectical manner. It is akin to a person afflicted with bipolar 
disorder, benefiting its home while pilfering Africa. Euro- North American 
modernity underdeveloped and undeveloped the colonies in order to develop 
the “metropolis”. It enslaves, dehumanises, and thingifies the colonies in 
order to enhance and uphold human rights in the “metropolis”. It extracts 
raw materials from the colonies in a destructive and ruthless manner that aims 
at maximising production at the cost of human life and the environment to 
afford the “metropolis” luxurious and technological goods. The “metropolis” 
has a persistent underside where it deposits all its negative aspects. This place 
is Africa and other (formerly) colonised parts of the world. It is from what 
Water Mignolo termed the darker side of Euro- North American modernity 
(Mignolo, 2011) that I am located and from where I write.
Contemporary Africa is a product of Euro- North American modernity. By 
definition, Euro- North American modernity is the occupation through vio-
lence of Africa and Africans’ time, geography, and being (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2015, 
p. 490, 2018, pp. 22– 23). This forceful occupation of time, geography, and space 
birthed the rhetoric of trajectorising humanity’s social “development” in linear 
terms of civilisation, development, emancipation, modernisation, and so on, 
with Euro- North America as the leaders and pace setters while Africa must play 
catch- up and learn from the “leaders”.
The book uses the three main decolonial analytical pillars; coloniality of power 
(Anibal Quijano, 2000; Grosfoguel and Georas, 2000; Wynter, 2003b; Grosfoguel, 
2007a; Mignolo, 2007), coloniality of knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2007a; Ghiso and 
Campano, 2013; Al- Hardan, 2014; Connell, 2014; Nhemachena, Mlambo and 
Kaundjua, 2016; Benyera, 2017a), and the coloniality of being (Wynter, 2003b; 
Maldonado- Torres, 2004, 2007, 2018; Maldonado- Torres and Richardson, 
2012). The coloniality of the market (Tafira and Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2017), nature, 
and agriculture (Janer, 2007; Graddy- Lovelace, 2017; Alimonda, 2019; Francis, 
2020) are also used to support the (re)colonisation thesis being advanced in 
these pages.
The conceptualisation of Africans as raw materials to be enslaved and mined 
for data is presented in typical Toulminian argument format (claim, grounds, 
warrant, backing, qualifier, and rebuttal). The claim is that coloniality will be 
further entrenched in Africa because of the 4IR. The grounds exist both in 
Euro- North America on one hand and in Africa on the other. The existen-
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conditions warrant the (re)colonisation of Africa as Euro- North America has 
very few options of sustaining their economies and (re)colonising Africa ranks 
as the main possible solution. The 4IR provides the propitious environment for 
the (re)colonisation of Africa, starting with digital and data slavery. The rebuttal 
is offered in the final chapter where Africa is positioned as having the pro-
pensity to utilise the 4IR to end coloniality by claiming its epistemic freedom 
and agency and stop supporting unethical and unjust leaders. Blind political 
follower-ship, unconditional loyalty especially to the independence polit-
ical parties and the instability to hold public officials to account have haunted 
Africa since the dawn of political independence. That Africans can not hold 
their pubic official to account can not be blamed on external parties. The con-
clusion of this logic is that the (re)colonisation of Africa has more to do with 
condition in Africa than elsewhere.
The trajectorisation of the past three industrial revolutions and how they 
accumulatively weakened Africa making it the weakest, albeit richest continent 
in the 4IR, is an innovative argument. This deviates from the analyses of the past 
industrial revolutions and their damages to Africa as episodic. Using Hardt and 
Negri’s thesis of the empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000), I argue that the empire 
operates in a continuum, underlined by capitalism which is characterised as 
the clothes of the empire (Passavant and Dean, 2004). Each past industrial 
revolution is linked to the problems it caused in Africa (darker side of Euro- 
North America modernity) and how each problem leads to the eventual (re)
colonisation of Africa predominantly by Euro- North America, this time joined 
by China.
Where it all began: Africa’s conquest
The opening up and accessing of Africa which led to its colonisation can be 
attributed to three European men and their collaborators. Two of them opened 
up the South African Cape peninsula to global navigation while the third one 
opened up the north of Africa for navigation. The first one is the Portuguese 
navigator Bartholomew Diaz who in 1488 failed to circumvent the Cape pen-
insula. The second one is another Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, who in 
1498 managed to circumvent the Cape peninsula and hence lead the way from 
Europe around the Indian Ocean to the Orient. The third man was the French 
engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps who in 1869 was instrumental in opening up 
the Suez Canal, and hence North Africa.
When Africa was thus accessible to the world, it engaged the Orient and 
Europe in five major ways: (1) interactively; (2) comparatively; (3) competi-
tively; (4) cooperatively; and (5) conflictually (Mazrui, 1998, p. 118). Prior to 
the opening up of North and South Africa to global navigation, Arabs had 
been coming to the eastern coast of Africa bringing along their religion as way 
back as the 7th century. This constituted the interactive, cooperative, and com-
parative aspects of these relations. There are cities that were born out of these 
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1972; Gayre, 1972, p. 59). Besides the Arabic religious influence, there was also 
a linguistic influence. The consequence of this influence was the birth of the 
Swahili language.
With regard to the conflictual relations, the slave trade was the major out-
come of these interactions (Williams, 1974; Kalusa, 2009). Slavery in Africa 
took place on three broad levels. First there was black- on- black slavery in 
countries such as Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Egypt (Collins, 1992; 
Tegegne, 2017). This practice consisted of black slave masters owning, trading, 
and controlling black slaves. The difference between Euro- North American 
slavery and intra- black slavery is that for the later, slavery was not biologically 
inscribed. Black on black slavery was socially constructed while Arab/white 
on black slavery was biological. One’s social status, not skin colour, made them 
slaves.
In Africa, slavery formed part of the social system. Indeed, there were 
grades of slaves depending on their different roles and functions. Also, there 
were relative degrees of servitude: the right to ownership of property, pos-
sibility for social mobility etc. Above all, a slave was not defined by bio-
logical characteristics. He was not “naturally” a slave; he was socially, not 
biologically defined.
(Encisco, no date, p. 26)
In some civilisations such as the Fulani, Fante, Ashanti, Mandinka (Malinke), 
and the Dahomey, this form of slavery predates Euro- North American mod-
ernity (Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson, 1957; Polanyi, 1966; Bohen, 1985; Dale, 
2010). However, the Dahomey Kingdom was also involved in slave trade with 
the Europeans. This became the source of Dahomey’s military might.
Dahomey traded prisoners, which it captured during wars and raids or 
exacted from tributaries, with the Europeans for miscellaneous goods such 
as knives, bayonets, firearms, fabrics and spirits. The trade was so profit-
able that Dahomey amassed considerable wealth within a few decades and 
consolidated its status as a regional military and political power.
(Joubeaud, 2014, p. 12)
Black- on- black slavery was also prevalent in precolonial Africa, especially in 
Nigeria among the Igbo people. Among the Igbos, slaves were created from 
prisoners of war, from those that failed to pay their debt or as punishment for 
various crimes. Slavery created a caste system akin to that in India whose dev-
astating effects persist until today. Descendants of former slaves among the Igbo 
people still face a lot of stigma, marginalisation, and all other ills suffered by 
(former) slaves elsewhere. Classifying the descendants of former slaves of the 
Igbo people as free persons is a misrepresentation and is an injustice because the 
effects of the enslavement of their forefathers still persist until today, albeit in a 
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In intra- Africa slavery, slaves were not traded, they were not moved from 
their geographies and shipped thousands of kilometres away. However, parallels 
exist between intra- Africa slavery and the European and American slave trade. 
One similarity is the sale of those adjudged to be a disgrace to the family. The 
same was also done by the English when they banished their criminals and 
disgraced fellows to Australia.
The practice differed from slavery in the Americas: slaves were permitted 
to move freely in their communities and to own property, but they were 
also sometimes sacrificed in religious ceremonies or buried alive with their 
masters to serve them in the next life. When the transatlantic trade began, 
in the fifteenth century, the demand for slaves spiked. Igbo traders began 
kidnapping people from distant villages. Sometimes a family would sell off 
a disgraced relative…
(Nwaubani, 2020)
So many atrocities were committed against both sets of slaves. For example, 
when an Igbo person died, six slaves were buried alive with the deceased. Igbo 
slaves were also often chained together with chains that were so heavy that a 
child could not lift them.
At another level, Igbo slave traders were also complicit in the colonisation 
of Nigeria as they collaborated with the missionaries and even protected them 
from their fellow Igbos who intended to expel the colonial forerunners and 
accomplices masquerading as missionaries. One such person who protected 
Anglican missionaries in Nigeria was Nwaubami Ogogo who gave armed 
escort to the first missionaries in that region, a trio who were known as the 
Cookey Brothers (Nwaubani, 2020). Intra- Igbo slavery’s legacy persist until 
today as narrated by a descendent of an Igbo slave trader, Adaobi Tricia Obinne 
Nwaubani, a celebrated journalist and author of award winning novel, I do not 
come to you by chance (Nwaubani, 2009). She narrated how slave trade still haunts 
its victims for generations after its official abolishment.
The descendants of freed slaves in southern Nigeria, called ohu, still 
face significant stigma. Igbo culture forbids them from marrying free-
born people and denies them traditional leadership titles such as Eze and 
Ozo. (The osu, an untouchable caste descended from slaves who served at 
shrines, face even more severe persecution). My father considers the ohu in 
our family a thorn in our side, constantly in opposition to our decisions. 
In the nineteen- eighties, during a land dispute with another family, two 
ohu families testified against us in court. “They hate us,” my father said. 
“No matter how much money they have, they still have a slave mentality.” 
My friend Ugo, whose family had a similar disagreement with its ohu 
members, told me, “The dissension is coming from all these people with 
borrowed blood”
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The second type of slavery was Asian on black slavery. This was mainly 
perpetrated by Arab slave traders along Africa’s various coasts, especially those 
in the east (Mazrui, 1988; Kalusa, 2009; Nimako, 2015a).
The third and most ruthless form of slavery was the European and Anerican 
slave system. This was the most commercially viable and also the most impactful, 
degrading of the three forms of slavery. The European and American slave trade 
had no room for upward mobility, assimilation, and was not integrational at all. 
Here, once a slave, always a slave – a situation attested to by the many Euro- 
North American contemporary black emancipation movements such as the 
Black Lives Matter and the I Can’t Breathe movements.
Today, these three forms of slavery are being replicated again in the 4IR. 
There is intra- Africa data slavery, followed by West Asian- centric data slavery, 
and finally and still at the zenith Euro- North American data slavery. The 4IR 
must take credit for enabling what Christopher Ahlberg, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Massachusetts- based cybersecurity company Recorded Future, termed 
“the great data transition”. Data transition is the movement and processing of 
data from its raw form when it is mined, to information which can be used to 
make decisions, especially for commercial and political purposes. This transi-
tion in turn enables data slavery to occur, hence the saying “colonised by data” 
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019). “Big data” is the generic term used 
to describe big volumes of both structured and unstructured data from data 
sets, programmes, and applications which are too big and too complex to be 
analysed or processed using orthodox data- processing applications and software. 
Three Vs are used to distinguish big data from other data: volume, velocity, and 
variety (Ammu and Irfanuddin, 2013, p. 613). The data that forms big data is of 
high volume, comes at a high velocity, and from a variety of sources such as sur-
veillance systems, social applications, software, institutions, governments, open 
source applications, and so on.
All this made Ali Mazrui’s words about Africans ring true. Writing in 
Africans: A Triple Heritage, Mazrui mourned how Africans consume what they 
do not produce and produce what they do not consume (Mazrui, 1986). This 
is especially relevant to big data being produced in Africa and consumed else-
where. In the meantime, Africa consumes “policy advice” from “international 
experts” and “technocrats” from multilateral institutions, some of whom are yet 
to spend a night in Africa. How did this all begin?
The genealogy of Africa’s colonisation
The late Samir Amin identified four stages that led to the eventual total col-
onisation of Africa (Amin, 2001). For Amin, colonisation was not a linear 
single process but a set of historically and logically interconnected processes. 
Ironically the first stage in the colonisation of Africa initially started outside 
Africa, with the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas by mainly 
the Spanish crown forcing all Muslims to convert to Christianity (Táíwò, 2009; 
Grosfoguel, 2013) during what Immanuel Wallerstein termed “the long 16th 
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period in Spain when the Christians fought many wars with the Muslims in 
which the Christians reconquered that territory in the process expelling the 
Muslim Moors from the Iberian Peninsula into North Africa. The Reconquista 
ended the Muslim rule of Spain. The exact commencement of the long 16th 
century was on 2 January 1492 when King Boabdil surrendered Granada to the 
Spanish forces. Lewis Gordon noted that,
… fifteenth- century expansion of Christendom was that 2 January 1492 
was marked by the victory of Queen Infanta Isabella I of Castile (1451– 
1504) and King Fernando de Aragón or King Ferdinand V of Castile 
(1452– 1516) in Reconquista (reconquest), which was achieved by pushing 
the Moors southward back into Africa. Reconquest is an appropriate term 
since Iberia went from Vandals to Visigoths, who exemplified Germanic 
Catholic conquest until falling to the Muslim Moors.
(Gordon, 2008a, p. 4)
These genocides/ epistemicides ensured that the Global North would never 
again be militarily, economically, epistemologically challenged by their victims. 
The victims of the long 16th century genocides/ epistemicides and other 
victims in the Global South are dealt with by the Global North in three main 
ways: absorbed, disciplined, or dispensed. For Ramon Grosfoguel, the long 16th 
century was characterised by four chronological genocides/ epistemicides.
(1) against Muslims and Jews in the conquest of Al- Andalus in the name 
of “purity of blood”; (2) against indigenous peoples first in the Americas 
and then in Asia; (3) against African people with the captive trade and their 
enslavement in the Americas; and (4) against women who practiced and 
transmitted Indo- European knowledge in Europe; they were burned alive 
accused of being witches.
(Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 77)
The first targets of Euro- North American conquest, enslavement, and colon-
isation were (1) Muslims and Jews, (2) indigenous Americans, (3) Indians and 
Africans, and finally (4) women. Of these four groups of victims, only Jews have 
managed to eventually extricate themselves from subjugation, albeit through 
setting up their own separate geographical habitation, Israel, in 1948 in histor-
ical Palestine – an area already occupied – by committing large- scale genocides, 
epistemicides, and ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants 
(Mamdani, 2015, p. 265). The rest of the victims, including Africans, have largely 
remained as enslaved, subjugated, and marginalised as they were in that long 
16th century. What has changed, however, is the mode of their subjugation as 
they respond to the various challenges coming their way, demanding and agi-
tating for total sustainable emancipation.
Before experiencing all the 16th century genocides and epistemicides, 
Africa had suffered sporadic Portuguese and later other Euro- North American 
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enslavement, theft of natural resources and wealth, all of which were used in 
developing Euro- North America. This thesis was well articulated by Guyanese 
historian Walter Rodney in his seminal works, A History of the Guyanese 
Working People, 1881- 1905 and How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 
1973, 1981).
The counter- agreement is that it is an overstretch to link the indus-
trial revolutions especially the first industrial revolution to slavery from 
Africa to Euro- North America. In the United States, the Slavery Abolition Act 
(1833), abolished slavery in most British colonies, freeing more than 800,000 
enslaved Africans in the Caribbean and South Africa as well as a small number 
in Canada. It received Royal Assent on 28 August 1833 and took effect on 
1 August 1834. But UK’s economy was still up without slavery support since 
then, the counterargument goes. The fact is that by the time slavery was offi-
cially abolished, Euro- North America and the broader capitalist system had 
already massively benefited and entrenched themselves. They had not only 
gained a massive advantage, but also annihilated other political and economic 
alternatives, especially in the territories where they had raided and harvested 
slaves as if they were harvesting fruits.
When the Dutch defeated the Spanish at the end of the Thirty Years’ War 
in 1648, the centre of global politics moved from the empires of the Iberian 
Peninsula to the North- western European empires, again a reality which still 
exists today. For Grosfoguel, these are the processes which led to Portugal and 
Spain being left out of the realms of what we now term Euro- North America, 
which is the epicentre of global hegemony. The meaning of Euro- North 
America was well contextualised by Grosfoguel who contended that,
Since the late 18th century, it is only men from five countries (France, 
England, Germany, Italy and the USA) who are the ones monopolising 
the privilege and authority of canons of knowledge production in the 
Westernised university.
(Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 85)
Euro- North America excludes Scandinavia, Canada, Eastern Europe, Portugal, 
and Spain. This background, together with the victory of the allied powers in 
the Second World War, is the brief history of how men from another set of 
five countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) came to dominate global affairs. These are referred to as the institution 
of the veto wielding five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (P5).
After the 16th century with its genocides and epistemicides, the second phase 
in the conquest of Africa was directly linked to the first industrial revolution which 
needed more cheap labour, raw materials, and larger markets. Commencing in 
the mid- 18th century, the first industrial revolution lasted until about 1830/ 1840. 
It was also during this time, in 1838, that the European and American slave trade 
was abolished, more than three centuries after 1503, the year that the Spanish 
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The first industrial revolution required mostly cheap resources such as 
labour, raw materials, and virgin, manipulatable markets, and Africa was a per-
fect source for all of these. This motive also worked perfectly well for the mis-
sionaries, hunters, explorers, and miners who I later characterise in this book 
as the forerunners of Euro- North American colonialism and the (re)colon-
isation of Africa. Their roles, collectively and individually, in foreshadowing 
both coloniality and colonialism, are clearly illustrated in the following quote 
by Couldry and Mejias about what happened to the Bororo people in Mato 
Grosso State, Brazil.
The telegraph pole, the Christian cross, and the rifle arrived all at once 
for the Bororo people of Mato Grosso. The rifle of the soldier and the 
settler served to seize the Bororo’s land in the name of industry and pro-
gress, the cross “pacified” and “civilized” them, and the telegraph integrated 
them into the rest of the newly wired Brazilian republic in the mid- nine-
teenth century. Some Bororo donned western clothing and moved from 
communal to single- family dwellings, as the priests told them to do. They 
learned the settlers’ language and were put to work on the construction of 
the national telegraph network.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019, p. ix)
Soldiers, hunters, missionaries, and traders used force to steal land, used religion 
to pacify and “civilise” their target populations while using the telegram to 
introduce the locals to the empire and correspond with their kith and kin back 
home to the world and vice versa. The Portuguese forcibly introduced them-
selves to the Brazilians of the central Amazon who then became westernised, 
colonised, Christianised, and pacified.
“Sir” Harry Johnson was a leading British painter, natural scientist, and 
explorer who was also a diplomat and administrator in Africa around 1876. We 
can learn a lot about how the empire viewed Africans as less than human beings 
when we read what he wrote in Fortnightly Review in 1890,
By their own unaided efforts, I doubt whether Negros would ever advance 
much above the status of savagery in which they still exist in those parts of 
Africa where neither the European nor Arab civilisation has as yet reached 
them.... The Negro seems to require the intervention of some superior 
race before he can be raised to any definite advance from the low stage of 
human development in which he is contentedly remained for many thou-
sand years.
(Gardiner and Davidson, 1968, p. 12)
The colonisers then, as is the case today, endowed themselves with the respon-
sibility to “aid” and “enlighten” Africans. As they see it, without their ben-
evolence Africans will remain savages, and Africa dark. The view that Africans 
are savages still exists today. It is argued that one way of taking Africans out of 
savagery is by connecting and datafying them. Connecting and datafying Africa 
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occurs when they get included in the global village, however, not as equal 
residents but inferior ones. Of course, the world is now a village, but like any 
village, it has its rulers and those being ruled, the rich and the poor, and so on.
“Sir” Henry Johnson was convinced that Africans required some outside 
intervention to assist them so that they could get out of their misery. This is 
a misrepresentation of the highest order. The so- called benevolent interven-
tion and civilising mission was actually the commencement of an enslaving, 
decivilising mission which has continued unabated till today. This pseudo civil-
isation mission was well described and unmasked by Aime Césaire,
What am I driving at? This idea: that no one colonises innocently, that no 
one colonises with impunity either: that a nation which colonises, that a 
civilisation which justifies its colonisation - and therefore force - is already 
a sick civilisation, a civilisation which is morally diseased, which irresistibly 
progressing from one consequence to another, one denial to another, calls 
for its Hitler, I mean its punishment. Colonisation: bridgehead is a cam-
paign to civilise barbarism, from which there may emerge at any moment 
the negation of civilisation, pure and simple.
(Cesaire, 1972, pp. 39– 40)
Instead of noting and endeavouring to correct their own deficiencies, Euro- 
North American civilisations went on to decivilise African civilisations, thereby 
dragging all civilisations involved into uncivilisation. The colonisers and the 
colonised all became decivilised.
For “Sir” Henry Johnson, the British was a superior race with a responsi-
bility to civilise the uncivilised. This is basically still the view held by the empire 
whereas the truth is that Africans before Euro- North American modernity 
were highly civilised until their history was stolen by the colonisers and their 
civilisations obliterated (Anta Diop, 1955; Gayre, 1972; Rodney, 1973; Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni, 2008; Goody, 2009; Adebajo, 2016; Benyera, 2018a).
Delving into the area of eugenics, race science, and medical politics which 
was overly abused, instrumentalised, and politicised by the likes of Eugene Fisher, 
Ottmar von Verschuer, Harry H. Laughli, and Reginald Ruggles Gates (Menozzi, 
1994; Angamben, 1998; Tucker, 2002), “Sir” Harry Johnson continued,
… the black race has, of course, like the other sections of humanity, many 
faults and shortcomings. It is, as a rule, strongly as averse to continuous 
regularised hard work, and its average disposition is passionate noisy, vain and 
quarrelsome. But with all his defects the Negro is more likeable, more akin 
to us of the white race in disposition, and far less alien to our civilisation 
than is the cold, inscrutable, reptilian, Chinese.
(Gardiner and Davidson, 1968, p. 13) [emphasis original]
There is nothing as dehumanising as being characterised as averse to continuous, 
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people. This characterisation amounted to a misrepresentation and dehuman-
isation which was meant to clear the conscience of the coloniser so that when 
they embarked on their murderous looting and exploitation of Africa, they 
could do so with a clear conscience. That Africans specifically are noisy, vain, 
and quarrelsome is also not true. These characteristics can obviously be part of 
virtually any population group of people anywhere in the world.
Johnson then showed the British hatred for the Orient in general and the 
Chinese in particular by describing the Chinese as “inscrutable reptilians”. 
The British hatred for the Chinese emanated mainly from their competition 
in dominating Africa and Africans. This competition is still present in parts of 
Africa such as Ethiopia where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
is being built with China supporting the Ethiopians while Egypt is being 
supported by the British, the Americans, and other Euro- North American 
countries. The same template is also true for South Sudan (Rolandsen, 2015; 
Mulindwa, 2020), where China and the United States are supporting opposite 
sides of the South- Sudanese civil conflict.
Soldiers, hunters, traders, and missionaries have mutated from their individual 
operations that started in the 15th century and continued ever since, and grad-
ually evolved into sophisticated global cartels and networks of coloniality. These 
global cartels include but are not limited to the following families and their 
trusts: Cecil John Rhodes, Rothschild, Walton, Bezos, Koch, Gates, and Mars 
(Lord, 2018). For Henderson, there are four omnipresent financial horsemen 
patrolling the global financial shores,
The Four Horsemen of Banking (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, 
Citigroup and Wells Fargo) own the Four Horsemen of Oil (Exxon Mobil, 
Royal Dutch/ Shell, BP and Chevron Texaco); in tandem with Deutsche 
Bank, BNP, Barclays and other European old money behemoths. But their 
monopoly over the global economy does not end at the edge of the oil 
patch.
(Henderson, 2019)
Financial cartels financed slavery, colonialism, and now the (re)colonisation 
of Africa. The recently formed World Transhumanist Association now called 
Humanity+ claims to champion the ethical use of emerging technologies in 
order to enhance human capacities. It is a huge oxymoron that the world’s 
wealthiest and most ruthless capitalists who moonlight as philanthropists 
are concerned about ethics and ethical business behaviour when they have 
accumulated their fortunes through unethical businesses such as the slave trade 
and presently, data mining.
Several of the richest men of the world, according to the last list of the 
magazine Forbes in 2018, are the organisers of the network Transhumanist 
Global, such as Carlos Slim, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Page, Sergey Brain, Bill 
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experimentation is probably the principal origin of their financial income 
for many of them.
(Flores, 2018b, p. 391)
These “philanthropists” are the champions of the consolidation of coloniality 
of Africa in order to achieve their ultimate goal of digital slavery. Mining cartels 
need the coltan and other rare earth minerals from Africa in order to digit-
ally enhance their technology which is aimed at creating a transhuman whose 
mind can be remotely controlled, and whose behaviour can be permanently 
monitored with what is termed the brain net. It will aim to eliminate emotions 
so that otherwise ruthless tasks can be undertaken without remorse. These 
eventual transhumans will live a videogame type of life, living in a virtual reality 
where mind deletion is possible and sexuality eliminated (Flores, 2018b).
With the enslavement of Africa and Africans and the theft of their resources, 
also started the phase of massive inequalities between the rich and the poor glo-
bally. This inequality was racialised then as it still is racialised today all over the 
world. The globe was experiencing the third industrial revolution when Africa 
was witnessing the consolidation of its enslavement and over- integration into 
Euro- North American economies.
Africa was also important for the survival of what became the British empire 
as its colonisation averted social revolution back home in Britain. In a way, 
Africa bailed the United Kingdom out of a social revolution (Amin, 2001, 
p. 2). Regarding the impeding social unrest in the United Kingdom, Cecil John 
Rhodes wrote,
I was in the East End of London (a working- class quarter) yesterday and 
attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, 
which were just a cry for “bread! bread!” and on my way home I pondered 
over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance 
of imperialism.... My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, 
i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom 
from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands 
to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods 
produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a 
bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become 
imperialists.
(Walker, 2009, p. 78)
The same European crisis highlighted by Rhodes as a factor which necessitated 
the colonisation of Africa was also highlighted by Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah 
Arendt (Luxemburg, 1913; Arendt, 1958, 1973). For Luxemburg, force, fraud, 
oppression, and looting underlie capitalist accumulation.
The other aspect of the accumulation of capital concerns the relations 
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start making their appearance on the international stage. Its predom-
inant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system, a policy 
of spheres of interest and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting is openly 
displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to 
discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the 
stern laws of the economic process. … In reality, political power is nothing 
but a vehicle for the economic process. The conditions for the reproduc-
tion of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects of the 
accumulation of capital.
(Luxemburg, 1913, pp. 432– 433)
For Samir Amin, Africa experienced a third stage in its subjugation when the 
Cold War ended (Amin, 2001). The Cold War was important for Africa, almost 
as a blessing in disguise, as it gave Africa global political and international 
relations currency. With the end of the Cold War contestations, the reign of 
most African dictators, warlords, and pseudo- nationalists who were leveraged 
either by the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) soon fell apart. Africa became more vul-
nerable to both internal and external threats. Enslavement, theft, pilfering, and 
corruption reached fever heights. It was during this period that the notion of 
Africa being afflicted with the so- called resource curse was accepted as normal 
(Burgess and Beilstein, 2013; Kopiński, Polus and Tycholiz, 2013; Miller, 2015; 
Knutsen et al., 2016).
Global cartels and networks of coloniality grew to compete with one 
another and their ruthless appetites for minerals and profits never diminished. 
Their operations and modus operandi were protected and normalised through 
various multilateral institutions which developed norms, standards, and rules 
of engagement which favoured these cartels, networks, and their countries of 
origin. For Samir Amin,
The objectives of dominant capital are still the same – the control of the 
expansion of markets, the looting of the earth’s natural resources, the 
super- exploitation of the labour reserves in the periphery – although they 
are being pursued in conditions that are new and in some respects very 
different from those that characterised the preceding phase of imperialism.
(Amin, 2001, p. 3)
Africa’s darkest hour during its long colonial history was when the hunters, 
missionaries, explorers, and traders either joined hands with, or became colonial 
administrators themselves. Cecil John Rhodes is an apt example in this regard.
The globally dominant countries which constitute what is termed the 
Triad (the United States of America, Western Europe, and Japan plus China), a 
medium through which Africa is first being rendered sovereignty- less (disem-
bowelled), before it will finally be (re)colonised. I am aware of the view that 
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world never ended, it simply mutated, and adapted to the challenges of decol-
onisation hence coloniality. Termed the myth of decolonisation, this thesis was 
well articulated in Sabelo Ndlovu- Gatsheni in his book Coloniality of Power 
in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonisation (S. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013a). The 
argument is how can Africa be (re)colonised when it is still colonised? What 
will happen is the consolidation and normalisation of coloniality as a way of 
life of Africans. Various violences, genocides and epistemicides instituted colo-
nialism, the 4IR will see the normalisation and routinisation of coloniality.
Colonialism occurred formally, starting with the partitioning of Africa, and 
decolonisation also ended formally with the independence of Africa starting 
when the then Gold Coast, now Ghana, became independent from the British 
empire on 6 March 1957. The second phase of the colonisation of Africa is 
occurring clandestinely through the work of the empire, cartels, and networks 
courtesy of the 4IR.
Located on what Enrique Dussel termed the underside of Euro- North 
American modernity (Dussel, 1996), Africa and parts of the (formerly) colonised 
world will experience the adverse side of the 4IR. Just like the first industrial 
revolution which brought mass production as a result of the development of 
the steam engine, for Africa the first industrial revolution saw the same steam 
engines propel slave ships to the shore of Africa to harvest slaves. Likewise, the 
second industrial revolution saw Africa being colonised in order to provide 
new markets and raw materials for the empire. The third industrial revolu-
tion saw cartels and multinational corporations ruling Africa in cohorts with 
African pseudo nationalists. The 4IR for Africa is a looter continua, from slaves, 
raw materials, and now the empire is looting African data which will result in 
the (re)colonisation of Africa.
In as much as the abolishment of slave trade did not end slavery and in 
as much as decolonisation processes did not end colonialism, Africa will be 
(re)colonised because the conditions which necessitated the initial colonisation 
still exist today more than they did then, both in the colonised lands and in the 
lands of the colonisers.
Will Africa sink deeper into subjugation and sovereignty- less or the 4IR 
is a propitious moment for Africa to redeem, rediscover, and reassert itself as 
an equal member of the international community? The response is negative 
because the colonially inaugurated asymmetrical power relations between the 




3  Contextualising the colonial  
project in Africa
Introduction
One issue which has been academically consuming many Africans and friends 
of Africa is why, despite the official end of colonialism in Africa, including 
apartheid in South Africa, are Africa and Africans still the same epistemolog-
ically, materially, and existentially? A lot of reasons for Africa’s current and 
past predicaments have been offered (Mafeje, 1986; Mbembe, 1992, 2000; Ali 
A. Mazrui, 1995, 2005; Mazrui, 1999; Mkandawire, 2002; Nzongola- Ntalaja, 
2006; Hamilton, 2011; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Benyera, 2020a, 
2020b). Concomitant with attempts to diagnose Africa’s challenges are also 
efforts to map Africa’s trajectory, especially in the 4IR. Previous industrial 
revolutions saw Africa assume the position of a voiceless, choiceless supplier 
of raw materials and labour under conditions of duress such as slavery and 
colonialism.
The slave trade might have been abolished, but slavery is continuing. 
Colonialism is officially over, but coloniality is going full throttle. I respond to 
the question: Will Africa sink deeper into a lack of sovereignty and (re)colon-
isation or will the 4IR present a propitious moment for Africa to rediscover, 
redeem, and assert itself as an equal member of the international community?
This is happening against the background of countless political summits 
and initiatives which took place at regional level led by the African Union 
(AU), and similar countless initiatives at sub- regional level such as the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), and other 
similar regional economic communities. These efforts notwithstanding, the 
lives of Africans have generally remained the same, that is, living without what 
Hannah Arendt termed the rights to rights (Arendt, 1949). For our purposes, we 
take human rights to mean being born, living, and dying a dignified life devoid 
of humiliation and able to enjoy four fundamental freedoms: freedom from 
want, freedom from fear, freedom from violence and freedom from enforced 
silence (Shivji, 2019, p. 7).
There were many multilateral interventions and initiatives especially 
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non- governmental organisations also intervened in trying to “solve” the African 
problem. Yet measured by any standard, the quality of life for the majority of 
Africans remains poor because of the effectiveness of the colonial matrix. 
In other words, colonially inaugurated harsh living conditions which took 
500 years to entrench intensified after the end of official colonialism. Ramon 
Grosfoguel opines that,
By “colonial situations” I mean the cultural, political, sexual and eco-
nomic oppression/ exploitation of subordinate racialized/ ethnic groups by 
dominant racial/ ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial 
administrations.
(Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 12)
Contemporary Africa is awash with violent conflicts of all magnitudes. Why is 
it that the most vicious conflicts in Africa are located where the rarest and most 
valuable minerals are found? The recent surge of violence in Mozambique’s 
northern province of Cabo Delgado is taking place where the world’s lar-
gest deposits of graphite and liquid natural gas were discovered. This is besides 
the offshore petroleum which is already being extracted there. There are also 
vicious conflicts in Walikale Territory, North Kivu province of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which is endowed with the world’s biggest coltan deposits. 
Coltan is used for the production of tantalum capacitors which are used in 
many electronic devices and smart devices.
Deals around raw materials have already been sealed in Guinea, for 
example, where the China International Fund funded Guinea’s infrastructure 
developments to an amount one and half times bigger than Guinea’s economy. 
Burgis notes that,
…the Queensway Group, through China International Fund, would 
announce joint ventures with the Guinean state that would undertake projects 
in mining, energy, and infrastructure. The whole package would be worth $7 
billion, equivalent to one and a half times the size of Guinea’s economy. 
China International Fund was to be paid for the infrastructure projects with 
revenues from mining concessions the government would grant it. … China 
Sonangol, 30 percent owned by the Angolan state oil group …
(Burgis, 2015, p. 119)
Being signed by Moussa Dadis Camara’s junta government which had massacred 
as many as 157 civilians on 28 September 2009, the deal was described by 
the previous administration as rapid and unorthodox, attesting to the fact that 
China had in fact already (re)colonised Guinea as the de facto government in 
Guinea will be the Chinese via their China International Fund.
Then there are the conflicts which resulted in Somalia becoming a failed 
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conflicts are attributable to Somalia’s geostrategic location leading to global 
powers wanting to situate their listening posts off the Somali Gulf of Aden. 
Libya’s oil resulted in the assassination of President Muammar Gaddafi and the 
resultant three governments, albeit in a failed state (Campbell, 2013). South 
Sudan with all its abundant petroleum is teetering on the brink of being a 
failed state. Then Nigeria and its neighbouring countries in the Chad Basin are 
perennially being terrorised by Boko Haram, again destabilising another oil- 
rich African country. Countries in the Chad Basin that are oil- rich and being 
destabilised by Boko Haram include Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Sudan, Algeria, and Libya. Mineral- rich African countries 
are deliberately being destabilised by powerful cartels from the empire so that 
these cartels and their local collaborators can loot and recolonise Africa.
One way of (re)colonising Africa has been to revisit colonial fault lines, espe-
cially in the case of condominium states. Somalia and South Sudan are typical 
examples of countries which experienced condominium rule. Condominium 
is a principle of international law which is derived from two Latin words com 
meaning together and dominium which means right of ownership. It is a prin-
ciple of international law where two sovereign political entities such as coun-
tries agree to have joint sovereignty over a territory. In a condominium state, 
the parties agree to have equal share of power and exercise their rights jointly 
over the same territory. The same principle can also apply to three states in 
which case it will be referred to as a tripartite condominium. A good example 
is the Abyei area which is jointly administered by the Republic of South Sudan 
and the Republic of Sudan since 2011. Sudan is not new to condominiums as 
it was once in this arrangement when it was referred to as the Anglo- Egyptian 
Sudan. This was between 1899 and 1958. During this period Sudan was jointly 
administered by the British and the Egyptians. At a larger scale the Antarctica is 
also part of a continental condominium where it is governed by 29 parties who 
are party to the Antarctic Treaty.
Regarding Somalia, it can be argued that there are basically three Somalias: an 
Italian Somalia, a French Somalia, and a British Somalia. There is in fact very 
little evidence of a Somali Somalia in Somalia. Sudan before the break- up was 
always a typical case of a secession waiting to happen, or, more correctly, to be 
caused. All the ingredients for a session were there: the North was Islamic, con-
trolled by the Egyptians and predominantly Arabic; the South was predomin-
antly Christian and controlled by the British. Sudan as a nation- state therefore 
never coalesced and the presence of abundant petroleum in the South just aided 
the break- up. In the ensuing milieu the (re)colonisation of South Sudan is busy 
taking place.
The British cannot be exonerated from exerting their colonial interest 
in petroleum-rich Nigeria (Olowu, 2010). And for good measure, the 
Portuguese in Mozambique and lately the Chinese are responsible for the 
current disturbances in Cabo Delgado province (Mheta, 2019). The want- away 
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are complicit in problems faced in this tiny oil- rich Peninsula (Konings and 
Nyamnjoh, 2003).
In order to actualise the (re)colonisation of Africa, the empire is busy situ-
ating military bases and command posts in Africa. The United States is the most 
present foreign army in Africa with their African Command (Africom) being 
omnipresent in every African region. As of now, the Russians are busy setting 
up their own military base in Sudan. The Chinese are already heavily present in 
Africa with their military base in Djibouti. A theory which explains this foreign 
militarisation of Africa is the (re)colonisation thesis.
For Mustafa Mheta, we have reached a point in international relations where 
foreign powers feel somehow entitled to Africa’s natural resources (Mheta, 
2019). This is the reason why African leaders who are not compliant with the 
demands of the empire are simply dispensed. The 2014 Obama- initiated US- 
African Leaders Summit held in Washington was akin to a second scramble 
for Africa with observers of the politics of the Great Lakes region labelling 
Rwandese President Paul Kagame an Anglo- American proxy in the region, who 
buys his legitimacy and protection by allowing the Eastern Congo to get looted 
of its rare earth minerals which are exported via Rwanda by the Euro- North 
Americans and their mining cartels (Bentrovato, 2014; Meagher, 2014; Burgis, 
2015; Ingelaere and Wilén, 2017; Mulindwa, 2020). The Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), rich in rare earth minerals and a former colony 
of Belgium, is now argued to be a clandestine economy run by Kagame on 
behalf of Euro- North American mineral cartels (Meagher, 2014; Burgis, 2015). 
There are also those, however, who credit Kagame with stabilising the Great 
Lakes region, especially through ending the genocide in Rwanda which the 
West watched while it was happening and did nothing about (Moon, 2011; 
Hoile, 2014). Those in support of Kagame argue that he took Rwanda from 
being a genocide ravaged country to one of the cleanest and most stable and 
technologically advanced countries in Africa. Rwanda is progressing econom-
ically, the quality of life, especially human security, is argued to have improved 
drastically. Rwanda is now the economic hub of the Great Lakes Region. The 
first cellphone to be manufactured in Africa, the Mara is from Rwanda.
One factor that clearly remains constant in Africa is the resilience of colo-
nialism. The resource curse has been widely explored (Burgess and Beilstein, 
2013; Kopiński, Polus and Tycholiz, 2013; Miller, 2015; Knutsen et al., 2016) 
and challenged (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007; Burgis, 2015), yet as 
Mheta questioned, “why is it that instability on our continent seems to be 
concentrated in highly resourced areas”? (Mheta, 2019). In order to properly 
respond to Mheta, I have to go back to Africa’s history of Africa’s conquest and 
pay attention to the role played by hunters, traders, explorers, and missionaries.
Hunters and traders: Missionaries as the link
I have claimed that the escapades of four groups of predominantly white 
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to the colonisation of Africa, albeit without substantiating this claim. I have also 
linked this claim to the greater scheme of capitalism, again without substanti-
ating it. In this section, I will present some evidence that proves that hunters, 
traders, explorers, and missionaries were not only the forerunners of, but also 
complicit in, colonialism. I will use the example of Frederick Courteney Selous. 
His story is in many ways similar to that of many other arch- colonialists such 
as Cecil John Rhodes, David Livingstone, Maurice Raymond Gifford, Alan 
Wilson, John Hanning Speke, the list is endless. Missionaries, and these included 
the Jesuits (the Society of Jesus), the Marist Brothers, and the Franciscans, 
imported their organised religion into Africa. Walter Rodney made this point 
when he noted that,
The Christian missionaries were as much part of the colonising forces as were the 
explorers, traders and soldiers. There may be room for arguing whether in 
a given colony the missionaries brought other colonialist forces or vice 
versa, but there is no doubting the fact that missionaries were agents of colonialism 
in the practical sense whether or not they saw themselves in that light. 
The imperialist adventurer, Sir Henry Johnston disliked missionaries, but 
he conceded in praise of them that “each mission station is an exercise in 
colonisation”.
(Rodney, 1973, p. 80) [emphasis original]
Frederick Courteney Selous was born in London in 1851 and his father was 
the chairperson of the London Stock Exchange. He received a very good edu-
cation and at the age of 19 came to Africa to become an elephant hunter and 
explorer. Between the ages of 19 and 25, Selous was at the Kimberley Diamond 
Mines digging and trading diamonds. At age 25 he was already a renowned ele-
phant hunter, successful miner, and influential diamond trader. As a trader, he 
traded not only in diamonds and ivory but various other merchandise and most 
importantly information on the geography and anthropology of South East 
Africa (Selous, 1893, 1968; Bourne, 2011, p. 19). As a hunter, explorer, miner, 
and trader, Selous’ sphere of influence was along and around the Limpopo, 
Chobe, Zambezi, and Congo rivers. He explored, mined, hunted, and traded in 
modern- day Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
South Africa, and parts of Namibia.
What is notable is that the British South Africa Company (BSAC) realised 
that Frederick Selous had cordial relations with African chiefs, especially the 
Ndebele aristocracy. His social capital was therefore efficacious in tricking 
African chiefs into signing the many concessions and even receiving these 
colonialists in their courtyards. As a hunter, trader, and explorer, Selous was 
therefore a genuine and bona fide forerunner for British colonialism in South 
East Africa.
In Frederick Selous, Cecil John Rhodes found a very capable partner 
and leader of his so- called Pioneer Column. The Pioneer Column set out to 
colonise modern- day Zimbabwe from a place in Botswana called Macloutsie 
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comprising 400 men and destined for Mount Hampden, Mashonaland, which 
is on the outskirts of modern- day Harare. They left on 28 June 1890 and crossed 
the Tuli River on 11 July 1890 into present day Matebeleland South Province, 
Zimbabwe.
There was no better partner for the South Africa British Company in their 
colonial venture than Selous. Selous was praised for skilfully guiding the inaug-
ural colonising force thus,
The spear- head of Rhodes’s plan of northward expansion was the “Pioneer 
Expedition” to Mashonaland, which, during the dry season of 1890, cut a 
road 500 miles in length through a hostile, rugged and trackless country, 
and succeeded in planting the British flag on the high plateau where now 
stands the modern capital of Salisbury. Skilfully guided by the hunter, Selous, 
the 200 pioneers, who were accompanied by a like number of mounted 
police, with 300 more in support, reached their objective without open collision 
with the Matabele regiments hovering on their flanks during their passage through 
the low country. Their march occupied three months, in which not a shot 
was fired.
(Hole, 1936, p. 39) [emphasis original]
Selous skilfully navigated the Pioneer Column from Botswana to Rhodesia 
such that they managed to avoid any hostile communities along the way. Not 
only was Frederick Selous useful in introducing Cecil John Rhodes to African 
chiefs, leading the Pioneer Column, and befriending the many Africans along 
the way, he later became one of Rhodes’ leading army commanders. Frederick 
Selous is also credited for bringing the modern- day Manicaland Province in 
Zimbabwe under British colonial control (Selous, 1893; Daly, 1982).
Besides his hunting, exploring, and trading prowess, Selous was also an 
accomplished soldier instrumental in putting down various local rebellions 
against colonialism (Selous, 1893, 1968; Cobbing, 1977). According to Selous 
himself, as a soldier for the British South Africa Company, he fought in the 
1893 Matabeleland Uprising (Selous, 1968). He was wounded in this battle and 
had to go home to England to seek medical treatment. He returned two years 
later in 1895, this time as the manager of the Essexville Estate. When the Second 
Matabeleland uprising broke out in 1896, Frederick Selous was commander in 
the H Troop of the Bulawayo Field Force. In his later life when he returned 
to England in 1908, he was to be invited by President Theodore Roosevelt to 
accompany him on a hunting expedition to East Africa. In 1915 during the 
First World War, Frederick Selous worked in East Africa as a British intelligence 
officer. Of course, he had mastered the geography and anthropology of East, 
South, and Central Africa which benefited not only British colonial ambitions 
but also Allied World War One ambitions.
The story of Selous demonstrates the fluidity and operational efficacy of the 
hunters, traders, and miners into turned soldiers and colonial administrators. 
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and turned into farmers and sudden land barons. The Pioneer Corps was offi-
cially disbanded on 1 October 1890. This is what I mean when I allege that 
the hunters, traders, missionaries, and miners were actually the forerunners of 
colonialism while their reincarnation, the big tech multinational corporations, 
are in turn the forerunners of Africa’s (re)colonisation.
We also see this intricate relationship between soldiers, traders, and colo-
nial administrators elsewhere, for example in colonial Nigeria. “Sir” Frederick 
Lugard, later Baron Lugard, is a classic example of how Euro- North American 
modernity had agents that mutated and chameleoned between these three roles. 
Initially, Lugard was a soldier who fought many colonial wars in West Africa 
between 1878 and 1887 (Gardiner and Davidson, 1968, pp. 23– 24). He became 
a key servant and senior agent of the Royal Niger Company. He then later also 
became a senior government official for the British government in Nigeria 
between 1912 and 1919. Attesting to the unity of purpose between the hunters, 
traders, and missionaries, and the importance of commerce in the colonial era 
for the benefit of the British empire, Baron Lugard wrote,
Let us admit that commercial enterprise in Africa is undertaken for our 
own benefit, as much as and more than for the benefit of the African. We 
have spoken already of the vital necessity of new markets for the Old World. 
It is, therefore, to our very obvious advantage to teach the millions of Africa 
the wants of civilisation, so that whilst supplying them we may receive in 
return the products of their country and the labour of their hands.
(Gardiner and Davidson, 1968, p. 23)
Lord Lugard’s legacy is omnipresent in Africa in general and in Nigeria in 
particular as it is his wife, Flora Louise Shaw, also known as Lady Lugard, who 
named the country Nigeria. Lady Lugard was a British journalist and writer. 
Writing in The Times of 8 January 1897 she suggested that the name Royal 
Niger Company Territories was too long and suggested Nigeria rather than 
Central Sudan. Today the country is still known as Nigeria, a name which 
therefore qualifies as a typical colonial creation: you create it and you name it.
Back to Lord Lugard, we learn three important views about the presence 
of the empire in Africa from Baron Lugard’s words, ‘the empire is present in 
Africa for its own commercial benefit’. Any benefit that accrues to Africa and 
Africans are incidental. Every relationship between the empire and the (for-
merly) colonised world including in the 4IR must be understood against a 
commercial background.
Colonialism and the (re)colonisation of Africa is all about the need for new 
markets for the empire. Having gained access to Africa’s rare earth minerals, 
the empire is now gunning for Africa’s cyber markets. For Africa, the 4IR is 
about the online and digital enslavement of Africans. The same template which 
worked during the first industrial revolution which resulted in the enslavement 
of Africans, was used during the second industrial revolution to result in the 
colonisation of Africa, and used during the third industrial revolution to ensure 
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that multinational corporations predominantly rule Africa. Now the same tem-
plate is being used to ensure that Africa’s cyberspace, data, and digital spaces, and 
products are owned and controlled by the empire.
By extrapolation, the digital and online life that Africans are nowadays 
being forced to acculturate to is not necessarily a matter of life and death for 
them. Baron Lugard explicitly stated that Africans must be taught to want the 
things which the empire will then supply. This is the empire’s interpretation 
of civilising Africa: stopping Africans from producing and consuming what 
they want and teaching them to consume what they have been made to need 
but cannot produce themselves. This is the genesis of what Ali Mazrui then 
observed decades later when he stated that “Africans consume what they don’t 
produce and produce what they don’t consume”.
The 4IR in Africa will produce massive amounts of data which Africa will 
not consume. In this process, Africa will also use millions of smart devices which 
it will not produce. This is data and digital slavery at work.
The above examples demonstrate the relationship between explorers, traders, 
missionaries, and miners on one hand and their role in initiating and enabling 
colonialism in West, South, East, and Central Africa on the other hand. Hunters, 
traders, explorers, and missionaries are the glue that cemented colonialism, 
bringing together local African communities on one spectrum and the British 
colonisers on the other. Their role as agents trusted by Africans brought the 
colonialists into direct and friendly contact with local chiefs and populations. 
In a way, through their local relations and knowledge they prepared a captive 
audience for colonialism. There is no way in which colonialism would have 
occurred so rapidly without the role and collaboration of hunters, traders, 
miners, and missionaries. These classes of Europeans were also useful in putting 
down the many African rebellions against colonialism. The relationship was 
summed up by Oliver and Fage (1970) in the following words,
Before the onset of the colonial fever in the 1890s, Europeans had already 
made substantial inroads into the southern third of Africa. During the first 
three quarters of the 19th century, events there were dominated by the 
expansion of European settlement north- eastwards towards from the Cape 
of Good Hope. By 1880 this stream of settlement was already touching 
the Limpopo, over a thousand miles into the interior from its base at Cape 
Town. Indirectly its influence was being felt even further afield, with missionaries 
and traders from the South African colonies producing an impact as far north as 
the Zambezi. Livingstone’s great transcontinental journey of 1853- 6 was to 
have important consequences both for the Bantu tribes of Central Africa 
and for the long- established zones of Portuguese interest in Angola and 
Mozambique. [emphasis original]
With regards to the 4IR, hunters, miners, explorers, and missionaries have now 
mutated into networks of coloniality such as the Seven Sisters of Oil, De Beers 
Mining Company, Lonrho, Rio Tinto, Monsanto, the Earth Liberation Front, 
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Total, Facebook, Intel, Apple, Samsung, Alphabet, Nokia, Erickson, Huawei, and 
many others. These networks are enabling not only what is being termed digital 
colonialism but the entire (re)colonisation of Africa. It is striking that the initial 
colonialism of Africa was fronted by both state and private companies, as is the 
case with the current consolidation of coloniality of Africa. This underpins the 
importance of capitalism in coloniality.
One such company which helped fronting the colonisation of Nigeria was 
the United Africa Company. It was a merchant company which traded pre-
dominately in the British empire in West Africa in present day Gambia, Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. It was formed in 1897 and later became National 
African Company in 1881, later Royal Niger Company (1886), becoming 
United Africa Company in 1929. William Lever bought the Royal Niger 
Company in 1920 and on 3 March 1929, William Lever’s company merged 
with the Niger Company, which was a competitor and, in the process, formed 
what became known as the United Africa Company Limited. Today the com-
pany trades as Unilever and is still operational in Africa in those parts of the 
(former) British empire, channelling profits back to London. Coloniality is 
therefore underpinned, by capitalist
Capitalism as destructive extractivism
One of the key characteristics of capitalism is its destructive extractivism. 
Whether it extracts from the earth or from people, capitalism leaves deep, 
unhealable scars in its aftermath. The rise of former concession companies such 
as Unilever to the status of global conglomerates is in part due to their ruthless 
extractivism and profits at any cost mentality. They extract not only minerals, 
people’s sovereignties and even power and loyalty from the local elites who they 
recruit and enlist as their local partners. Ironically and unknowingly, people 
look up to these local elites for salvation from the ruthlessness of multinational 
corporations unaware that they work in cohorts with these corporations. The 
end was the establishment of a symbiotic relationship between politics and cap-
ital branded as neo-liberal politics. In some cases, such as South Africa, labour 
is part of the alliance between capital and politics, in the process increasing the 
vulnerability of the people they are supposed to serve and save.
Political power is mainly contested and amassed because it gives unfettered 
access to economic processes which drive capitalism. This explains the link 
and symbiosis between company executives (capital) and politicians (politics). 
Politics needs capital to run a country and therefore protect it while capitalism 
needs politics to access resources. Therein lies the umbilical symbiosis.
The link between capital, politics, and colonialism is well illustrated by 
the story of London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) 
founder, Tiny Rowland. In 1947, Rowland crossed from South Africa to 
Southern Rhodesia with three things: a Mercedes Benz, 5000 British pounds, 
and an ambition to seek and get fortune. When he crossed the Limpopo at 
Beitbridge border post, Rowland had no particular skill yet he was to later rise 
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and head an intracontinental, transcontinental conglomerate with 800 com-
panies, 110,000 workers and with a combined value of 3 billion British pounds 
(Baba Nyenyedzi, 2019; Tendi, 2020, pp. 226– 227). In reality, Tiny Rowland 
actualised Cecil John Rhodes’ wishes of creating a British empire where the 
sun never sets. Just three years after arriving in Rhodesia, Rowland was already 
the richest man in Rhodesia. How did he manage to do this? Rhodes, Frederick 
Courteney Selous, Maurice Raymond Gifford, Charles Rudd, Leander Starr 
Jameson, and Rowland formed a cartel which was to own most of the land 
and mining concessions in Africa. Their land was in excess of one million acres.
From Rhodesia, Tiny Rowland controlled the economies of Mozambique, 
Zambia, Sierra Leone, Botswana, Tanzania, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Malawi, and as far into French Africa as Ivory Coast where he partnered with 
the state in forming SOCIVEX. Rowland was useful in propping up and finan-
cing dictators in Africa thereby keeping them beholden to London even after 
colonialism. Such a trend continues under American hegemony and Chinese 
influence. The only ones benefiting here were Tiny Rowland and Lonrho and 
similar Euro- North American capitalists and not Africans.
One company which epitomises capitalism and its extractive nature in colo-
nial and post- colonial Africa is Lonrho. The name says it all: loot Rhodesia, 
enrich and build London. Lonrho, now renamed Lonmin, was and still is a 
destructive company which was instrumental in looting and corrupting the 
colonies especially in Anglophone Africa. The same company was responsible 
for the deaths of 34 miners in Marikana in 2012 in South Africa’s North West 
province. The way Lonrho operated during the colonial period is exactly the 
same way in which Lonmin is operating in post- apartheid South Africa, that 
is, the ruthless extraction of minerals at whatever cost, including human lives.
Under the leadership of Tiny Rowland, Lonrho became the link between 
post- colonial African governments and the London administration. Lonrho 
was a perfect vehicle for the transmission and enforcement of instructions 
from London to the various capitals of the newly independent African states. 
The company was instrumental in ensuring that the interest of the (former) 
colonisers remained untouched and unthreatened. Lonrho was therefore 
basically a foreign policy arm of the British government in the wrongly 
named Commonwealth. The sum of the functions of such London- based 
African looting machines was that they acted in cahoots with the British gov-
ernment in ensuring that the United Kingdom continues to be underwritten 
by Africa. The effectiveness of the conglomerates in maintaining the power 
of the Empire effective in Africa was seem though how African states gained 
independence with de jure but not de facto sovereignty.
The empire and African states without de facto sovereignty
In tandem with the deployment of Hardt and Negri’s notion of empire (Hardt 
and Negri, 2000) it needs to be reemphasised that colonialism was not simply an 
expansion of geography, administration, population, and power. More import-
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on the colonised. Colonialism then and coloniality now capture and control 
human life itself, in one form or the other. Colonialism inaugurated the African 
as the fuel for capitalism, a raw material to be mined, processed, priced, and 
traded as a commodity.
The result of Africa’s colonialism was the establishment of the empire. In 
their seminal work simply titled, Empire, Hardt and Negri developed a pro-
pelling thesis in which they argued that the empire is the form of sovereignty 
which exists under conditions of globalisation (Hardt and Negri, 2000). By 
definition,
Empire is the new logic and structure of rule that has emerged with the 
globalisation of economic and cultural exchanges. It is the sovereign power 
that effectively regulates these global exchanges and thereby governs the 
world.
(Arrighi, 2002, p. 3)
For those in the (formerly) colonised parts of the world, the empire is schizo-
phrenic and bipolar. It has two personalities, the good (for its own children) 
and the bad (for the colonised). Euro- North America enjoys the best while 
Africa suffers the worst of the empire. Ndlovu- Gatsheni characterised this 
bipolarity thus,
… empire deposited its positive values and cultures of modernity, secularity, 
mass education, human rights, ethics, equality, development and democracy, 
whereas the latter emerges from an epistemic site where the darker aspects 
of empire that include mercantilism, the slave trade, imperialism, coloni-
alism, forcible Christianisation, apartheid, neo- colonialism, neo- liberalism, 
underdevelopment, “hot wars”, and structural adjustments, were the order 
of interactions.
(Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013b, p. 4)
After the “success” of the decolonisation project in Africa, the empire took over 
the project to continue the subjugation of Africa. With colonialism technically 
and officially gone from Africa, there was need for a new structure to continue 
what the colonisers could not do without – the subjugation of Africa. Having 
lived off Africa’s resources for decades, the (former) colonisers were in no way 
able to stand on their own without the cheap labour, resources, and epistemolo-
gies of Africa. A new plan and structure were put in place, and Hardt and Negri 
rightly contend that this was the empire.
Under globalisation, they argued, sovereignty was remodelled and rescaled 
away from the level of the nation- state upwards to the level of the global. 
Instead of sovereignty being vested in the nation- state, the empire ensured that 
it now resides within the power of global cartels which feed the empire. The 
link between cartels and the empire operates where, for example, cartels finance 
the presidential campaigns of especially United States presidential candidates 
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office. Arms manufacturers and financial cartels are the most notorious for pla-
cing their preferred candidates in office to, inter alia, preserve their interests and 
markets. In Africa, the opposite occurs, cartels assassinate or cause to be removed 
from office all presidents and public officials deemed to be antagonistic or non- 
compliant to their demands. The deaths of Patrice Lumumba, Thomas Sankara 
(Zeilig, 1962; Gerard and Kuklick, 2015), and Muammar Gaddafi (Campbell, 
2013) testify to this fact.
There is contestation over what constitutes the notion of sovereignty, with 
others refuting Hardt and Negri’s notion of the empire (Thompson, 2005; Toms, 
2008). Kevin Dunn, for example, argued that Africa had what he characterised 
as an ambiguous relation to empire. For Dunn,
Sovereignty is an institution or discourse that is constantly undergoing 
change and transformation, representing constituted and constituting 
power. It should never be assumed or taken as given, fixed, or immut-
able. While a paradigm of sovereignty has emerged in modern Western 
discourses, it is neither monolithic nor universally accepted and practiced.
(Dunn, 2004, p. 144)
Dunn is correct that sovereignty is contested, changes, and represents constituted 
and constituting power. The question is whose power constitutes sovereignty? The 
answer is that it is the power of the empire which constitutes and reconstitutes 
state sovereignty. State sovereignty was invented in Europe and politicised 
and instrumentalised so as to act as a weapon of disembowelling Euro- North 
America’s (former) colonies. The greatest irony in international relations is that 
after the Thirty Years’ War, Europeans agreed never ever to fight each other 
again, recognising and respecting each other’s sovereignty while agreeing to 
deny Africa its sovereignty, and instead partitioning and colonising the continent.
As a result, the African continent has in effect been rendered a eunuch and 
can no longer intervene in its own affairs in regulating the digital space so as 
to prevent the illicit mining of data. In Africa and other parts of the (formerly) 
colonised worlds,
… everyday relations with data are becoming colonial in nature; that is, they 
cannot be understood except as an appropriation in a form and on a scale 
that bears comparison with the appropriations of historical colonialism.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019)
Capitalism, as the underwriter of colonialism and coloniality, consciously and 
continuously reinvents itself to, inter alia:
 (1) Deal with new challenges such as was the case with decolonisation efforts.
 (2) Adapt to new challenges such as the Must Fall Movements.
 (3) Dispense challenges it cannot deal with or adapt to such as the latter- day 
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For Mahmood Mamdani, Africa is no longer accountable to its citizens but 
to international norms and standards that were developed by Euro- North 
American- centric multilateral institutions. These norms and principles include 
the responsibility to protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention (Mamdani, 
2009). Mamdani historicises and theorises this shift in sovereignty and account-
ability thus,
When World War II broke out, the international order could be divided 
into two unequal parts, one privileged, the other subjugated: on the one 
hand, a system of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere and, on the 
other, a colonial system in most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Post 
war decolonisation recognised former colonies as states, thereby embracing 
state sovereignty as a global principle of relations among states. The end 
of the Cold War has led to another basic shift, heralding an international 
humanitarian order that promises to hold state sovereignty accountable to 
an international human rights standard. Many believe that we are in the 
throes of a systemic transition in international relations. The standard of 
responsibility is no longer international law but has shifted, fatefully, from 
law to rights. As the Bush administration made patently clear at the time 
of the invasion of Iraq, humanitarian intervention does not need to abide 
by the law. Indeed, its defining characteristic is that it is beyond the law.
(Mamdani, 2009, pp. 273– 274)
Noam Chomsky agrees and argues that Euro- North American countries 
bestowed on themselves the responsibility to develop international norms and 
principles (Chomsky, 2003). Obviously, they develop these in their own favour 
and most damagingly, to perpetuate colonialism and the subjugation of Africa 
and other (formerly) colonised countries. Just as was the case during the slave 
trade Africa is once again at the receiving end of the empire’s brutality. This 
time, the difference is that the brutality is codified and presented as a civilised 
set of principles and norms. This is reminiscent of the misrepresentation of 
colonialism as a civilising mission.
The shift in state sovereignty and state accountability from citizens to norms 
and standards was codified in 2005 at the United Nations World Summit which 
resulted in the adoption of the now in vogue Millennium Declaration of the 
Millennium Development Goals which are now the Sustainable Development 
Goals. What is key is that the declaration claims the responsibility to protect 
what it terms “vulnerable people”. For Africans, Euro- North Americans are the 
most vulnerable people in the world. It is actually their vulnerability which led 
them to colonise Africa; it is also their vulnerability which led them into many 
wars and brutalities such as in Vietnam (1955– 1975), Falklands (1982), Korea 
(1950– 953), Libya (2011), Iraqi (2003– 2011), Syria (2011- ), and so on.
The vulnerability of the empire was demonstrated by Horace Campbell when 
he documented how the responsibility to protect was massively abused by the 
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2013). States can therefore be destroyed outrightly in the pursuit of politicised 
norms and principles which in actuality serve to protect vulnerable citizens of the 
empire. The big picture here was to (re)colonise Libya, thereby setting in motion 
the (re)colonisation of Africa. Libya was a good starting point as it targeted the 
“stubbornest” country to make an example of how the empire deals with dis-
contentment. Using an example on a different continent, the same argument can 
be made about the myth of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (Barnett and 
Duvall, 2005; Bellamy, 2005; Dodge, 2013; Evans, 2013). Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction are yet to be found almost 10 years after the end of the war and the 
assassination of Saddam Hussein (Edström and Gyllensporre, 2012). Again, these 
weapons were a disguise so that American- led Euro- North American interests 
could (re)colonise Iraq and have a field day sharing its oil resources.
The invasion of Iraq could not have been explained as the need to depose 
the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, for not following the dictates of the 
United States (coloniality); therefore, it was explained instead as due to 
Hussein being an undemocratic leader “in possession” of weapons of mass 
destruction. Once weapons were fabricated to implement wars; the neo-
liberal inversion of the rhetoric of modernity consists in fabricating wars 
to implement and sell weapons.
(Mignolo and Walsh, 2018, p. 141)
The same formula is now being applied in Africa using the 4IR and the notion 
of big data. There is a United Nations specialised agency which deals almost 
with every specific aspect of human life from postal services to health and even 
libraries. The United Nations is the undoubted extension of the victors of the 
Second World War’s foreign policies. Hardt and Negri saw this as problematic, 
thus asserting,
The birth of the United Nations at the end of the Second World War 
merely reinitiated, consolidated, and extended this developing international 
juridical order that was first European but progressively became com-
pletely global. The United Nations, in effect, can be regarded as the cul-
mination of this entire constitutive process, a culmination that both reveals 
the limitations of the notion of international order and points beyond it 
toward a new notion of global order.
(Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 4)
The empire made sure that it outsourced the manning of global affairs to this 
multilateral institution called the United Nations and its various specialised 
agencies. Laws are now being made at the United Nations and brought down 
to national governments to domesticate without much input and debate at the 
local level (Mude, 2014a, 2014b). A practical example is Regulation of Interception 
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In order to legalise and normalise global surveillance especially of the poor 
in Africa, laws had to be formed at the highest level which made it virtually 
impossible for African states to maintain their online data and digital sover-
eignty. This is what Hardt and Negri meant when they postulated that sov-
ereignty was rescaled upwards from the nation- state to the empire. With the 
interception of communications gazetted and legislated at every nation- state 
level, the empire literally has ears all over the world. The fact that data is the 
new oil completes the puzzle for the (re)colonisation of Africa. The various 
technologies of the 4IR are the new clothes for the empire, to borrow the 
words of Paul Passavant and Jodi Dean (Passavant and Dean, 2004). They the 
empire access to every corner of the world, thereby fulfilling words one the 
archi-colonialist, Cecil John Rhodes that the sun must never set on the British 
empire.
The consolidation of coloniality in Africa
There are many motivations for Euro- North America to (re)colonise Africa. 
Before colonising Africa, Europe was a poor continent. Ironically, it is Europe 
which first colonised the Americas when the Vikings left Scandinavia for what 
is now Newfoundland. Fast forward to the Second World War when it was 
America’s turn to colonise Europe. Europe became poorer as a colony of the 
United States whose main interest was to contain the advancement of com-
munism from the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and East 
Europe towards West Europe. Today Euro- North America is one of the richest 
regions in the world; these riches can be largely attributed to the colonisation 
of Africa and other parts of the (formerly) colonised world. Two structures were 
produced by colonialism – empire and cartels. The contribution of cartels to 
the empire and how the empire is responsible for the (re)colonisation of Africa 
will be discussed later.
A reconceptualisation and rereading of colonialism is necessary here. 
To colonise is to make another country (the colony) dependent on another 
(the empire), usually by force or through the deployment of power including 
soft power. The dependence has to be that of a large extent. The word “col-
onise” is derived from various Latin words (1) colere which means to cultivate, 
(2) colonia meaning a landed estate or a farm, and (3) colonus, a tiller of the 
soil, a farmer. Drawing on its etymology, a colonialist is one who inhabits and 
farms land which does not belong to him. He owns, dwells, and farms that 
land by force. There is a direct link between being a coloniser (colonus), and its 
opposite corollary, dispossession, oppression, enslavement, and marginalisation 
of the colonised. In the 4IR, the colonialists are the data farmers who mine 
data from users of smart devices, commodify the data, and sell it. These data 
farmers of the 4IR are the conceptual and in some cases actual descendants 
of the first industrial revolution’s slave owners and the second industrial 
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Another motivation for the (re)colonisation of Africa is the sustained 
growth in the sovereign debt of both Europe and the United States (Mann 
and Haugaard, 2011; Xaba, 2011; Zielonka, 2013; Benyera, 2020a). For Francis 
Fukuyama, the irony is that the “birthplace” of democracy was also the birth-
place of the European Union’s financial crisis. He noted,
Beginning in late 2009 and steadily intensifying thereafter, the European 
Union was shaken by a financial crisis that has threatened the future of the 
euro as a currency and the EU as an institutional framework for promoting 
peace and economic growth. At the centre of the crisis lay the inability of 
certain EU countries, in particular Greece and Italy, to repay the sizable 
sovereign debt that had accumulated in the previous decade. The sovereign 
debt crisis quickly evolved into a banking crisis for Europe as a whole, as 
the viability of the financial institutions holding this debt was called into 
question.
(Fukuyama, 2014, p. 6)
Greece’s financial crisis quickly spread to the rest of the European Union and 
the viability of the EU’s whole financial sector was under threat from the 
moment Greece joined the European Union in 2001. Having struggled with 
this and other crises, the European Union and its allies have one solution which 
is to export the crisis by (re)colonising Africa.
Besides the EU problem child Greece, the bloc is teetering on the verge of 
chaos with one of the main members, the United Kingdom, having Brexited. 
The bulk of European Union member states are in some or other financial 
crisis and these include Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland (Xaba, 2011). This 
leaves Germany and France to carry the European Union through these finan-
cial and political crises. As a main member of the European Union it is a stated 
fact that France cannot survive without looting its (former) colonies in Africa 
(Chafer, 2002; Ogunmola, 2009; Burgis, 2015; Eckert, 2016). French public 
and private opinion is unanimous on “the fact that restoring the greatness of 
France could come only from its Empire and not in its strong integration in 
the structures of global economy” (Bost, 1999). On its own, France cannot 
carry itself, let alone lead the EU, hence its vested interest in all its (former) 
colonies.
With an increased burden of being the senior member of the European 
Union, France is now more motivated than ever to (re)colonise Central, North, 
and West Africa. This background explains France’s action in West African “Sahel 
conflicts” in Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. The develop-
ment in 2009 in which francophone countries came up with their own cur-
rency separate from the Euro was a farce as this new currency was pegged to the 
Euro and its foreign exchange reserves are still held by the French central bank.
France’s overreliance on its colonies which is hurting and haunting it today was 
initiated by its decision to grant its colonies pseudo- independence. When France 
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in one year, this pseudo- benevolence was actually the height of coloniality. As 
a precondition for being granted “independence”, France retained four major 
aspects of these (former) colonies economies. These are: (1) defence, (2) finance, 
(3) natural resources, and (4) international relations. Up to this day, France’s 
(former) colonies pay reparation to France for the “benefits” of slavery and 
colonialism which these (former) colonies are supposedly enjoying (Koutonin, 
2014). Needless to state that the opposite must be happening as it constitutes 
restitutive justice, that is, France must pay reparations to all its (former) colonies 
for the theft, agony, and humiliation of slavery and colonialism.
As for the United Kingdom, its life is underwritten by Southern and Eastern 
Africa. The United Kingdom is essentially a barren, cold, small country. Its soil 
is not fertile hence its aggressive policies towards Zimbabwe’s land reform pro-
gramme. Zimbabwe was punished by the United Kingdom and its allies for its 
2000 land reform programme because, for them, Zimbabwe was setting a dan-
gerous precedent for their (former) colonies. The UK has some of the world’s 
largest gold reserves, yet their country does is not endowed with gold resources 
as its (former) colonies, especially Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Their 
gold mines are in Ghana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and other African countries. 
(C)overtly, the United Kingdom cannot do without the economy of Zimbabwe 
and South Africa in the same way in which France cannot do without the 
economy of the Ivory Coast.
The UK’s imperial priority was to have five colonies developed into white 
supremacist colonies. These five were Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe (Bowman, 1973). The UK succeeded in Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand but ultimately failed in South Africa and failed 
dismally in Zimbabwe. The West’s belligerent response to land reform in 
Africa, especially in Zimbabwe and South Africa, must be viewed against this 
background.
Elsewhere, both European and American sovereign debt was constantly on 
the rise with devastating consequences for both. According to Xaba,
Citizens had a rude awakening when the pyramid scheme collapsed, 
triggered by American subprime mortgage speculation. Their dream 
became a nightmare and reality hit home. European governments and their 
citizens were always broke. Their lavish lifestyle was sustained by an artificial 
economy. The pension fund did not save money and public tax revenue was 
below health, social welfare and educational needs. Germany cannot sus-
tain its efforts of bailing out its wasteful neighbours. Europe is desperate. … 
America’s base for economic success is Africa and her resources.
(Xaba, 2011)
With both the European Union and the United States in persistent financial 
crises, Africa’s (re)colonisation offers them a soft landing. These crises will not 
end as the problem creating them is inherent in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
which created the EU’s common currency, the Euro, without creating the 
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concomitant framework for a corresponding common fiscal policy. In a nut-
shell, capitalism is in a big crisis and according to Samir Amin this is because,
… the contradictions of globalised capitalism, unfolding in real societies, 
have become such that capitalism puts human civilisation itself in danger. 
Capitalism has had its day. The destructive dimension that its develop-
ment always included now prevails by far over the constructive one that 
characterised the progressive role it fulfilled in history.
(Amin, 2009, p. 8)
Stated differently, the good that capitalism did is far outweighed by the bad 
which it did during the same period. And to be precise, it is Euro- North 
America which is dragging the rest of Africa into its crises as the former cannot 
surving without the later. Colonialism cemented the (former) colonisers and 
the (former) colonised in a somewhat umbilical relationship. In this relation-
ship one is the parasite (Euro North America) and the other (Africa) is the host. 
Any attempts by the host to end this relationship were bitterly defended by the 
parasite. This explains the wars in Libya and West Africa which were disguised as 
fighting for the human rights of Africans, yet they were wagged for the survival 
of the (former) colonosers.
France cannot survive without looting from West Africa and North Africa. 
West Africa rumbles for real sovereignty made Sarkozy to run like a headless 
chicken in defiance of the spirit of international law and destroying the cred-
ibility of international institutions. Libya’s intension to encourage West African 
countries to participate in new banking system that is not based on the French 
currency made Sarkozy mad. Ivory Coast’s desire for self- determination pushed 
Sarkozy to limits. Self- determination meant removal of French hegemony 
over Ivorian economy and military. Ivory Coast is the hub of West African 
economic activity and therefore loosing Ivory Coast meant losing the whole 
region. Imagine what will happen to French without West Africa. France had 
to go to war with Libya and Ivory Coast, not for the protection of civilians 
or promotion of democratic values but for safeguarding its economic interest 
(Xaba, 2011).
A key motivation for the (re)colonisation of Africa by the empire is located 
in Euro- North American modernity and its link with coloniality. There are 
two types of modernities which are often fatally conflated, African modernity 
and Euro- North American modernity. Euro- North American modernity was 
imposed on Africa, and it interrupted, and hijacked African modernity.
Euro- North American modernity began in Europe during the Renaissance as 
a break from European traditional culture which had dominated their ideology 
and mostly feudal way of living. This form of modernity is organised around 
the principle that human beings, individually and collectively, are responsible 
for their own history. This is a break from the past where history was attributed 
to God and supernatural powers. With Euro- North American modernity also 
came the notion of reason and the reconceptualisation of democracy. Having 
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developed like this in Europe and then exported to the colonies, Africans were 
henceforth trapped in an unwinnable, perpetual race to play catch-up with the 
moving target of having to become democratic, modern, and civilised people. 
There is an asymmetrical relationship between those catching up and those to 
be caught up with. Writing in his Frankfurt Lectures, Enrique Dussel defined 
and contextualised Euro-North American modernity as,
… an essentially or exclusively European phenomenon. In these lectures, 
I will argue that modernity is, in fact, a European phenomenon but one 
constituted in a dialectical relation with a non- European alterity that is 
its ultimate content. Modernity appears when Europe affirms itself as 
the “centre” of a World History that it inaugurates: the “periphery” that 
surrounds this centre is consequently part of its self- definition. The occlusion 
of this periphery (and of the role of Spain and Portugal in the formation 
of the modern world system from the late fifteenth to the mid- seven-
teenth centuries) leads the major contemporary thinkers of the “centre” 
into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity. If their 
understanding of the genealogy of modernity is thus partial and provincial, 
their attempts at a critique or defence of it are likewise unilateral and, in 
part, false.
(Dussel, 1993, p. 65) 
There are key attributes to Euro- North American modernity which we can 
tease from Enrique Dussel’s definition. Firstly, and essentially, Euro- North 
American modernity is exclusively a European creation and a European phe-
nomenon. Secondly, it is constitutive of and constituted by its creation which 
is the periphery, in this case Africa. Dussel notes that Euro- North American 
modernity is constituted in a dialectical relationship with non- Euro- North 
Americans. The same argument was made by Walter Rodney when he argued 
how Europe underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 1973) and by Kwazi Mhango 
when he argued how Africa developed Europe (Mhango, 2018). Euro- North 
American modernity affirms itself by “unfirming” others that are non- Euro- 
North American. Euro- North America inaugurated itself as the centre of the 
world and by centring itself it alternatively decentred the rest of the world.
There is a peculiarity and exceptionalism about Euro- North American 
modernity. For Dussel, it construes itself as prototype and peculiar from the rest. 
In order to affirm and create this dialectical relationship, it uses colonialism and 
(re)colonisation. These are dialectical relations wherein the exceptional centre 
oppresses, tortures, steals, kills, subjugates, dispossesses, and misrepresents the per-
ipheral other in order to achieve its goal of domination. The exceptional centre 
tortures and (re)colonises the peripheral other in order to afford the centre an 
exceptional first- class life. The centre dispenses hell in the (former) colonies in 
order to deliver heaven to itself. Using the locus of enunciation, we learn that 
the empire is schizophrenic and suffers from bipolar disorder. It tortures the 
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modernity has two opposite sides, an underside (the colonised other) and a 
top side (the colonising exceptional prototype) (Patterson, 1984; Dussel, 1996; 
Gordon, 2008b; Maldonado- Torres, 2008; Mignolo, 2011; Warikandwa, 2017). 
However, those residing on the underside of Euro- North American modernity 
should never be forced to perceive and interpret life through the perspective of 
those located on the top side of Euro- North American modernity.
The result of this dialectical relationship is eurocentrism (Said, 1977, 1991, 
2010; Dussel, 1993, 2000, 2019; Aníbal Quijano, 2000; Amin, 2009; Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni, 2013c).
Then there is African modernity which was interrupted, hijacked, and 
vanquished by the colonisers, a notion referred to as the theft of African history 
(Goody, 2009). For Táíwò, colonialism pre- empted African modernity (Táíwò, 
2009) and in the process rendered Africa susceptible to (re)colonisation. The 
pre- empting of Africa’s modernity was akin to removing a person’s white blood 
cells. Without white blood cells, the human body’s immune system becomes 
defenceless even against the least lethal infection.
One aspect of African modernity which was replaced with a Euro- North 
American one was the African university which existed as a community of 
scholars and their students who would meet to debate and solve the problems 
of their communities in general and humanity at large. Demonstrating how 
advanced the African university was well before colonialism, Malawian his-
torian Paul Tiyembe Zelela states,
One country where monastic education developed early was Ethiopia 
where Christianity was introduced in the fourth century A.D. and became 
the state religion. From the period of the Zagwe dynasty in the twelfth 
century this system included higher education, which was largely restricted 
to the clergy and nobility. At the bottom of the system was the Qine Bet 
(School of Hymns), followed by the Zema Bet (School of Poetry), and at 
the pinnacle was an institution called Metsahift Bet (School of the Holy 
Books) that provided a broader and more specialised education in religious 
studies, philosophy, history, and the computation of time and calendar, 
among various subjects.
(Zelela, 2006)
This system of education was later to be reproduced in ancient Greece and 
credited to Greek thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato. The stratification of edu-
cation, the focus on disciplines such as religious studies, philosophy, history, 
and the computation of time and calendar have long ceased to be credited to 
Africans.
The idea that colonialism introduced modernity to Africa is both mali-
cious and outright mischievous as the opposite is in fact true, that is, that there 
were two competing modernities, one Euro- North American and one African. 
African modernity predates colonialism. In fact, African civilisations were 
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systems which were in tandem with local soils, rainfall patterns, and different 
terrains (Beach, 1974, 1976b; Anta Diop, 1987b, 1991; Rasmussen, 2014; 
Medupe, 2015). Human security was advanced and not only from a military 
and defence perspective, but also from a food security, public health, and climate 
change perspective.
European culprits responsible for halting and hijacking Africa’s modernity 
were the aforementioned missionaries, hunters, explorers, traders, and military 
adventurers (Táíwò, 2009, p. 5). Euro- North American modernity in Africa was 
inaugurated by mainly missionaries, most of whom were increasingly African. 
This as European missionaries recruited and converted locals, especially the 
African aristocracy, to preach and convert their fellow Africans and subjects. 
African missionaries were therefore the mechanism through which African 
transitioned from its own modernity to Euro- North American modernity. In 
this regard Táíwò writes,
The transition to modernity was inaugurated under the direction of native 
agency in the context of the propagation of Christianity, civilisation, and 
commerce.
(Táíwò, 2009, p. 8)
Once “civilisation” and commerce entered Africa through the church and the 
church seeped through the local aristocracy, African modernity suffered one of 
the following three fates. It was (1) usurped if considered a threat; (2) demonised 
if considered manageable; and (3) appropriated and regulated if considered pal-
atable and useful. This is how the Great Zimbabwe empire fell.
The link between capitalism, Euro- North American modernity, and the 
slave trade still applies to the impeding (re)colonisation of Africa (Tomich 
and Zeuske, 2008; Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019). Colonialism has an 
enduring function which it performs for capitalism. This function is for the,
… illegitimate appropriation and exploitation and … redefining [of] 
human relations so that the resulting dispossession comes to seem natural. 
It is such continuities that the term data colonialism enables us to grasp.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019) [own emphasis]
Colonialism and Euro- North American modernity play three important roles 
in the survival and functioning of capitalism: (1) they enable the looting of 
resources from the colonies to the empire; (2) they enable the redefinition 
and reclassification of human relations; and (3) they normalise the resultant 
human relations, thievery, and enslavement. Once Euro- North American mod-
ernity and colonialism structured people into slavery/ slave masters, colonised/ 
colonisers, civilised/ uncivilised, black/ white, it often normalised these 
classifications through laws, religion, violence, war, and education, inter alia.
Racial classes and ethnicities were created by the colonisers as a weapon of 
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division was especially pronounced in South Africa where the policies of apart-
heid and Bantustans became normalised and are still as effective today as they 
were during their official days.
By compelling us to declare whether we belong to this or that so- called 
“race”, the state forces us into a racial mould, whether we like it or not. 
Eventually, a racial habitus takes hold of us so that we take it for granted 
that we belong to this or that so- called “race” and we assume the relevant 
racial identity. This is what happened during the colonial- apartheid era and 
this is, preposterously, what continues to happen in post- apartheid South 
Africa, allegedly in order to benefit the oppressed and exploited majority.
(Alexander, 2013, pp. 159– 160)
The normalisation of racism, ethnicity, xenophobia, sexism, and other nega-
tive -isms through practice, legislation, and violence makes it easy for the (re)
colonisation of Africa as Africans will be divided and not united. Disunity is a 
propitious environment for (re)colonisation.
It is against the background of all these Euro- North American modernity 
inaugurated negative -isms that we view coloniality. Coloniality renders the 
subjugation of Africa and Africans, data slavery, racism, sexism, and patriarchy 
normal. By its nature, capitalism must accumulate and that happens through 
expansion. A new avenue of expansion is through data slavery and the (re)col-
onisation of Africa. Having exhausted current sources of its livelihood, capit-
alism must find new ways of making profit and finding new markets, just like it 
did when Africa was first colonised.
A question may be asked: how exactly is data slavery occurring? The answer 
is hidden in plain sight. Ever pondered why is it that for all the services, apps 
and Google searches, Google never sends you a bill? Contrary to conventional 
thinking, Human beings are not Google’s customers, but they are Google’s 
products. Human beings are no longer a source of production but are now 
the product to be mined day and night. Human life is now a raw material to 
be exploited and colonised. The 4IR is leading to the (re)colonisation not of 
countries and lands, but the (re)colonisation of human life itself, as captured by 
data. If something is raw, it is ready and available for processing and transform-
ation. An African is both raw and a material to be owned, patented, commodi-
fied, and exploited just like the sugar plantations in Haiti and the Caribbean, the 
cotton plantations in the Southern states of the United America, and the coltan 
in Bisie Mountain, Walikale Territory, North Kivu Province, DRC.
In this emerging form of capitalism, human beings become not just actors 
in the production process but raw material that can be transformed into 
value for that production process.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019)
Africa has four billion mobile users and that is a massive market for data miners 
and scavengers who will do anything to lay their hands on this raw resource. 
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Inasmuch as the abolishment of the slave trade did not end slavery and inas-
much as decolonisation processes did not end colonialism, Africa will be 
(re)colonised because the conditions which led to its initial colonisation which 
existed in the colonising countries of Euro- North America still exist today 
even more than they did then. So, how will Africa be (re)colonised in the 4IR?
Africa’s cyberspace as terra nullius, res nullius, and tabula rasa
There are three principles that underlined and which the empire relied on 
to colonise Africa. These are terra nullius, res nullius, and tabula rasa. The first 
implies that the continent was unoccupied, that is, there were no inhabitants. 
Res nullius implies that Africa was a no man’s land, it had no owners. Tabula rasa 
means that Africa was effectively an empty slate (Nhemachena, Hlabangana 
and Matowanyika, 2020a, p. 7). These three need to be unpacked first in their 
relation to the colonial project and subsequently to the (re)colonisation project.
Why was Africa described as an empty and unoccupied land, a no man’s 
land and an empty slate? The answer is found in the notion of the coloniality of 
being. Colonisers did not perceive Africans as human beings, let alone human 
beings equal to the European colonisers. The Herero genocide (Anderson, 
2005; Eckert, 2016; Madziyauswa, 2019) and the writings of Joseph Conrad 
attest to this reality (Nyamnjoh, 2004; Conrad, 2008). In order to (re)colonise 
Africa, Euro- North Americans had to doubt the humanity of Africans. When 
European hunters, traders, and explorers visited Africa for the first time and saw 
no white person, they then concluded that there were no people. Because for 
them a person was only a human being if they were white, specifically a white 
Caucasian man.
When they therefore reported back to the “metropolis”, they reported 
that they encountered only empty land with no other people (read white) in 
the vicinity. The same logic explains why David Livingstone “discovered” the 
Victoria Falls in 1855 (Livingstone, 1857, 1861; Kleeberger, 1925; Siddle, 1974), 
and why the source of the Nile River was “discovered” by John Hannings Speke 
in 1862 (Speke, 1864, 1908). The same logic is also behind how Vasco da Gama 
“discovered” the Americas. That is what Nelson Maldonado-Torres correctly 
termed imperial Manichean misanthropic scepticism at its best (Maldonado-
Torres 2007, p. 245). It is the notion of viewing people from Euro- North 
America as the prototype of humanity. The rest are then classified as non- white, 
meaning that black people deviate from the prototype of humanity, which is 
a white person, albeit not every white person but specifically a Euro- North 
American white person.
The reason why Africa was described as a tabula rasa, an empty slate, is because 
notwithstanding the existence of many African civilisations prior to Europeans’ 
arrival in Africa, for the European coloniser only European civilisation essen-
tially meant civilisation. Hence the notion of colonialism as a civilising mission.
Coming from a different civilisation and a different cosmology, one can be 
forgiven for concluding that places where there were no household dwellings 
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misconstrued as empty lands. The truth is that those areas, forests, and places had 
inhabitants. Those were also the places where African ancestors and the ances-
tral spirits dwelled – hence the notion of forests as sacred spiritual dwelling 
places for the spirits (Karambakuwa and Mangwende, 2010; Mawere, 2010, 
2012; Ngara, Mangizvo and Mangizvi, 2013). Colonialism was therefore a 
double jeopardy for Africa because it colonised the land of the living living and 
also the land of the living dead, the ancestral spirits.
Having been described as empty, unowned, and unoccupied lands, Africa 
was open for colonisation. The same template is today being used for Africa’s 
cyberspace and other online spaces for which there is an ongoing scramble 
in order to occupy and control. Tech companies from Euro- North America, 
China, and Japan are jostling to gain a foothold and dominate Africa’s cyber-
space. The Chinese, through their tech company Huawei, and WeChat the 
messaging app, are leading together with South Korea’s Samsung (Burgis, 
2015; Manu, 2015; Gavaza, 2019). Others competing in this space are Finland’s 
Nokia and Swedish telecommunications and networking equipment company 
Eriksson. There is also competition for Africa’s cyberspace from Facebook, 
Alphabet, and other Euro- North American tech companies that are offering 
apps and owning the social media space.
As postulated by Hardt and Negri, the empire works by rescaling sover-
eignty away from individuals and the nation- state and cedes it to the empire 
of which the big tech companies are an integral part (Hardt and Negri, 2000). 
“Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, 
the sovereign power that governs the world” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. xi). 
Data sovereignty of individual Africans and African states is being mined, stolen, 
and abducted by these companies. The unearthing of this scandal by Edward 
Snowden is just a fraction of the scandal (Lyon, 2014). The empire vested itself 
with sovereignty together with its agencies and benefactors. Hardt and Negri 
assert the following,
This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire. The 
declining sovereignty of nation- states and their increasing inability to 
regulate economic and cultural exchanges is in fact one of the primary 
symptoms of the coming Empire. It is a decentered and deterritorialising 
apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm 
within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, 
flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks 
of command.
(Hardt and Negri, 2000, pp. xii– xiii)
The declining power of individuals and nation- states to own and control their 
sovereignties will be accompanied by an increasing inability to regulate their 
economic, cultural, political, and digital spheres. The empire therefore decentres 
and deterritorialises both the individual and the nation- state. The sovereignties 
that would have been appropriated by the empire will be custodianed by what 
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“networks of coloniality” and “colonialities of network” (Nhemachena, 2018). 
Decentred and deterritorialised from themselves and from Africa, Africans and 
Africa will be ripe and ready for (re)colonisation. This is exactly the same way 
slavery and colonialism occurred in Africa. It commenced with denying the 
humanity and sovereignty of the would- be victims before stealing their sover-
eignty, enslaving the victims and colonising them.
Of the two triads plus China and the squeezing of Africa
The known triad in international relations consists of the US, Western Europe, 
and Japan (Amin, 2001, p. 3). There is, however, another triad marauding Africa’s 
poor, squeezing itself in- between African citizens and their governments. 
According to Issa Gulamhussein Shivji, this omnipresent and all- powerful, all- 
knowing triad consists of,
…the “DONs” (donor organisations), the “INFOs” (international finan-
cial organisations) and the NGOs, including “GoNGOs” (government- 
organised NGOs) and the “DoNGOs” (donor- organised NGOs).
(Shivji, 2007, p. 25)
These NGOs, as part of this triad, through their advisors and consultants, have 
not only hijacked Africa’s resources but also Africa’s problems, misrepresenting 
themselves as friends of the poor when in fact they are agents of imperialism 
and the (re)colonisation of Africa. Using the colonially invented, politicised, and 
misleading notion of development, Western NGOs have relegated the state in 
Africa to a role similar to that of spectator ions in a chemical reaction. Shivji has 
no kind words for these NGOs, noting that,
In this “discourse” the developmental role of the state is declared dead and 
buried. Instead, it is assigned the role of “chief ” to supervise the globalisa-
tion project under the tutelage of imperial – now called development –  
partners or “true friends”. The irony of the recent British Commission 
for Africa was that it was convened, constituted and chaired by a British 
prime minister, while an African president and a prime minister sat on it 
as members. This symbolises the nature of the so- called “new partnership”.
(Shivji, 2007, p. 25)
Development is a doctrine developed by the West to justify their various 
interventions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Development was politicised and 
then deployed in Africa. The notion of development has been politicised espe-
cially by the triad of the USA, Western Europe, and Japan plus one, that is, China, 
for two purposes. Firstly, to prop up juntas, dictators, and illegal regimes in Africa 
which in return allowed them unfettered access to their country’s resources. 
Secondly, the notion of development allowed the two triads plus China to crowd 
out genuine development partners intending to pursue sustainable development 
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China, even for the things that Africa is endowed with. These conditions created 
very fertile conditions for the (re)colonisation of Africa in the 4IR.
With the triads of the United States of America, Western Europe, and Japan 
on one hand, and that of Western donor organisations, the international finan-
cial organisations, and the NGOs on the other, Africa faces yet another form 
of (re)colonisation, this time from China. That China has been involved in 
the second scramble for Africa’s rare earth minerals and is positioning itself 
to (re)colonise Africa has long been established in scholarship (Skocpol, 1979; 
Broadman, 2008; Burgess and Beilstein, 2013; Mohan and Lampert, 2013; 
Niu, 2014; Gu et al., 2016; Dobler, 2017). The consequence on Africa of all 
these pressures is that Africa lost its own triad of esse, nosse, and posse (being, 
knowing, and having power) (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 407). For decolonial 
scholars, courtesy of the various and never- ending colonial onslaughts, Africa 
now experiences coloniality of being (Maldonado- Torres, 2007), knowledge 
(Grosfoguel, 2007b), and power (Aníbal Quijano, 2000), the market (Tafira and 
Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2017), human rights (Maldonado- Torres, 2018), and finally 
of nature (Francis, 2020).
China’s (re)colonisation: He who owns the debt  
controls the continent
China’s grand strategy to restore itself as a great power is three- pronged: (1) by 
2021 to double its 2010 gross domestic product to $12 trillion; (2) acquire more 
regional and global leadership status; and (3) attain world class power and status 
by 2049, which is the year of the centenary of the Communist Party of China 
(Swaine, 2015; Cai, 2017; Nantulya, 2018; Gupta, 2019). China believes that 
Africa is the enabler to achieving the above three goals. Africa is indispensable 
to China’s international relations ambitions and this hardens China’s resolve to 
dominate Africa and in the process crowd out Japan, the US, the UK, and France.
China is very innovative in its response to the competition for Africa’s 
resources coming from both the (former) colonisers and some Arab coun-
tries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. China is not a 
new entrant into African politics. Under Chairman Mao Tse Tung’s leadership, 
China was an ally to most nationalist parties that were fighting for the inde-
pendence of their respective African countries. Under Mao’s leadership China 
supported infrastructure projects in Africa which it believed would help unify 
Africa. These include the 1,860 km, US$400 million Tanzania- Zambia Railway 
Authority (Tazara) railway line project which links Zambia and Tanzania. Built 
between 1970 and 1975, China provided most of the funding as a grant.
Communist China offered ideological support, ammunition, refuge, training, 
moral and financial resources to most nationalist parties. These include the African 
National Congress of South Africa (ANC), Chama Cha Mapinduzi of Tanzania 
(CCM), Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA), Southwest African Peoples Organization of Namibia (SWAPO), 
and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). China also 
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countries such as in Angola where it supported two rebel groups: the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência 
Total de Angola or UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola or FNLA) (Meservey, 2018). China therefore 
has an established foothold in Africa that is even stronger than that of the (former) 
colonisers, especially Britain, France, and Portugal. Seen as an all- weather friend, 
China finds it easy to “invest” in Africa. Competition for Africa’s dominance for 
China came from the United kingdom yet the United Kingdom does not have a 
post- colonial continent-wide project in Africa.
It is, thus, frustrating that in its complicated, enmeshed, centuries- long his-
tory in Africa, there has never been a Western proposal for continental- 
scale infrastructure building. Outside Cecil John Rhodes’s racist “civilising” 
project of connecting Cape to Cairo from the 1870s, there has never been 
any programme, backed by financial resources, to build Africa’s rail, roads, 
ports, water- filtration plants, or power stations. It was the Chinese who 
sought to build a road, rail and maritime infrastructure network to link 
Africa’s economies with the rest of the world.
(Moore, 2020, p. 2)
While the UK is absent when it comes to Africa- wide infrastructure develop-
ment and investment, it is the leading economy when it comes to harvesting 
wealth from Africa. This phenomenon amounts to coloniality of power wherein 
the United Kingdom uses its colonial networks and cartels to continue pil-
laging Africa.
… 101 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange — most of them 
British — have mining operations in 37 sub- Saharan African countries and 
they collectively control over $1- trillion worth of Africa’s most valuable 
resources.
(Moore, 2020, pp. 1– 2)
This denotes coloniality at its worst because without any rules forbidding the 
United Kingdom from benefiting from its historical colonial past, it continues 
to harvest the economic and political benefits of its imperial past. By its nature, 
coloniality benefits the (former) colonisers as it allows them to enjoy the cumu-
lative and multiplier effects of their past endeavours and benefits in Africa, no 
matter how ill- gotten they were.
While the UK is generally absent from Africa- wide developmental projects, 
China’s investments in Africa are actually its way into the (re)colonisation of 
the continent. Having abandoned the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola) in favour of the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) in Angola, 
China also ditched Frelimo and started supporting the Comité Revolucionário 
de Moçambique or COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique) in 
Mozambique. This demonstrates China’s modus operandi, political expediency, 
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China is clearly at the forefront of increasing its presence and influence in 
Africa, covertly and overtly. Its main strategy is its global infrastructure programme 
known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Belt and Road Initiative is 
not something new but actually unfinished business for China. While Tazara was 
a “gift” to Africa, the Belt and Road Initiative is actually a curse disguised as a 
means to enhance infrastructure, trade, and development links between China, 
Africa, the Gulf countries, Asia, and Europe. The BRI is an intrinsic web of 
Chinese state- funded infrastructure projects which officially is aimed at allevi-
ating global logistical challenges faced by poor countries. However, in reality, 
this is China flexing its soft power and indulging in debt- trap diplomacy (Gupta, 
2019). Debt- trap diplomacy is the act of seducing poor countries, usually in 
Africa, with debts which end up resulting in their (re)colonisation by China as 
these African countries eventually fail to repay the Chinese debt. Between 2000 
and 2017, Chinese loans to Africa amounted to US$143 billion. Strategic and 
mineral- rich countries are on top of the list of countries having received these 
loans. According to Gupta, the top five African recipients of China’s aid are the 
DRC, Angola, former Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Gupta, 2019). The DRC 
with its abundance of rare earth minerals got US$7.4 billion, oil- rich Angola got 
a whopping US$43 billion, East- Africa powerhouse Kenya got US$9.8 billion, 
and Sudan before the breakup got US$6.5 billion, while geopolitically strategic 
Ethiopia got US$14 billion. Eventually these countries and others in Africa will 
be (re)colonised, this time by China, through the process where they will swap 
their huge debt for natural resources. This process has already started to occur 
in Zimbabwe where the Chinese now own vast tracks of the most fertile land 
which ironically was confiscated predominantly from former white commer-
cial farmers, most of whom were of British origin. (Burgess & Beilstein, 2013; 
Gu et al., 2016; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Scoones, 2014). China is therefore 
emerging as the biggest beneficiary of the hotly contested 2000 land reform 
programme, also known as the Third Chimurenga. The Chinese emerging dom-
inance in fertile land ownership in Zimbabwe is akin to replacing one coloniser 
(the British) with another coloniser (the Chinese) in the process leaving the 
Zimbabwean citizens still marginalised and fertile, productive land deprived.
China is also proactively training Africa’s future leaders, thereby guaranteeing 
its interest when leadership inevitably changes in Africa. China is particularly 
interested in the next generation of African elites. Last year, Beijing announced it 
would invite 1,000 young African politicians for training in China, after hosting 
more than 200 of them between 2011 and 2015. Thousands of African students are 
pursuing undergraduate and graduate degrees in China on scholarship programmes 
funded by Beijing. As of 2017, more Anglophone African students study in China 
than the United States or the United Kingdom, their traditional destinations of 
choice (Kuo, 2017). China has thus used the tried and tested method of offering 
scholarships as a way of exerting the most soft power on Africa. Here China will 
be taking competition to its Anglo- Saxon, French, and Portuguese competitors.
Since 2011, when South Sudan was established China has given at least 
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officials. In August 2017 China pledged to offer at least 240 more scholarships. 
The China- South Sudan Friendship Association, headed by a former foreign 
minister and partly sponsored by the Chinese embassy, embeds South- Sudanese 
businesspeople with Chinese companies (Kuo, 2017). In July 2018, while offi-
cially laying the foundation of the US$ 45 million Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial 
Academy, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China,
… will provide leadership training to emerging leaders from countries 
governed by the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA). 
… African National Congress of South Africa, Chama Cha Mapinduzi of 
Tanzania, Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola, Southwest African Peoples Organization of 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.
(Nantulya, 2018)
With its soft power firmly projected in the whole continent, China’s backing 
of the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa includes making 
sure that they stay in office for their mutual benefit. The competition for the 
control of Africa is why Euro- North American “democracies” support liberal 
opposition political parties such as the Movement For Democratic Change 
in Zimbabwe whereas China supports its comrades with whom it walked the 
liberation journey – liberation here meaning liberating both Africa and China 
from Euro- North American colonialism.
It is thus clear that one way in which China is increasing its presence in 
Africa is through infrastructure development and finance lending. Ordinarily, 
most of Africa’s debt to China can be considered bad debt. China often finances 
corrupt governments, dictatorships, and even illegal African regimes. China also 
prefers targeting countries that are mineral- rich. What is the big picture here 
for China? Known as debt- book diplomacy (Walker, 2009; Wong, 2015; Dobler, 
2017; Nantulya, 2018), China lends money to countries which it knows will 
not be capable of repaying that debt financially. Instead, China then opts for 
a swap of the debt for natural resources. As mentioned above, equity for debt 
swaps have already happened in Zimbabwe, with China aiming to swap US$ 
150 billion of global debt in this way, most of which is owed by African coun-
tries (Weinland and Wildau, 2017). African resources on the Chinese’s debt for 
equity swap radar include land, minerals, offshore areas, and of late air space 
and cyberspace. This is how China will (re)colonise Africa. For China, debt- 
book diplomacy is a smart, quarrel- free, and uncontested way of securing and 
protecting its interests abroad.
Besides Zimbabwe, China has already swapped debt for equity successfully in 
Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. In practical terms, China is behaving like a loan 
shark, grabbing land and other resources from countries who fail to pay it back.
Djibouti borrowed $1.4 billion from China in the last two years – more 





62 Contextualising the colonial project
its first overseas military installation. In Sri Lanka, China acquired 99 years 
of operating rights for the Hambantota Port after costs for the project spir-
alled out of control, forcing Colombo to give up control of the port in 
return for a Chinese bailout. Back in 2011, China reportedly wrote off 
Tajikistan’s debt in exchange for around 1000 square kilometres of territory.
(Gupta, 2019)
China’s strategy worked elsewhere and will not fail in Africa. As of now it 
is dominating aid, trade, investment and, most importantly, underwriting the 
tenure of unpopular regimes in Africa. China’s success naturally demanded a 
counter response in this battle for Africa from the United States and its allies. 
Their strategy in this counter response entailed the invention of the War on 
Terror which legitimised their military presence in Africa.
What does the coronavirus pandemic mean for China, Africa, and the 
equity- debt swap strategy? African countries were already struggling to pay 
back China even without the coronavirus pandemic. This pandemic will hasten 
their demise and deliver these countries to China. This pandemic is an oppor-
tune moment for China to throw its debt- book diplomacy at Africa. This pan-
demic is a blessing in disguise for China as it will enhance the realisation of its 
goal to be the global dominating power by 2049.
This is so because most countries will struggle to recover from the cor-
onavirus pandemic. Many of the most affected countries are those that were 
competing with China for dominance in Africa and include France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The pandemic is offering China a 
golden opportunity to increase its assistance and soft power in Africa with 
little or no competition from Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France.
The threat of the (re)colonisation of Africa by its (former) colonisers mainly 
Britain, France, and Portugal explains the hostilities between China and Euro- 
North America. For Africa, the choices are limited at the moment. It is either 
(re)colonisation by China or (re)colonisation by Euro- North America. In this 
regard, Africa is showing an affinity towards China’s “C” policy of co- option, 
cooperation, and inducements. Co- opted into and cooperating with the China- 
Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), while being induced to acquire massive 
loans and debt which it cannot service, Africa is on the road to Chinese (re)
colonisation. The Commonwealth, Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development, the United States Africa Summit, and the Francophone Africa 
Summit have now become FOCAC rivals.
All these global centres of power are courting Africa; Why? The main reason 
is that Africa is (re)colonisable which in turn opens up many economic benefits 
of colonial proportions.
China’s growing political capital in Africa
What exactly does China want in Africa? Of course, China wants the rare earth 
minerals, the oil, and also arable land. The big price for China, especially as it 
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extends a helping hand to its founded “friends” in Africa during the coronavirus 
pandemic, is political capital. For China, gaining Africa’s trust and goodwill is 
more important and efficacious than deploying “boots on the ground”. This is an 
astute strategy: political capital will give China an advantage over its adversaries.
Before the coronavirus pandemic hit Africa, especially Africa south of the 
Sahara, the subcontinent was in serious trouble. There were the Ebola virus out-
break, endemic corruption and state capture, non- performing economies, and 
massive budget deficits. The arrival of the coronavirus only worsened an already 
desperate African problem. Africa generally lacks the human capital and infra-
structure to effectively fight the coronavirus pandemic. There are countries with 
more vice- presidents than ventilators. There are literally five vice- presidents in 
South Sudan while this country of 11 million people has only four ventilators. 
That gives an equation of 2.7 million citizens per ventilator. What a long queue.
The same dire situation also exists in the Central African Republic where 
a population of five million only has access to three ventilators. Unlike the 
Americans that sent in their Marines when there was an Ebola virus out-
break in Africa, China sent in health equipment such as personal protective 
equipment and ventilators. All of Africa received this equipment from China’s 
billionaire “philanthropist” Jack Ma, the owner of Alibaba. This is an important 
point: China stood by Africa during anti- colonial revolutions and today China 
continues to stand by Africa in its most difficult moment, therefore China can 
be trusted more than the West, especially the US, France, and the UK.
The sum of China’s manoeuvres in Africa lies in its soft power. In contrast, 
Euro- North America is busy losing traction in Africa while China is increasing 
its soft power, notwithstanding the anger from African citizens resulting from 
the xenophobic attacks on Africans especially in Guangzhou which occurred 
in early 2020. The Chinese will always spin something like this and present it 
as the Americans trying to separate the Africans and their Chinese brothers and 
sisters. The growth of Chinese soft power can be attested to by the fact that 
more African countries attended President Xi Jinping’s 2018 FOCAC Beijing 
Summit than presidents who attended the United Nations General Assembly 
held only a few weeks later.
The implication is that for Africa, China is more important than the United 
Nations, a reality being driven home by the presence of China in Africa during 
the coronavirus pandemic and the absence of the United Nations. Increasingly, it 
can be argued that the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation will become more 
important for Africa than the United Nations. The United Nations General 
Assembly, where Africans and other peripheral members of the international 
community are accorded equal time to speak, has been criticised as a talk show 
where nothing happens, where leaders from the late Yasser Arafat to Robert 
Mugabe and Fidel Castro went to vent their anger only to return home to the 
same reality of Euro- North American dominance and oppression. The Forum 
on China- Africa Cooperation is a different platform. China listens and China 
helps without any conditions such as opening up the market, democratising, 
free and fair elections giving the civic organisations space for African leaders. 
An African problem today is being sentenced to a Chinese solution.
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Whereas the first and second industrial revolutions and the resultant colon-
isation of Africa took place by brute force, the ongoing 4IR (re)colonisation is 
taking place through manufactured consent. (Re)colonisation by manufactured 
consent occurs through the usurping of the very individual sovereignties of 
African citizens thereby also controlling the national sovereignty which is the 
aggregate of these individual sovereignties.
Manufactured consent is premised on a number of myths regarding how 
China operates in and with Africa. There are five myths regarding the Chinese 
in Africa: that China operates through (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; (2) mutual non- aggression; (3) mutual non- interference 
in internal affairs; (4) equal rights and reciprocal benefits; and (5) peaceful 
coexistence. Of course all these are highly contestable because China (1) does 
not respect the sovereignty of African states; (2) has been aggressive in Africa; 
(3) interferes in the internal affairs of African countries; (4) does not deal fairly 
with African states and companies; and (5) does not promote peace in Africa 
and has actually funded militias, coups, and jihadists in Africa.
America’s War on Terror as a cover for the  
(re)colonisation of Africa 
Firstly, before focusing on the United States, what drives and necessitates the 
(re)colonisation of Africa? Since colonialism and coloniality are underwritten 
by capitalism, any threats to capitalism are threats to coloniality. If the capitalist 
and neoliberal system is in jeopardy (Amin, 1997; Anibal Quijano, 2000; Shivji, 
2009; Dussel, 2013), it also presents coloniality with even more problems, hence 
must be defended at any cost.
At a practical level, the thesis of the resource curse assumes a bloody state. The 
American- led War on Terror as it plays out on African soil, is concentrated in 
resource- rich countries. Coincidence? Not at all. Once the Americans invented 
the War on Terror which was also fought on African soil, it gave NATO and its 
cartels a legitimate reason to get involved militarily. The whole War on Terror 
story was an invention and a farce allowing the US to respond directly to the 
challenge they face from the Chinese for Africa’s resources. Mamdani placed 
the invention and deployment of the myth of the War on Terror on the same 
trajectory as colonialism and the Cold War (Mamdani 2009, pp. 6-7). Being 
on the same trajectory and of the same genealogy, colonialism and the War on 
Terror are the proverbial evil twin brothers who dispense the same violence on 
the same victims with the same aim: subjugation, humiliation, and (re)colonisa-
tion. Mamdani asserts that,
I put Darfur as well as Rwanda in a national, African, and global context, 
which over the past century has been one of colonialism, the Cold War, and 
the War on Terror.
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For Africans, this is more of the same as (re)colonisation by China or the United 
States remains (re)colonisation with the same effects: that of marginalisation, 
subjugation, and humiliation. The War on Terror is actually the actualisation of 
the (re)colonisation of Africa. The evidence is that two years before Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi ’s death in 2009, China had overtaken the United States as 
the continent’s largest trading partner and this was also the time when Gaddafi 
was the President of the African Union (Glazebrook, 2017). This therefore made 
Colonel Gaddafi a legitimate military target for the United States- led NATO. 
In Gaddafi and Libya, the US, its allies, and the cartels that supported them saw 
an opportunity to make an example to other African leaders of how they treat 
those that challenge and endanger Western capitalist interests in Africa.
Reading from Glazebrook, the destruction of Libya achieved seven important 
goals for the empire and its cartels.
 1. They demonstrated to African leaders how they treat those that threaten 
neo- liberalism capitalism and Western interests.
 2. They rendered Libya a clean slate (tabula rasa) for Euro- North America to 
(re)colonise and their ally cartels to loot. With three governments in two 
cities (two in Tripoli and one in Tobruk and Al Bayda), Libya is a failed 
state. The West almost succeeded in rendering Libya a no man’s land (terra 
nullius). As a no man’s land, (re)colonising Libya becomes even easier. This is 
why French oil company Total was at the forefront of funding the destruc-
tion of Libya.
 3. At a strategic level, the assassination of Gaddafi, the biggest threat to 
Western interests in Africa, weakened the resolve of Africa and decimated 
the AU’s dream of a United Africa.
 4. Libya as a failed state implies that North- African security no longer 
existed. The country and the region was therefore open for human and 
drug trafficking cartels to undertake their illicit trade with no policing. This 
renders Libya further ungovernable.
 5. The War on Terror turned Libya into a failed state and in turn created 
an incubation space for terrorist groups which are a known resource for 
cartels, Arab and western governments. The resultant looting of Libya’s 
armouries and arsenals meant that the terror groups were armed right up 
to the teeth from day one, ready to repay their masters by aiding the (re)
colonisation of Africa.
 6. With these resultant homegrown terrorists and terror groups in Africa, 
Euro-North American governments and their cartels legitimately created a 
natural demand for their military “benevolence”.
Charles Tilly theorised about this phenomenon of creating protection rackets 
which is applicable in contemporary Africa (Tilly, 1985). Africom and the way 
NATO operated in Libya fits well into Tilly’s notion of protection rackets in 
Africa. Tilly argues that protection rackets,
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… represent organised crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state 
making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legit-
imacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime.
(Tilly, 1985, p. 169)
Deployed in the field as was the case of Africom and NATO in Africa, the 
results produced were not only true but also conformed to Tilly’s sequencing of 
the processing of protection rackets. Tilly noted that results for organised crime 
masquerading as state making are four- fold:
 (1) War making: Eliminating or neutralising their own rivals outside the terri-
tories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.
 (2) State making: Eliminating or neutralising their rivals inside those.
 (3) Protection: Eliminating or neutralising the enemies of their clients.
 (4) Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – 
war making, state making, and protection (Tilly, 1985, p. 181).
War making is what happened in Libya, in the process eliminating Libya the 
state from international relations as well as Gaddafi the arch-enemy of Western 
interests. Secondly, state making is also taking place, which is basically the 
remaking and (re)colonisation of Libya. Protection will occur only when the 
new state of Libya will be underwritten by those who sponsored it and will 
benefit from its new status as a (re)colonised, rebirthed Libya. The disguise for the 
underwriting will be misrepresented as the need for dictators and dictatorships 
never ever to return to Libya again. What this means from an African perspec-
tive is that sovereignty and autonomy will never ever return to a rebirthed 
Libya. From one failed Libya, terror and terrorist groups are now operating in 
or can target 15 countries. There is a direct correlation between the deploy-
ment of Africom and the escalation in these terror attacks. For Glazebrook, the 
deployment of Africom resulted in an
… increasing numbers of lethal terror attacks across the continent including 
those in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tunisia.
(Glazebrook, 2017)
With American boots on African soil, Gaddafi assassinated, Libya a failed state, 
African incubated terror groups running amok, the (re)colonisation of Africa 





4  Data mining, harvesting, and 
datafication
“To every birth its blood”: To every industrial  
revolution its death
In a novel set in apartheid South Africa, titled To Every Birth its Blood, by Mongane 
Serote (Serote, 1981), the link between blood and birth is reenacted and politicised. 
The notion is that to every birth, its blood is a conducive analogy to use for this 
book in explaining how the birth of each industrial revolution was underwritten 
by African blood. Each industrial revolution can be depicted as a birth in Africa; 
a birth of hope that Africa can extricate itself from the colonial matrix of power. 
However, the blood that is shed at birth, gives life, which is contrary to historic 
African experiences, where many deaths occur with each successive industrial 
revolution. This occurs repeatedly as Africa’s resources are ruthlessly extracted, 
from the coltan mined in Walikale, in the North Kivu Province, in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, to the rosewood timber removed illegally in the 
forests of Gambia and Senegal and smuggled to China. Blood is shed in Africa, by 
Africans deprived of their resources through local- Western elite collusion and the 
use of outright brutality, that is, the paradigm of war.
With all the resources which Africa is endowed with, the only way these 
resources can be extracted and exported to what Samir Amin (Amin, 1972, 
2001, 2009) termed, “the centre”, is by weakening African governments, through 
collusion with African elites, and subjugation and punishment of those Africans 
who dare to oppose coloniality agencies and its collaborators. While successive 
industrial revolutions are celebrated in Euro- North America, in Africa, they sig-
nify death, subjugation, and thingification (Cesaire, 1955; Rodney, 1973; Dussel, 
1996; Mignolo, 2011).
Data as a raw material
The raw material- ness of data was aptly captured by big data specialist and 
mathematician Clive Humby in his now famous words,
Data is the new oil… and shares many of its challenges. In its crude state it 
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to make it useful. When processed it is potentially explosive and dangerous. 
Just like plastics and polymers… … some of the best and most profitable 
uses are what is made from it by others.
(Humby, 2011)
These words capture the essence and usefulness of African data, just as they 
capture the essence of Africa’s oil, be it in Nigeria, Angola, or Mozambique. 
Its existence is tantamount to chaos, dictatorship, failed states, and what others 
(Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007; Kopiński, Polus and Tycholiz, 2013; 
Knutsen et al., 2016) labelled the resource curse. If resources such as oil and 
data are a curse, why does the curse mainly apply to African countries?
Raw materials underline capitalism and fuel industrial revolutions. The 
First Industrial Revolution wanted raw materials and got slaves. The Second 
Industrial Revolution also wanted raw materials and got colonies. The Third 
Industrial Revolution wanted raw materials and corporations ruled the world 
by harvesting state sovereignty in Africa (Korten, 1995). The 4IR is now 
witnessing the continuation of African bodies (citizens) as a raw material. This 
is a continuation of the same practices inaugurated by capitalism during the 
slave trade. Couldry and Mejias (2019) sum it up as follows,
Then, through the practice of slavery (which preceded colonialism, but 
which reached a massive scale under colonialism), human bodies were 
transformed into a raw material for capitalism in the form of slaves [ori-
ginal emphasis]. Historians have warned us against treating slavery - usually 
imagined as a premodern practice - in isolation from the development of 
industrial capitalism. The plantation and the factory coexisted for a long 
time. The treatment of human beings, as mere property, stimulated the 
rationalities of profit maximisation, [original emphasis] accounting pre-
cision, and data optimisation that we now tend to associate with modern 
rationality.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019)
Generally, the black body has been considered by capitalism as property, to be 
traded and profited from. The black body is generally dispensable, just like all 
other resources.
The 4IR has resulted in online data becoming the latest resource sought 
after by global capitalists. Like any other raw material, capitalists will seek to 
extract it at the least possible cost, if not for free, and sell it at the highest price. 
Like any other resources sought by capitalists, data is also being accumulated at 
massive rates (Katal, Wazid & Goudar, 2013; Mayer- Schoenberger, 2013; John 
Walker, 2014; Baack, 2015; Flyverbom, Deibert & Matten, 2017; Helbing et al., 
2017; Sadowski, 2019).
One characteristic which cuts across the previous industrial revolutions is 
the capitalist practice of accumulation (Amin, 1976; Frank, 1978; Patnaik & 
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and now (re)colonisation occurs primarily through dispossession. Stated in its 
most basic sense, accumulation by dispossession is making something private, 
which was not previously regarded as such. This is what happened to land in 
Africa and is now happening to data in Africa. Force, fraud, oppression, looting 
(Harvey, 2003, p. 137), alienation, obfuscation, trickery, and misrepresentation 
are some of the methods used during accumulation through dispossession.
Data users are enslaved before using any app or downloading anything; they 
are given only one option, which is to agree to the terms and conditions. This 
amounts to obfuscation, trickery, and misrepresentation: (1) it portrays a wrong 
picture that users have plenty of options, yet there is only one option – which is 
misrepresentation; (2) it portrays a false image that the user is willing to part with 
their details, information, and everything that will be harvested from them – 
which is manufactured consent; (3) it portrays the picture that the relationship is 
symbiotic, yet it is parasitic – which is misrepresentation; (4) once entered into, 
the relationship cannot be annulled, amended, or anything – that is enslavement; 
and (5) the resultant product (big data) is alienated from the source – which 
amounts to displacement and appropriation.
Coloniality of data and technical rationality
The role played by technology and by extension, big technology companies in 
alienating Africans from their data cannot be overemphasised. In this coloniality 
era, there is a form of alienation, which is produced by technology through what 
German- American philosopher, sociologist, political theorist, and Frankfurt 
School theorist Hebert Marcuse termed, “technical rationality” (Marcuse, 1941, 
1991). Technical rationality denotes how rationality is used, initially, in decisions 
to incorporate technology in society and how, once incorporated, such changes 
will be considered rational. Society will adjust to life with these new technolo-
gies, compliance becomes second nature, and questioning or not complying 
with new technologies will be criminalised and punishable. In this regard, 
Marcuse (1941, p. 154) states,
The objective and impersonal character of technological rationality 
bestows upon the bureaucratic groups the universal dignity of reason. The 
rationality embodied in the giant enterprises makes it appear as if men, in 
obeying them, obey the dictum of objective rationality.
The Registration for the Interception of Commutations Act (RICA) was domesticated in 
many jurisdictions, with very little no democratic debates and participation. The 
RICA Act prescribes that all telecommunications companies register and keep 
a data base of their clients. It also regulates the interception of communications 
and associated processes such as applications for and authorisation of interception 
of communications. The rationale of the law is to prevent criminals from using 
cellular telephones and related technologies for illegal activities such as but not 
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regulation and include Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritania, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria (GSMA, 2016, p. 9). Having amassed the personal identifica-
tion information to their mobile cellphone subscribers, big tech companies will 
be in possession of all the ingredients needed to create a new online order. Big 
tech companies become reason themselves and obeying “terms and conditions” 
the norm. These data miners and harvesters become the embodiment of ration-
ality; yet, they are data thieves and agencies of the (re)colonisation of Africa.
There was a point when the industrial revolutions resulted in the accumu-
lation of slaves and slave labour from Africa to cater for Euro- North American 
labour and human resources needs. There was also a time when there was a 
massive accumulation of natural spiritual and epistemic resources from Africa, 
especially its minerals. A case in point is the looting and accumulation of Africa’s 
artifacts looted during colonial conquest which are displayed in Euro-North 
American museums, and the human skulls collected by the colonial German 
forces after the Herero-Nama genocide are still in Germany. At another level, 
Switzerland produces the most chocolates; yet, it does not have a single cocoa 
farm. Belgium is richer than most African states; yet, it has no natural resources 
of its own. What accounts for these anomalies? It is the capitalist and colonial 
practices of accumulation, looting, and dispossession.
Harvey (2004) and Nhemachena (2018) posit that accumulation occurs 
mainly by displacement (Harvey, 2004; Nhemachena, 2018). For others, accu-
mulation occurs through looting, murder, plunder, (ab)use of the law, and out-
right waging of war (Said, 1979; Cobbing, 1988; Ali A Mazrui, 1995; Goody, 
2009; James, 2009; Mawere and Nhemachena, 2017; Benyera, 2018a; Benyera, 
Mtapuri and Nhemachena, 2018; Mtapuri, Nhemachena and Benyera, 2018). 
The current accumulation involves Africa’s data and, subsequently, the sover-
eignty of both individuals and nation- states. Like previous accumulations, there 
is ruthless extraction of data, similar to the ruthless extraction of slaves epis-
temological, spiritual and natural resources.
Each revolution has got certain characteristics and these include (1) violences, 
(2) ruthless extraction, (3) massive accumulation, and (4) the creation of norms 
and standards which authenticate, officialise, and routinise these practices. 
Regarding “violences” as opposed to “violence”, Benyera (2017b, p. 69) noted 
that for colonialism to thrive, several violences were used against the colonised, 
including,
… “foundational violence”, which authorised the right of conquest and 
had an “instituting function” of creating Africans as its targets; “legitim-
ating violence,” was used after conquests to construct the colonial order 
and routinise colonial reality; and “maintenance violence,” was infused into 
colonial institutions and cultures and used to ensure their perpetuation.
(Benyera, 2017b)
Other accumulations include the accumulation of weapons, especially weapons 
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beneficiaries of the past three industrial revolutions may appear to be unlinked 
to these industrial revolutions; yet, these revolutions were the propellers and 
rationalisers of these violences. As these violences were instituted and normalised, 
they enabled and routinised these series of extractions. Without violences, no 
revolution would succeed. The same is true for all industrial revolutions; without 
violences, no industrial revolution would succeed and the 4IR is no exception.
Consistent extraction and pilfering African resources
Starting with the First Industrial Revolution through to the 4IR, Western 
multinational companies consistently extracted and pilfered African resources – 
slaves, knowledges, and mineral resources and, currently, African data. Capitalism 
never ceases to capitalise on what Africa possesses. African resources are pilfered 
to service the ever- increasing resource appetites of developed economies, in 
the process, further marginalising and hindering development in Africa. Each 
passing industrial revolution becomes a proverbial death nail in Africa’s coffin. 
Instead of the industrial revolutions bringing respite and opportunities for 
Africa, by reinstating its humanity, recognising its epistemologies and resusci-
tating its economies, the opposite has happened, with more and more resources 
being exported to what Samir Amin termed, “the centre” (Amin, 1972, 1976) 
wherein Euro- North America constitutes the centre of civilisation, power, eco-
nomics, law, and virtually every aspect of life. All other parts of the world out-
side Euro- North America, especially Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Asia form the periphery, hence the centre- periphery notion. The centre- 
periphery thesis found much application especially from the Latin America. 
For dependency theorists from the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) such as Andrea Gunder Frank, Africa and other parts of the periphery 
failed to develop not because of internal barriers to development, an argument 
put forward by modernisation theorist theorists, but because the developed 
Euro- North America has systematically undeveloped and underdeveloped 
them, keeping them in a state of dependency (Prebisch, 1959, 1962; Frank, 
1966, 1978, 2015; Cardoso, 1977).
Hence, the claim and the analysis being made in this book is not new at all 
but applies to a new form of extraction and thievery by Euro- North American 
companies and their local collaborators. In a way, this section continues the 
debate on the inadequacies of the decolonisation processes (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 
2013a) and argues that the marginalisation, thingification, and pilferage of Africa 
continues, albeit in a different form and for different commodities (Amin, 1972).
The notion of coloniality convinces us that what changes in the colonial 
project is the item that will be pilfered from Africa and the way that it will be 
stolen. Mejias (2019) notes that,
Today, apart from minerals and fossil fuels, corporations are after another 
precious resource: personal data. As with natural resources, data too has 
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For its part, and due to many reasons, Africa failed to create a local indigenous 
bourgeoisie that could compete with cartels from the empire. French MNCs 
are dominant in (former) French colonies and they include Total, Elf, Orange, 
Sodexo, Société Générale, Groupama, Suez, Renault, Monoprix, Bricorama, 
Havas, GDF- Suez. British companies include British Gas, Crosco IDW, Shell, 
G4S (AITEC, 2014)
China filled this gap by effectively using local African state- owned enterprises 
as their partners in both wadding of Euro-North competition for Africa’s 
resources while simultaneously (re)colonising these African client states. In 
Africa, generally, these state- owned enterprises have become a source of looting 
and personal enrichment by both local and empire elites with the Chinese 
elites joining the elites from the empire. This phenomenon had been termed 
state capture or state of capture and is a resut of the operations and effectiveness 
of what William Reno classified as the Shadow State (Reno, 2000). In Reno’s 
Shadow State, rulers undermine the institutions of government which they 
preside over for personal gain, in the process diminishing the overall wellbeing 
of the economy making it susceptible for (re)colonisation. Reno demonstrates 
the depth of Shadow States in Africa thus, The Angolan insurgency, UNITA 
… reportedly earned as much as US$600 million annually from illicit sales of 
diamonds. Liberia’s president, popularly known as “Superglue” for his personal 
habit of keeping anything he touches, hosts various former South African intel-
ligence operatives. Ukrainian arms merchants and American “missionaries” set 
up their own bank in Monrovia (Reno, 2000, pp. 433–434). The Shadow State 
in Africa is therefore a key alley not only for China, but any multinational cor-
poration willing partner local elites especially by offering these elites protection 
from their won people.
Decentring and dispossessing throughout the industrial 
revolutions
The empire operates by decentring and dispossessing cognitively, materially, 
and epistemically. The initial contact between Europeans and Africans resulted 
in the decentring of Africans by misaligning them with their civilisations. Once 
Africans were decentred from their civilisations and foreign, mainly European 
civilisations forcibly imposed on them, they became vulnerable to disposses-
sion. These dispossessions happened in the form of slavery, which was both a 
physical and epistemological disposition. Colonialism resulted in physical dis-
possession of land and, most importantly, epistemological dispossessions. The 
current phase of coloniality, which will result in the (re)colonisation of Africa, 
is not only about the material and epistemological dispossessions but about 
finalising sovereignty dispossession through data dispossession and accumula-
tion. Data dispossession will result in data accumulation, which, in turn, will 
allow cartels from the empire to dispossess Africans of their sovereignty, their 
remaining humanity, and their identity.
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But how dominant are cartels in the global capitalist project? Helbing 
(2016) notes the dominance of a few individuals in the global tech commu-
nity for example, thus,
… today, 62 people are said to control as much capital as 50 per cent 
of people on this planet. The following people lead the ranking: Bill 
Gates (Microsoft, USA), Amancio Ortega (fashion, Spain), Warren Buffet 
(finance, USA), Jeff Bezos (Amazon, USA), Carlos Slim Helu (telecom-
munication, Mexico), Larry Ellison (Oracle, USA), Mark Zuckerberg 
(Facebook, USA), Charles and David Koch (oil and various products, 
USA), Liliane Bettencourt (L’Oréal, France), Michael Bloomberg (finance 
data, USA), Larry Page (Google, USA), Sergey Brin (Google, USA). We 
see that business with data, software and information and communication 
technologies is outpacing most classical business models, and I expect that 
we might see a further rapid concentration process until the world is con-
trolled by very few people.
(Helbing, 2016)
Increasingly, and typical of cartels, fewer and fewer people are in charge of 
the global tech industry. They will even become fewer as cartels have a ten-
dency of cannibalising each other in their fight for spheres of influence. This 
is what I mean when I allude that capitalist cartels from the empire, Singapore, 
China, and Japan are in charge of the global tech business. Cartels are interested 
in profit, accumulation, and dispossessions. Humans and human activities are 
being dispossessed of humanity and humaneness. A question may be asked: how 
exactly is 4IR enhanced technology being deployed to dispossess humans of 
their humanity and humaneness?
The processes of inserting chips into human brains, developing designer 
babies in test tubes, developing robots, robo- humans, and other forms of 
augmented humanity blur the lines that inform human identity (Schwab, 2016, 
pp. 26, 93; Rocha, 2018, p. 127). Once these lines have been blurred, human 
identity will be very easy to appropriate. One way of such appropriation is 
through hacking into the Internet of Things.
Not only is human identity be at stake in the 4IR, but other aspects of life 
are also be impacted. These includes, but are not limited to, electoral democ-
racies, which will be susceptible to manipulation by big technological com-
panies (Ceron, Curini and Lacus, 2017). Cambridge Analytica, Facebook, and 
Twitter already have been found guilty of manipulating elections (Benyera, 
2018c; Zuboff, 2019; Canals and Heukamp, 2020). The threats posed by the 
4IR on citizens’ lives is yet to be fully comprehended.
The scandal involving Cambridge Analytica, the British research company 
that was given access to Facebook users’ personal information for polit-
ical manipulation purposes, has revealed the real danger of what we com-
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a significant amount of legitimacy among its operators and users. Some of 
the users have become addicted to it. They have found marriage, expanded 
their businesses and enjoyed a wider reach of networking opportunities.
(Benyera, 2018c)
Benyera notes how ICT cartels have subscribers from many countries and these 
subscribers, whose personal data the tech companies own, are massive beyond 
comprehension. To use David Korten’s (1995) words, these corporations run the 
world (Korten, 1995). Regarding the power of social media, Benyera contends 
that,
The extent of the power that social media, especially Facebook, possesses 
is often understated. Of the 7.5 billion people in the world, 2.2 billion are 
regular Facebook users. This means that Facebook has close to 30% of the 
global population’s data at its disposal. If Facebook was a country, it would 
have more people than China. This demonstrates the immense power 
that Facebook has across various countries, which, when not regulated 
as is the case now, has the potential to undermine democracy and human 
rights. Facebook’s monopoly in this market is sure to be worrying many 
governments.
(Benyera, 2018c)
Then there is the power that these cartels hold with regard to finances. Financial 
systems will be under threat due to the creation of parallel currencies, that 
is, unregulated and autonomous systems/ currencies such as cryptocurrency. 
Facebook’s Libra is a blockchain cryptocurrency which now rivals Bitcoin 
(Brühl, 2019, p. 3). The potential of Libra to disrupt African economies is no 
longer an item of scholarship (Schwab, 2016). For Schwab, the world already 
reached a currency tipping point as, “10% of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) [is] stored on blockchain technology” (Schwab, 2016, p. 143).
On the dark web, cartels and criminals are the biggest winners, with tech- 
based terrorists now asking for ransom in cryptocurrencies (Fields, 2018; 
Skilton and Hovsepian, 2018). What is now at stake for Africa is the reality that 
its currencies will be rendered redundant as the world will move more towards 
cryptocurrencies. This again fits into Hardt and Negri’s argument, namely 
that the empire has rescaled state sovereignty away from the national state and 
towards big Western multinational corporations and the cartles that support 
them. They noted,
This is a decisive shift in the concept of sovereignty. Married to the concepts 
of nation and people, the modern concept of sovereignty shifts its epicentre 
from the mediation of conflicts and crisis to the unitary experience of a 
nation- subject and its imagined community.
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Africa’s financial markets are at the mercy of emerging disruptive alternative 
currencies. Diphoko (2019) highlights the eminent financial (re)colonisation of 
Africa and comments on this thus:
If the Libra becomes a reality, it could disrupt financial systems, especially 
in the African continent. Emerging countries are the main target of the 
planned cryptocurrency by Facebook and partners.
(Diphoko, 2019)
For Diphoko (2019), Facebook’s grand plan is to apply price control in Africa. 
It will own the currency and the platform, namely, social media. Benyera is 
correct in characterising the misrepresentation of social media as social media; 
instead, Benyera unmasks it and asserts that the so- called “social media” is, in 
fact, a global mass surveillance programme. To quote Benyera,
(…) But the less charitable fact about Facebook is that it is not exclusively 
a “social media” that many think it is. That Facebook presents itself as a 
social media platform is also a deliberate misrepresentation by the company. 
The social media element gives Facebook the legitimate means to conduct 
illegal surveillance without a user’s consent.
(Benyera, 2018c)
Slowly the continent is ceding control to foreign tech companies to regu-
late prices and many other key activities that were traditionally the domain 
of governments. Not only is the 4IR disruptive of lives, but it could poten-
tially also capture and enslave. These disruptive systems/ currencies not only 
undermine the sovereignty of nation- states, but also theoretically affirm the 
thesis by Hardt and Negri (2000), Boron (2005), and Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2013c), 
namely, that globalisation resulted in the rescaling of sovereignty, away from 
the nation- state towards global cartels (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Boron, 2005; 
Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013b). Decentring and dispossessing Africa is an ongoing 
project traceable to slavery.
Africa and data slavery
Five essential components constitute Africa, namely: (1) its people; (2) its air 
space; (3) its territorial waters – oceans, rivers, and similar bodies; (4) the land; 
and (5) products derived from the above four components. One of the most 
contemporarily contested products is data produced in Africa.
In this section, I will demonstrate how slavery never ceased to occur – that 
is, slavery as it applied to Africa in regard to Euro- North America. The initial 
phases of the slave trade involved humans being enslaved, trafficked, and then 
commodified and sold on the markets in Euro- North America. The slave trade 
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There are many similarities between the 17th- century slave trade and today’s 
digital slavery. Firstly, in the past, there was the very dangerous combination 
of powerful European and North American slave traders and ignorant and or 
cowardly African chiefs. These African chiefs were complicit in selling their 
subjects to European and Arab slave traders such as Tipu Tip (Wallerstein, 
1989; Satia, 2018). Tipu Tip, real name Hamad bin Muhammad bin Juma Tajab 
el Murjebi, was a notorious Zanzibari Afro- Arab trader who, besides selling 
slaves, also sold ivory (Page, 2018). He was a plantation owner and governor of 
Stanley Falls District (now roughly Tshopo Province of the DRC) in the then 
Congo Free State. He operated in central Africa where he me met, assisted, and 
collaborated with other imperialists, slave traders, and fortune hunters such as 
David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley (Roberts, 1967).
On their side, the Europeans were very powerful economically and militarily. 
The same situation continues today, where some African leaders are complicit 
in selling the data of their people to foreign multinational corporations. Instead 
of protecting the data of their citizens, African leaders and their accomplices are 
distributing information in a way that is reminiscent of yesteryear’s slave trade.
The counterargument is that the ICT multinationals, from China and Japan 
to Euro- North America are so powerful that African leaders do not have an 
option, but to surrender to their demands. However, this is not the case, as 
these African leaders are actually ceding their powers in order to amass personal 
wealth, usually facilitated through offshore banks predominantly those in the 
Isle of Man and Switzerland. Therefore, instead of operating under duress, they 
are willing partners in the looting of Africa’s data and, in the process, raking 
in huge profits. African leaders are among some of the richest individuals in 
the world.
Another similarity between the 17th- century slave trade and today’s data 
slavery is that African leaders believe that they have crossed the abyssal line 
and therefore left Africa, the zone of none being, and crossed into Euro- 
North America, the zone of being. Similarly, yesteryear’s African slave traders 
also believed that they were immune from slave trade as they believed them-
selves to be in the same class with their Arab, European, and North American 
slave- trading partners. Just as these two classes justified trade in slavery, current 
African leaders also justify the sale of Africa’s data. The justification is that, while 
the latter viewed their African subjects as their personal possessions, African 
leaders, today, see the data generated by their people, in their countries, as their 
personal property. This, they accomplish through deploying the Shadow State, 
a situation in which state officials use their official capacity to derive personal 
benefits and in the process undermining the very bureaucracy which they offi-
cially manage. Instead of protecting Africa’s data, these Shadow State officials 
are at the forefront of trading it. This is what Charles Tilly termed protection 
rackets, the largest organised crimes run with the greatest advantage derived 
from legitimacy (Tilly, 1895, p. 169).
Digital slavery, also known as data slavery, is occurring globally, but is more 
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and country- level, big technology companies are dominant such as Siemens, 
Nokia, Apple, Huawei, Samsung, and Ericsson. The dominance of the Chinese 
technical giant Huawei in the provision of 5G connectivity in Africa is worrying, 
at various levels. Firstly, the data generated from the ensuing communications 
will, in most cases, be owned and controlled by China. Secondly, when in con-
trol of that data, China will most likely weaponise and politicise it to, inter alia, 
support regimes that are in favour of its dominance in Africa. In this way, digital 
slavery will lead to the (re)colonisation of Africa, this time by China. China’s 
appetite for dominating Africa’s digital spaces has only one explanation, the 
need to dominate and control data coming from and into Africa. Thirdly, when 
China manages to own and control Africa, the scenario will help China to 
dominate and consolidate its (re)colonisation of Africa, as it is, by and large, also 
in control of large aspects of Africa’s mineral and natural resources (Niu, 2014; 
Gu et al., 2016; Dobler, 2017).
Data or digital slavery also occurs at an individual and more practical level 
globally, but with greater impact in Africa. From waking up, going through the 
day – be it schooling or a working day – to going back home and sleeping, 
no aspect of human life is not technologised. The data generated from these 
everyday modes of living such as recording one’s heart rate, location, body 
temperatures, and so on, is owned, processed, and sold by big technological 
companies, who harvest this big data. Nhemachena (2019) argues that digital 
slavery will take the form of humans being implanted with microchips in their 
bodies, particularly their brains, which will allow those in charge to control the 
behaviour of the population. He asserts,
Treated as text and as data, human beings will increasingly have their 
genes and memories edited using implanted technological devices, in the 
Internet of Things. Human brains will also be subject to hacking once they 
are wirelessly connected to the Internet of Things.
(Nhemachena, 2019, p. 4)
Once a person’s gene and memory have been captured by the data miners, 
a person will be subject to being hacked and controlled by those in charge. 
There is no superior form of slavery such as owning, controlling, and managing 
one’s genes, memory, and thought processes. The capturing of these aspects of 
humanity constitutes what can be termed the sum of all colonialities, aka summa 
colonialities, to borrow from St Thomas Aquinas’ notion of Summa Theologica 
(Aquinas, 1947).
The dataring (rendering humans into data mines) and interconnectedness 
of humanity and the logic which justifies the Internet of Things will enable 
the (re)colonisation and enslavement of nature, humans, and things to be under 
simultaneous and similar control of a global tech oligarchy.
There is what has been termed self- surveillance which occurs within sur-
veillance capitalism, courtesy of the 4IR (Dissel, 2004; Revel, 2009; Lyon, 








78 Data mining, harvesting, and datafication
2019). Self- surveillance occurs when users of smart device and smart tech-
nologies unintentionally and unknowingly use applications and other related 
platforms in such a manner that the generated data is harvested by third 
parties. Examples include the use of smart devices when exercising whose 
data is harvested by pharmaceutical and medical companies, online chronic 
conditions platforms whose data is harvested by pharmaceutical companies 
and individuals’ tweets which are harvested by political parties and public 
relations firms. Instead of these firms having to invest millions of dollars in 
gathering the data, they simply provide “free apps” and harvest the data from 
these apps.
For those in developed economies, there is virtually no aspect of their lives 
which is not datafied. The difference between societies in Euro- North America 
and those in Africa and other (former) colonies is that the former have data 
rights, which they are capable of enforcing, while the latter are, for all purposes, 
data slaves and data mines.
These apps imply that they have enslaved humans to technology. Human 
beings now cannot do most things without the assistance of their smart 
applications. That humans are overly dependent on technology implies that 
there is a point in time where technology will take over the running of human 
life. Self- reproducing computer viruses hint at this possibility and now self- 
reproducing robots that are capable of functioning at a higher sentient level 
have actualised this idea. Also known as self- replicating machines these robots 
are capable of self- reproducing using raw materials found in the environment 
(Freitas and Merkle, 2004). This puts these machines at the same level as humans 
as they self- reproduce with no human input. This raises a lot of questions about 
the future especially of those parts of the world not capable of producing and 
deploying their own self- reproducing machines.
Numerous studies support the view that a sizable proportion of today’s 
young generation is virtually addicted to technology (Price, 2004; Ng and 
Wiemer- Hastings, 2005). This comes with a host of other challenges such 
as social and physical problems including obesity. Online and technology 
addiction has also resulted in what is called “virtual adultery” (Price, 2004; Ng 
and Wiemer- Hastings, 2005; Fields, 2018, p. 38). Virtual adultery is the tendency 
to spend, “less time spent with ‘real people in their lives in exchange for solitary 
time in front of a computer’ and resulting disruptions in real- world intimate 
relationships” (Fields, 2018, p. 39). This form of digital slavery affects mainly the 
affluent, referred to in this chapter as the “digi- privileged”.
What forms of digital enslavement apply to the digi- deprived, those in the 
Fanonian zone of none- being (Fanon, 1952), (or the other side of the abyssal 
line) (de Sousa Santos, 2007)? For Tendai Sithole, the digi- deprived are dispens-
able, subhuman, and predominately consists of the,
black subjects, who are caught in the world which locates and incarcerates 
then in the positionality of the other. In this positionality, black subjects 
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anti- black world burdens, suspends or, at worse, totally eliminates them by 
the virtue of being raced.
(Sithole, 2016a, p. 179)
The digi- deprived are without technology, exist without a digital and elec-
tronic footprint and are, therefore, as good as non- existent, in other words, 
non- human. Being classified as non- humans gives the (re)colonisers a moral 
conscience to physically enslave and (re)colonise the digi- deprived, as such rte 
resultant (re)colonisations will not be deemed by those undertaking them to 
constitute human rights abuses. An example of this is the reported cases of 
housemaids and manual labourers being enslaved in the Middle East (Ullah 
et al., 2020, p. 12).
A counterargument is a liberal view that holds that Africa, just like the rest of 
the world, can benefit abundantly from the 4IR, especially from a governance 
perspective. This view is captured by Naude who asserts that,
African governments can learn from the experience of other governments 
with crowdsourcing, open government, big data, virtual- citizen schemes 
(such as Estonia’s e- residency) and virtual currencies such as Bitcoin and 
the blockchains that are underpinning new trends in global finance and 
trade. Having access to large amounts of digital data will allow governments 
to assess and track changes more accurately and timely in their economies, 
changes in competitiveness, and measure in more detail the participation of 
their firms in the global economy.
(Naudé, 2017, p. 13)
What Naude (2017) omits to mention, is the fact that Africa does not own 
the data that is generated in Africa, by Africans. The notorious “terms and 
conditions” ensure that big tech companies, such as Siemens, Nokia, Facebook, 
Instagram, WhatsApp, Apple, and Samsung, are the owners of the data, com-
plete with patents and intellectual property rights. Africa has to buy these data 
from the tech companies or through designated third- party data and digital 
merchants. For Africa, to buy data, which was stolen from Africa, constitutes 
coloniality of data.
“If you’re not paying for it, you are the product”
Attributed to an anonymous commentator long before the internet boom, the 
phrase that “if you are not paying for it, you are the product” is now more 
relevant than ever before. While online services may appear to be free in mon-
etary terms, social media and other online platforms are not at all free. Besides 
being the customer, online users are also the clients because they pay in one of 
the world’s most valuable currencies which is time. The time that users spend 
online can never be recovered. Yet the goal of tech companies is to get more 






80 Data mining, harvesting, and datafication
free online access. The myth of free online platforms is the gateway to data 
coloniality and online slavery.
The expression that “if you are not paying for it, you are the product” can 
be traced to the boom in television marketing which occurred during the 
Third Industrial Revolution. From competing in capturing the attention of 
television viewers, the mission is now to capture and increase users’ net online 
spent time. The greatest lie ever told in the 4IR is that apps and other online 
platforms and services such as Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Wechat, TikTok, 
and Google searches are free. The truth is that these are not free; they act 
as rendezvous for advertisers and the users who are the customer. The idea 
behind the enslavement of online users is how much of their life will they 
spend online and how much of their private life will they share on these 
platforms.
The product that is being sold is the gradual but irreversible change in 
one’s behaviour and perception about life in general but also includes political 
choices in elections. In a way, the more time users spend online, the more they 
lose their agency, autonomy, and sovereignty to the tech oligarchy. The more 
time one spends online, the more their perceptions are altered in the direction 
desired by the advertisers and the owners of the platform. Online platforms are 
an unprecedented form of power, a holy grail, as they can afford their owners 
and networks power to change the way that people think, and subsequently 
how people make their political choices. This alters many facets of life such 
as religion, politics, economics, and how humanity relates as conflicts can be 
created, hatred famed, people enslaved, and terrorism perpetrated online.
Known as surveillance capitalism, this process is meant to ensure that 
advertisers are as precise and hence as successful as possible, to the extent of 
even altering the choices, consumer and voter psychologies of online com-
munities. The least empowered communities such as those in Africa and other 
(formerly) colonised parts of the world are at greater risk of being manipulated, 
enslaved, captured, and even experimented upon.
As noted in the al Jazeera documentary titled, The Social Dilemma, the new 
global market is now the online market and the product being traded is human 
futures, perceptions, choices, and thought processes. The future of humanity is 
being shaped online. The idea is to produce a human who is predictable, com-
pliant, and responsive to online demands. This is intended to benefit capitalism 
as much as possible by driving profit from as little advertising and marketing 
effort as possible. As the documentary narrated, every online activity is profiled, 
measured, monitored, and recorded. User online footprints are used to predict, 
influence, and then pre- empt human behaviour. There are three core drivers 
of surveillance capitalism. These are: (1) the engagement goal, (2) the growth 
goal, (3) the advertising goal. The emerging global tech oligarchy aims to 
engage online communities for as long as possible, thereby giving rise to online 
addiction and subsequently online slavery. They also intend to keep growing the 
number of hours that humanity spends online. Finally, the goal of surveillance 
capitalism is to make advertising as direct and as targeted as possible, thereby 
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giving unprecedented profits to both tech companies and retailers while driving 
up consumerism.
Life without an email address is now almost impossible. Emails are now a 
prerequisite for participating in the capitalist economy. Email addresses are part 
of the harnesses used to trap humanity into tech slavehood. This is because 
tech companies use powerful algorithms to power their three goals of engage-
ment, growth, and advertising, ultimately creating a compliant and responsive 
human being.
Stated differently, social media was created to affect the behaviour of 
humanity. It is one of the most powerful behaviour change tools ever made, 
more addictive than drugs. To be potent, online platforms use very persuasive 
techniques and captive technology which is applied to the extremes to affect 
and modify human behaviour, thereby compelling online communities to carry 
out activities which otherwise they would not have done. This happens through 
the planting of unconscious habits into the psyche of online users so that they 
become almost programmed. Linked to the above phenomenon is the practice 
of growth hacking which is when tech engineers use online platforms to hack 
into people’s emotions and psychologies, in the process directing humanity to 
think in the ways chosen by the hackers. Without being aware of it, online users 
are made to do what they would otherwise have not done. This is made possible 
by the way tech companies’ ability to exploit the vulnerabilities that exist in 
human psychology. The same tricks were used by yesteryear magicians.
Based on its many characteristics, online life qualifies as a drug because it 
possesses the main biological imperative of connecting humanity, albeit virtu-
ally, thereby directly affecting the release of the hormone dopamine. Dopamine 
is the feel pleasure hormone and it plays a huge part in people’s ability to think 
and plan, hence the conclusion that social media is addictive, manipulatable, and 
consequently politicisable.
While the above effects of online life media occur across humanity, time, 
and geography, the effects are most pronounced in Africa and those in the 
(formerly) colonised parts of the world because of the following three 
reasons. African administrations are corrupt, most unethical, and prone to 
abuse by elites. Secondly, Africa is one of the fastest- growing markets in the 
world and is bound to attract many online platforms. Thirdly, Africans lack 
human rights and subsequently the ability to enforce them. The effects of 
surveillance capitalism and other forms of online malpractice by tech oli-
garchies will be most felt in Africa, just like any other global problem is most 
impactful in Africa.
The data- coloniality nexus: Vladmir Lenin revisited
There is a connection between data, especially big data, and coloniality. The 
notion of coloniality implies the continued subjugation of Africa by the 
(former) colonisers. Coloniality is essentially the resilience of colonialism and 
imperialism. For colonialism to be resilient, it must (re)manufacture new ways 
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of remaining relevant and dominant. In the 4IR, one way in which colonialism 
is remaining effective and lethal is through data coloniality.
Like all other forms of coloniality, such as coloniality of power (Anibal 
Quijano, 2000), coloniality of knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2007a), coloniality of 
being (Maldonado- Torres, 2007), nature (Janer, 2007; Mignolo and Walsh, 
2018), the market coloniality (Tafira and Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2017) and, lately, 
coloniality of data (Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019, pp. 83– 112), the 
same asymmetrical power relations exist between Africa on one hand and 
Euro- North America plus China, the Asian Tigers and Japan. In this context, 
coloniality of data implies an asymmetrical relationship in data collection, pro-
cessing, and beneficiation in between Africa and its (former) colonisers. While 
Africa’s (former) colonisers have unfettered access to Africa’s data, through their 
many nefarious connections and networks, Africa does not enjoy the same 
status. Africa and Africans are sources of resources, such as minerals and data, to 
be mined by big multinational corporations.
What makes African big data a desirable commodity is that Africa is the future 
global market (Nhemachena, 2018; Hicks, 2019). Additionally, Africa is also the 
source of the rarest minerals used in the 4IR. Thus, the ones who control Africa’s 
data, also control Africa. Together with Africa’s debt, Africa’s big data is one of the 
most sought- after commodities in the 4IR. As alluded to aerlier on, debt trap has 
emerged as one of the most potent tools of (re)colonising Africa where African 
countries are “favoured” with huge debts which they fail to service. Having 
accumulated huge debts African countries end up giving up their sovereignty in 
exchange of debt cancellation. This strategy has been perfected by China.
In this section, I revisit Vladimir Lenin and redeploy his 1916 notion, 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Lenin, 1963). In these pages, I argue 
that coloniality is the highest stage of colonialism, not imperialism. What Lenin 
foretold, as the characteristics of imperialism, are mostly markers of coloniality. 
Samir Amin (Amin, 2001) also differs with Lenin on Lenin’s postulation that 
imperialism is a stage in colonialism. For Amin, imperialism is not even a stage 
of colonialism, but a perpetual part of it. Amin argues,
Imperialism is not a stage, not even the highest stage, of capitalism: from the 
beginning, it is inherent in capitalism’s expansion. The imperialist conquest 
of the planet by the Europeans and their North American children was 
carried out in two phases and is perhaps entering a third.
(Amin, 2001, p. 1)
An example is an idea that cartels, networks, and monopolies will take over 
global affairs. The notion that cartels, networks, and monopolies will run global 
affairs was foretold by Lenin in 1902 (Lenin, 1902, 1918). Baran argues that there 
are five ways in which networks will run global affairs. These are: (1) control of 
economic life; (2) development of financial oligarchies; (3) export of capital by 
the triad; (4) territorial division of the world (pen holder at the UNSC); and 
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In 1928, the heads of British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, and Standard 
Oil met in the Scottish Highlands and secretly agreed to limit production in 
the wake of the huge discoveries of oil in the Middle East. Today, the con-
trol that technology companies want to impose on Africa is more evidenced 
in the transport sector, where one tech app, Uber, which has disrupted, captured, 
and remodelled the transport sector globally, but more devastatingly in Africa. 
A tech company, based in California, Uber, has influenced global public trans-
port fares literally at the touch of a button and, in the process, it pays very little 
taxes to the African governments where it operates. Besides controlling the 
global movement of passengers, Uber has the data of its users – it knows who 
went where, when, and with whom. Passengers’ data footprint, such as their 
financial records, is literally being harvested, processed, and stored by big tech 
companies such as Uber and these are available for sale to the highest bidder.
Data colonialism and multilateralism
The 18th- century idea of colonialism was to expand the empire into new markets 
and form new colonies. With the (re)colonisation of Africa, the template is still 
the same: expanding the empire into new markets and forming new colonies. 
The difference is that this time, the colonies are cyber- colonies, online colonies, 
and data colonies. This is consistent with Marxist view that capitalism exists by 
accumulation and expanding (Marx and Engels, 1867, 1894; Luxemburg, 1913; 
Harvey, 2003). In the 4IR, capitalism accumulates new markets, which, in this 
case, is turning people into raw materials, harvesting people’s information and 
everyday communication into a commodity, which is priced and traded. The 
previous industrial revolutions and colonialism were characterised by the farming 
and harvesting of cocoa, sugar cane, cotton, and sisal as well as the extraction of 
gold, coal, platinum, and diamonds from mines. In the 4IR, the new farms are 
data farms and the new mines are people, who are being mined for their infor-
mation, unknowingly so. Data mines are now the most lucrative forms of mines.
The plot here is simple, Western capitalist cartels are busy setting up 
telecommunications infrastructure and communications apps and, in the pro-
cess, harvesting data, which they then turn into money. Like previous forms of 
colonialism, Africa and Africans will resist and try to fight back. Big tech com-
panies and the beneficiaries of the (re)colonisation of Africa, simply threaten 
African countries using, among others, fake news and information. Napoleon 
Bonaparte once said that war is 90% information (Sundaravadhanan, 2018, p. 78). 
Misinformation and fake news, originating from the empire, is very often used to 
fight and punish African governments that threaten the interests of the West and 
data companies. The work of Cambridge Analytica, Facebook, and Mackenzie 
Global Incorporated, by interfering with states’ elections, demonstrate the ability 
of big tech companies to destabilise even some of the most viable democracies.
But what exactly is data or digital colonialism, how does it differ from data 
coloniality and how does the (re)colonisation happen? What is termed data 
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data coloniality because it continues to sustain asymmetrical power relations 
netween the (former) colonised and the (former) colonisers in the absence 
of official coloniality. Colonialism officially started and ended, coloniality is 
ongoing. Mejias and Couldry (2020) explain data colonialism it as follows,
Data colonialism is the startling new social order, based on continuous 
tracking of our devices and online lives that has created unprecedented 
opportunities for social discrimination and behavioural influence by 
corporations. It goes well beyond the social media platforms and search 
engines that have attracted most criticism and comprise a complete reorgan-
isation of everyday life and business. True, data colonialism may not have 
all the features for which historic colonialism is now most remembered 
(extreme physical violence, for instance). But, if we think about the core 
function of colonialism in world history – to exploit the world’s resources 
on a completely new scale, redefining human relations to economic pro-
duction in the process – the parallel is clear.
(Mejias and Couldry, 2020)
The fact that what they term data colonialism has some traces of colonialism 
renders the phenomenon data coloniality and not data colonialism because it is 
anchored on colonial infrastructure, and matrix of power. According to South 
Africa’s former Statistician General, Pali Lehohla (2018), data colonialism works 
like any other form of colonialism, that is, without the consent and knowledge 
of the victims. Lehohla noted,
… data colonialism designates the decentralised extraction of data from 
citizens, without their explicit consent, through communication networks 
developed and owned by Western tech companies.
(Lehohla, 2018)
For him, data colonialism,which has been argued to be data coloniality, is 
structured and has four pillars or main functions. These are:
 1. The tech companies providing the technology and infrastructure for the 
data extraction, ad targeting, and ad distribution.
 2. The advertising and consultancy firms, which use the technology provided 
by (1) to target different groups with highly personalised ads and messages.
 3. The local companies, parties, and organisations, which pay (2) to help them 
impose their different agendas for the respective countries.
 4. The citizens, who play both the role as data sources for (1) and target 
groups for (2) and (3).
These four structures of data coloniality – Western tech companies, advertising 
and consultancy firms, local companies, and the citizens – work or are made to 
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tech companies provide the technological infrastructure such as base stations, 
4G and 5G connectivity, and the undersea continental data cables. They also 
manufacture and provide end- user devices, such as cellular telephones, laptops, 
and tablets.
They work hand- in- hand with the second pillar, which is advertising 
companies and consultancy firms. The role of advertising companies in data 
coloniality is to make the tech companies and their products relevant, palat-
able, lawful, and viable in Africa. Like cheerleaders, they create hype around the 
data industry. They provide, so- called, consultancy services, especially to African 
governments, in the process making it easy for big tech companies to set up 
operations in Africa. The role of advertisers is to link the market together with 
the tech providers, where a lot of misinformation and appealing propaganda 
is used.
Local companies’ work is the dissemination of the technology and also the 
infrastructure. Local companies are important for the localisation of the big 
tech companies. There are networks here in Africa that were formed to make 
this localisation easy and legitimate. The result is that the same cartels operate in 
different African countries. Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) and Voice Data 
Communication (Vodacom) work together with Huawei across many African 
countries. Huawei is reported to be offering equipment and cellular telephone 
network infrastructure in Africa, at a lower cost when compared to its main 
competitors, such as Nokia and Siemens (Gavaza, 2019). Resultantly, Huawei 
now provides Africa with 70% of its 4G infrastructure, which will increase 
when 5G is rolled out (Woodhams, 2020).
The final pillar is the citizens, who are the source of the raw data. In other 
words, the raw material to be mined. Again, advertising plays a very important 
role. The localisation of data coloniality is also accompanied by marketing. This 
is why cellular telephone and technology companies are among the biggest 
sponsors of sports in Africa. Sahara Computers which was owned by the Gupta 
family and which eventually closed when allegations of impropriety and state 
capture mounted on the owners, the Gupta brothers, was sponsoring cricket, 
MTN and Vodacom are very big in soccer and rugby sponsorship. They do this 
in order to occupy the top of the mind of the citizen, who is their data mine.
Whose data is it anyway?
This is probably one of the frequently asked questions about data (Velasquez, 
2018; Robert and Donetto, 2020). The question of intellectual property, works 
of art, and other related products has been an item of contention from time 
immemorial. Before the digitalisation of the camera, when photographs used to 
be taken on a film, which was then developed to produce the photograph, cases 
arose about the ownership of the negative film. Does the negative film belong 
to the photographer or the person on the photograph? Fast forward to the 4IR. 
Does the data belong to the person who generated it or to the tech companies 
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The anomaly in this scenario is that it is pitting individual citizens against 
big tech companies the size of Apple, Amazon, Google, Vodacom, MTN, Varidi, 
Airtel, Glo, Appo, Vivo, Huawei, Samsung, and so on. The data accumulated 
include fingerprints, user location history diets, medical records, and financial 
records. The collection of biometric data of global citizens is the working form 
of data accumulation occurring. This is how it happens. Most Smartphones 
require that users use their fingerprints and or facial recognition for identifi-
cation and authentication. It implies that those users, using their fingerprints 
and facial recognition for identification on Samsung smartphones, have their 
fingerprints and facial identities stored somewhere by Samsung. Samsung has 
therefore accumulated fingerprints and facial photographs of global citizens at 
a magnitude bigger than any country or continent. The question is: Who has 
the ownership of the data that is produced when people engage in their modes 
of everyday communication such as sending WhatsApp images and messages, 
sending Tweets to their followers on Twitter, and so forth?
The easy and generally refereed answer is that the data belongs to the person 
who generates it. However, with the way that capitalism accumulates and 
dispossesses, the question of the ownership of data is not that simple, espe-
cially since data is a form of soft power albeit in the hands of private elites and 
not states. The power of rising tech oligarchy was witnessed twice in inter-
national relations. Firstly, when Twitter unilaterally decided to ban the US 
President Donald Trump from the platform and secondly when Twitter the 
pages of Australian news outlets because the Australian government had insisted 
that Facebook pays for the news content shared on its platform. Facebook 
later reversed the ban after India, Canada and the US joined the matter siding 
with Australia. Like African slaves, which drove the First Industrial Revolution, 
African data is also driving the 4IR. Given the asymmetrical power relations 
between the generators of data and those who are contesting the ownership, 
the European and North American blueprint of disposition and accumulation, 
at whatever cost, will once again be replicated.
Besides the World Trade Organisation (WTO), many other multilateral 
organisations have issued regulations to control the ownership of data (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2016).1 One 
thing that these regulations by the multilateral organisations have in common, is 
the banning of the localisation of data. They embedded various anti- localisation 
clauses that ban countries from requiring transnational tech companies to store 
and process data on local servers. Like farm products from African farms and 
precious minerals from African mines, they are beneficiated and enjoyed in the 
capital cities of Euro- North America, and not Africa. This complete liberalisa-
tion of digital trade benefits those in charge of developing norms, standards, 
rules, and regulations that govern the farming, storage, ownership, and trade 
in data.
In the 4IR, economies are gradually becoming data economies. According 
to UNCTAD, as of 2014, as much as 10% of global trade was happening 
through e- commerce (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD), 2016, p. xi). With cloud computing and the Internet of Things 
increasingly becoming part of business practices and norms, the trajectory 
is such that the global data economy will become the mainstream economy 
by 2025.
In these data economies, the cardinal questions are: (1) Who has the data 
and (2) who owns the data? As the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
other multilateral institutions are busy drafting regulations, tech companies are 
amassing large volumes of data. No matter the final regulations, tech companies 
will always be a step ahead and will emerge victorious. In a typical coloniality 
modus operandi, four reasons account for their assured victory: (1) they work 
in tandem with Western governments; (2) they sponsor African governments 
at some of these multilateral institutions; (3) they carry out the research that 
informs discussions, decisions, and policies adopted at multilateral institutions; 
and (4) they develop the norms that will be used to regulate data storage.
A regulation conundrum exists when it come to the regulation of tech 
companies and their operations. Ordinarily governments lack the technical 
knowledge of how the data economy functions. Governments, inevitably, are 
forced to ask for technical assistance from the very tech companies they will be 
trying to regulate. A case in point is when, in the United States Congress called 
Facebook’s Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg for a congressional 
enquiry. The hearings centered on the roles of Facebook in three areas: digital 
currency (Facebook’s Libra, privacy and elections). Most of the United States 
congressmen and congresswomen lacked both craft literacy and craft com-
petency of the subject that they were interrogating. To state it clearly, the US 
Congress ended up asking Facebook for advice on how to regulate Facebook. 
If this is the case in the United States and the West, generally, it is even more 
amplified in the Global South.
As postulated by British mathematician, Clive Humby, after he made a for-
tune together with his wife after consulting for Tesla on big data, data is the 
new form of global currency and source of power, in the process replacing oil. 
(Humby, 2011). Humby drew parallels between oil and data,
Data is the new oil… and shares many of its challenges. In its crude state it 
is difficult to use and benefit from It needs refining and external catalysts 
to make it useful. When processed it is potentially explosive and dangerous.
Just like plastics and polymers… … some of the best and most profitable 
uses are what is made from it by others.
(Humby, 2011)
Like all raw materials, especially those found in abundance in the Global 
South, it is not the communities endowed with the raw materials who benefit 
from them, but those with the ability to collect, process, and then trade the raw 
materials. This template worked in the First Industrial Revolution, Second 
Industrial Revolution, Third Industrial Revolution, and will also be effica-
cious in the 4IR. Capitalism is extractive by nature and will also extract value 
 
 
88 Data mining, harvesting, and datafication
from African data. Like all extractive industries, they leave a mess behind, 
which is then normally cleaned up by Western- funded non- governmental 
organisations.
Africa’s situation is exacerbated by its lack of ownership of vital data 
economy infrastructure. Most, if not all, of the data economy infrastructure, 
such as submarine cables, network nodes, data and data centres, algorithms, 
and artificial intelligence software are mostly owned by non- African com-
panies. Without owning its data economy infrastructure, Africa will remain 
on the same trajectory, that is, that of being a continent that is colonised 
by those economies that own the data economic infrastructure, which now 
constitutes the new means of production. Without owning the infrastructure, 
which necessitates and actualises the farming of data, Africa will remain at 
the receiving end of non- African monopolies, cartels, and syndicates espe-
cially those from the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong), China, Japan, and Euro- North America.
Where data economy transgressions are committed in Africa, by Western 
companies, Africa does not have the power to sanction these companies. Where 
legislative frameworks exist, in Africa, to sanction big tech companies, their 
home countries will quickly come to their rescue by threatening African coun-
tries with all sorts of eventualities such as the withdrawal of aid the imposition 
of economic sanctions or the devaluation of the currency. The United States 
is notorious for employing this tactic. African countries do not have anti- trust 
laws and do not charge any digital taxes on these foreign tech companies.
Euro- North American countries are schizophrenic when it comes to data 
regulation. In their home countries, they value and cherish the protection of 
data. However, regarding Africa, they view the same caution to the protec-
tion of data as undemocratic, stifling competition and against the norms of 
open- market trading. According to Sven Hilbig, “data protection is viewed as 
valuable and worthy of protection in Europe – yet a handicap for European 
companies’ economic activities in other countries” (Hilbig, 2020). This asym-
metrical application of norms and standards is typical in a coloniality relation-
ship. It is the same system which created and continues to sustain the underside 
of Euro-North American modernity. For Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007), 
they actualise the abyssal lines which divide life in the two zones, the zone of 
being and the zone of none being (Fanon 1952).
Data storage: Who is responsible for storing data?
One question which has seized the multilateral fraternity is: Whose respon-
sibility is it to store global data? This issue was top of the agenda at the June 
2019 G20 Summit, held in Osaka, Japan (Hicks, 2019). On the agenda was the 
endorsement of the International Declaration on Data Flows. Also known as the 
“Osaka Track”, many Global South countries refused outrightly to sign the dec-
laration. Key boycotters were India, South Africa, and Indonesia, who rightly 
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input (Kanth, 2019). Most importantly, their interests and those of other coun-
tries in Africa and East Asia were not taken into account when drafting the dec-
laration. In other words, they felt that the International Declaration on Data Flows 
constituted coloniality of data and they were rightly offended to be invited to 
sign the policy, but they had not been consulted during the development of the 
declaration.
The crux of the disagreement regarding the Osaka Track is the ownership 
and control of data generated in the signatory states (Hicks, 2019). The dec-
laration intended to introduce “sweeping rules on data flows, removal of pro-
hibitions on data localisation, and cloud computing among others” (Kanth, 
2019). This behaviour is consistent with that of an empire that seeks to rescale 
sovereignty, in this case, data sovereignty, from the individual human being and 
the nation- state to multilateral institutions through agreements that are a front 
for the empire.
Other technicalities were also flouted in the development of the Osaka 
Track, especially regarding the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) principles. 
The WTO lays down principles to be used when reaching consensus- based 
decisions. The five principles followed by the WTO are non- discrimination, 
reciprocity, binding and enforceable commitments, transparency, and safety 
values.
The Osaka Track pontificates several important issues which point to the (re)
colonisation of Africa by the empire, which are identified as follows:
 1. The Osaka Track was developed without the full participation of those to 
be signatories. This represents the coloniality of policy space. Japan and its 
partners deemed (formerly) colonised countries to be unfit to contribute 
to the drafting of the declaration. This demonstrates coloniality in action 
(we, the empire, think for you the colonies).
 2. Even without inviting them to the drafting of the declaration, the empire 
expected the (formerly) colonised states of Africa and Asia to sign. This is 
coloniality of power at play. The empire feels entitled to form opinions on 
behalf of Africa and regarding its resources; hence, they saw no reason to 
invite them to the drafting of the declaration.
 3. There were several behind the scenes, pseudo- consultations with South 
Africa, Indonesia, and India, to try and encourage (read “force”) them to 
sign. These were attempts to legitimise the illegitimate – an admission of 
guilt, which was being wrongly corrected.
 4. The 26 June 2019 ultimatum, circulated by Japan, demonstrates the pat-
ronisation, arrogance, and disdain which characterised these “negotiations”. 
The empire was offended that South Africa, India, and Indonesia refused to 
sign the Osaka Track, which was contrary to what Japan and other drafters 
of the declaration expected, in other words, the usual “Yes Sir/ Madam” 
agreement from the (formerly) colonised countries.
 5. The frog- marching of developing countries with regard to data- related 
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2019, was meant to set a precedent for future technology- related multilat-
eral agreements.
 6. The way Japan and its G20 partners, such as the EU members, interpreted 
the notion of multilateral census, proves that they do not view developing 
nations as equal multilateral partners, but rather as their benefactors, whom 
they expect to toe the line or they will discontinue their (dead) aid.
How multilateral agreements are negotiated is contrary to the notion of 
rules- based, consensus- based multilateralism, as enshrined in the Marrakesh 
Agreement, the founding document for the formation of the World Trade 
Organisation. It would appear that the rules apply to the weak, while coercion 
is used by the strong. This is partly why the United States is not a member of 
the International Criminal Court (Moss, 2012; Ambos and Stegmiller, 2013; 
McCargo, 2015; Benyera, 2018b). It does not need the protection of multilat-
eral institutions, as it has the capacity to protect itself. One way through which 
European and North American countries protect themselves, is through brute 
force. An apt example is the “War on Terror”, which, ironically, is a large- scale 
dispensation of terror and not the prevention of terror. All this, in order to pre-
serve crisis- ridden neoliberal capitalism.
Note
 1 International and Regional Organisation data regulations and instruments include 
the following eight:
 1. United Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection
 2. African Union Convention on Cyber- security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP)
 3. Privacy Policy Developments in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum
 4. Data Protection in the Commonwealth
 5. The Council of Europe Convention 108 (Data Protection Unit, Council of Europe)
 6. Data Protection in the East African Community
 7. ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/ SA.1/ 01/ 10 on Personal Data Protection










The 4IR ushered in three major technological developments: (1) cloud com-
puting, (2) Internet of Things and (3) big data analytics. Let me define these 
three terms first. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTD), cloud computing is,
… a service for enabling self- service provisioning and administration. 
Cloud services are defined as services that are provided to and used by 
clients on- demand at any time, through any access network, using any 
connected devices that use cloud computing technologies (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development.
(United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), 2016, p. 10)
The Internet of Things refers to the datafication of everyday modes of life 
through internet- enhanced devices such as “wearable devices and gadgets, 
agricultural machinery, retail analytics and healthcare” (Kumar, Sangwan and 
Nayyar, 2019, p. 3). Even homes are now also online giving rise to smart homes. 
Self- driving cars also known as autonomous or driverless cars, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (drones) and so on are all part of the Internet of Things.
Big data refers to the ways of managing, processing, and storing big data sets 
and volumes which are not fit to be dealt with using conventional methodolo-
gies and systems. The connection between data and the (re)colonisation must 
be established a priori. Data is a resource for capitalism, and like all resources, 
they can be stolen, (re)colonised, (ab)used, owned, priced, and traded.
This (re)colonisation of Africa in the form of data colonisation must be 
exposed. Being disguised as “data” data coloniality does not imply that it will 
only affect Africa’s “data life”. Unlike 16th, 17th, and 18th century colonialism 
before it, data colonialism is the sum of all colonialisms as it is premised on the 
appropriation of human life not parts of it.
Since colonialism hijacked human life in Africa and at decolonisation, handed 
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extracted for free in Africa and offered for sale to the highest bidders. The 4IR 
extended Hardt and Negri’s notion of the empire to what is now termed the 
cloud empire (Couldry and Mejias 2019, p. 38). The empire is well disguised as 
a menu of free apps and other social media offering. Harris correctly noted; 
“Everything is free, except the video we capture of you. That we own… I am 
going to sell you your life back” (Harris in Couldry and Mejias 2019 p. 37). 
While colonialism gave rise to empire, 4IR gave rise to cloud empire. The 
battle for the (re)colonisation of Africa is now in the cloud, literally. In this (re)
colonisation, a new form of imperialist, the cloud empire and the cloud farmers 
operate informally and have no political desire to control any territory.
Unlike earlier forms of imperialism, the cloud empire is not founded on 
a particular state’s overt military and political desire for control of territories. 
Instead, it operates more informally, seeking to make all of life available to cap-
italization through data not by brute force but by sustaining the expansion of 
exploitable spaces (Couldry and Mejias 2019 p. 38.
The cloud empire operates by outsourcing the development of infrastructure, 
mechanisms, and systems that are required to mine data from people, process it, 
quantify it, and repackage it for sale and redeployment. This redeployment can 
be for any purpose, such as electoral (mal)practice or limiting human freedoms 
through mass surveillance. According to Couldry and Mejias,
Cloud Empire, (is) a totalising vision and organisation of business in which 
the dispossession of data colonialism has been naturalised and extended 
across all social domains. The Cloud Empire is being implemented and 
extended by many players but primarily by the social quantification sector, 
the industry sector devoted to the development of the infrastructure 
required for the extraction of profit from human life through data.
(Mejias and Couldry, 2020) [emphasis original]
Courtesy of the social quantification sector, data is being mined from unknowing, 
unconsenting people and sold for profits. This represents data slavery. The 4IR 
will turn almost everything into data through inter alia, the Internet of Things. 
By definition,
The Internet of Things is the term used to describe the numerous objects 
and devices that are connected to the Internet and that send and receive 
data.
(United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), 2016, p. 12)
In this 4IR dispensation, big data is the new gold (Hirsch, 2015). Secondly, 
the purpose of colonialism was threefold. Firstly, to destroy African networks. 
Secondly, to simultaneously set up Euro- North American networks. Thirdly, 
colonialism aimed to and indeed created new identities, structures, and 
institutions both in the colonies and at home. Most of the identities were bin-
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(Nettheim, 1993; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2007), blacks and whites (Sithole, 1980; 
Ahmed and Mills, 1999; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2008; Stovall, 2010).
Networks are the proverbial golden thread that link, unite, and control colo-
nially created and sustained identities, structures, and institutions. They are so 
successful and effective because they are underwritten by the power of the state 
and their ability to unleash all forms of violence. In most cases, cartels control 
African governments (Korten, 1995). By definition, networks are a form of 
social capital cultivated by civilisations over the years. Networks are well- knit, 
usually homophilic, closed communities which constitute structures of power 
specialising in a specific aspect of human life such as finance, diamonds (de 
Beers Mining Company), oil (the Seven Sisters of Oil), and so on. Networks 
can be both formal and informal, highly structured or unstructured at all. What 
links them is a common goal which in most cases must be attained at whatever 
cost. We see these networks and cartels emerging in the global data economy.
There have been various efforts to fight the growth and impact of networks, 
especially in the petroleum sector. In opposition to the domination of the 
Seven Sisters cartel, the Organisation for Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
formed in the 1960s. Typical of networks and cartels, the Seven Sisters of oil 
have merged and are now down to four, albeit powerful sisters. The argument is 
that collusion is much easier among four as opposed to seven cartel members.
At a basic level, pre- colonial Africa had developed mostly family and clan- 
based networks. These specialised in specific knowledges, for example, some 
became best medicine man for snake bites, some became experts at predicting 
the weather, some were experts at technology for preserving seeds, while some 
were experts at training craftsman such as a blacksmith. When these knowledge 
systems were disrupted, mainly by massacring the knowledge holders and geo-
graphically dispersing them, the colonisers then replaced these epistemologies 
with Western ways of knowing and doing – a practice known as coloniality of 
knowledge.
In addition to identities and structures, colonialism also created principles and 
norms both in the colonies and back home (Korten, 1995). Colonially created 
identities and classes include tribes (Chimhundu, 1992), ethnicities (Ranger, 
1989), racial classes such as kaffirs (Phimister, 1980; Mafeje, 1986; Mazrui, 2014). 
Other colonially created identities include the notion of the foreigner, which 
is absent in many, if not, all African civilisations wherein, for example, among 
the Shona of Zimbabwe and Mozambique one is either a visitor (muyeni), trav-
eller (mupfuuri), or resident (chizvarwa). The identity of a foreigner is therefore 
foreign to Africa and has no history in most of its civilsations, most of which 
were open to welcoming new members from other clans, geographies and even 
defeated armies and kingdoms. Structures such as companies, financial markets, 
banks, Western- centric legal systems, and so on are colonial creations which 
uprooted Africans from their cosmology and planted them in an alien Euro- 
North America one, albeit while they were physically located in Africa. This 
notion has been labelled the coloniality of being (Wynter, 2003a; Maldonado- 
Torres, 2007; Maldonado- Torres and Richardson, 2012; S. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 
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coloniality of ignorance and geopolitics of ignorance as central to coloniality 
and (re)colonisation” (Nhemachena, Hlabangana and Matowanyika, 2020b), 
[emphasis original].
One of the key results of the coloniality of ignorance is that it inscribed two 
permanent identities to global citizens – the conquered and the conquerors. 
These two binaries were codified by race and racism. Racism is,
… is a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the 
human that has been politically, culturally and economically produced and 
reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the “capitalist/ patriarchal 
western- centric/ Christian- centric modern/ colonial world- system”.
(Ramón Grosfoguel, 2015, p. 10)
Maldonado- Torres asserts that the role of racism was to create a model of power 
matrix applicable globally. This determines who is data mined and who is not. 
Race is efficacious for mass surveillance and collective punishment. Maldonado- 
Torres noted,
The codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in 
the idea of “race”, a supposedly different biological structure that placed 
some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others.
(Maldonado- Torres, 2007, p. 243)
Economically, socially, and politically conquered, Africa is struggling to escape 
from the omnipresent colonial matrix of power that is at its zenith in the veto- 
wielding five members of the United Nation (in)Security Council.
The exclusive veto power of the UNSC amounts to the totality of all 
colonialities, wherein power, in all its forms, is used to achieve and maintain 
the desires of the P5 (five Permanent members of the UNSC) and their allies. 
Coloniality of the United Nations enables systems, mechanisms, and networks 
to infiltrate, coerce, and or bypass African governments as they extract data and 
other resources from Africa and Africans.
Political, economic, and epistemological (re)colonisation
Colonialism occurred in three distinct stages. The first one was the usurping of 
Africa’s political sovereignty. The second stage was economic enslavement and the 
final stage was epistemological subjugation. Africans first lost their political power 
and subsequently lost their economic sovereignty. The final phase in the colon-
isation of Africa was the loss of epistemological sovereignty. Having lost their 
political, economic, and epistemological sovereignty it took Africans a lot of 
effort to reclaim their political sovereignty. This was done through the processes 
of decolonisation. However, as the colonisers were letting go of political power 
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Although Africa managed to gain political independence, this was the first 
process characterised by what Ndlovu- Gatsheni termed the myth of decolon-
isation (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013a). Decolonisation meant Africa gained political 
power only and without economic and epistemological power and sovereignty. 
Thus, Africa remained a de- facto colony of Euro- North America. In terms of 
global epistemological and economic power, the (former) colonisers are riding 
on the 4IR to reclaim Africa’s political sovereignty which they lost through 
(de)colonisation.
Evidence that Africa only gained political independence is seen from the 
way France relates to its 14 former colonies. As alluded to earlier on, while vol-
untarily surrendering political autonomy to its (former) colonies, France uni-
laterally decided to withhold four aspects of these (former) colonies’ economies. 
These are: (1) military alliance, (2) economic and monetary control, (3) control 
of natural resources, and finally (4) control of foreign policy. This agreement 
effectively implied that the independence of Francophone colonies in Africa 
was essentially a non- event. French remains the language of communication 
and business in these former colonies, and every aspect of life is predominantly 
French- based. In sending its troops to the Lake Chad area and Francophone 
Africa generally, France will be endeavouring to maintain its control of the 
above four factors while venturing into the (re)colonisation phase as was the 
case in Libya. This is a parasitic relationship which can only be stooped by 
the host rejecting the parasite. The parasite cannot be negotiated with to suck 
easily, or to suck only at night. By their nature, parasites suck the host ceaselessly, 
only to stop when the host dies.
What evidence exists to support the claim that Africa never had its total 
sovereignty? There is a notion at the United Nations Security Council known 
as the pen- holder notion (United Nations Security Council, 2018). Under the 
pen- holder principle, France is responsible for all resolutions to do with its 
(former) colonies. The United Kingdom also has a prerogative in tabling any-
thing to do with its (former) colonies to the United Nations Security Council. 
This includes but not limited to the drafting of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions. The United States, on the other hand, is responsible for the 
Middle East. China and Russia have the right to see the first versions of these 
draft resolutions. This behaviour of the P5 is the zenith of coloniality of power.
On colonialism, decolonisation, coloniality,  
and (re)colonisation
The link between networks, big data (read big money), and the (re)colonisa-
tion of Africa has to be conceptually linked to its genesis, which is Euro- North 
American modernity and colonialism. But for this conceptual linkage to be 
efficacious, the concepts have first to be disentangled.
But first, a small proviso: What makes the telling of the story of coloni-
alism very complicated are three factors vis- a- vis the sources of the colonial 
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story. Secondly, the colonial tale is often told by subjects who essentially will be 
repeating what colonialism taught them. Finally, the tale of colonialism is told 
by the colonisers themselves should they decide to. Thus, the tale of colonialism 
is very complex and absent to be fully comprehended.
Colonialism is often reduced to a few sentences or allegations such as crimes 
against humanity. Some even praise and defend colonialism (Gilley, 2017). Three 
founding texts are important in allowing us to understand how colonialism 
worked. These are important not only because of their content but also because 
of the roles played by the authors in instituting and perpetuating colonialism. 
Applying mostly to southern, eastern, and central Africa, these are the writings 
of Frederick Selous and Cecil John Rhodes, the prime colonisers (Rhodes, 
1902; Millin, 1936; Selous, 1968; Daly, 1982). Their detailed analyses are canon-
ical in the comprehension and analysis of the nuances of their colonial actions.
Colonialism is a culmination of a series of events which resulted in Africa 
and other parts of the world being directly ruled by other countries such as, 
inter alia, England, Portugal, Spain, and Portugal. Colonialism is essentially an 
economic and political relationship wherein one country imposes its sover-
eignty on the other and starts stealing, abusing, pillaging, and exporting the loot 
mainly to the home country. As conceded by Cecil John Rhodes, the purpose 
of colonialism was to set a giant empire with various networks located across 
the globe such that these networks will be the ones running global affairs and 
not governments (Rhodes, 1902; Millin, 1936).
To recap, the purpose of colonialism was not only to occupy and rule Africa, 
and in the process steal its resources, it was also about displacing Africans and 
their languages, cultures, economies, and broadly their epistemologies. Laying 
the foundation of colonialism, Rhodes arrogantly proclaimed,
I will lay down my own policy on this native question... We have to treat 
natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way to our-
selves. We are the lords over them... The native is to be treated as a child 
and denied the franchise; he is to be denied liquor also... We must adopt a 
system of despotism, such as works so well in India, in our relations with 
the Barbarians of South Africa.
(Millin, 1936, p. 64)
Decolonisation is the removal and relocation of the coloniser from the colony 
usually by force but also by consensus as was the case with the decolonisation 
of Francophone countries, back to Euro- North America. It is noteworthy that 
in relocating to the so- called metropolis, the coloniser left behind in Africa 
institutions, languages, norms, cultures, and systems which were meant to per-
petuate colonial rule in the absence of the colonisers. This phenomenon is 
termed coloniality. Coloniality is the infrastructure of colonialism, resilient, 
mutative, adaptive and at times deceptive. The sovereignty of the decolonised 
country while technically would have been restored as a result of decolonisa-
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sovereignty through various means, which for decolonial scholars are coloniality 
of power, knowledge, and being. The asymmetrical power relations between the 
(former) colonisers and the (formerly) colonised is taking a new turn under the 
realm of the 4IR. This turn sees the (re)colonisation of Africa which is being 
enabled by the 4IR and takes the form of denying and stealing Africa’s and 
Africans’ digital and cyber sovereignty.
What is happening with data today is that it is being accumulated through 
dispossessing the human who owns and generates that data of their data sover-
eignty. This leads to the colonisation of data by capitalist cartels from the empire.
… this data capture process is a means of capitalist “accumulation by dis-
possession” that colonises and commodifies everyday life in ways previ-
ously impossible. Situating the promises of “big data” within the utopian 
imaginaries of digital frontierism, we suggest processes of data colonialism 
are unfolding behind these utopic promises. Amidst private corporate and 
academic excitement over new forms of data analysis and visualisation, 
situating big data as a form of capitalist expropriation and dispossession 
stresses the urgent need for critical, theoretical understandings of data and 
society.
(Thatcher, O’Sullivan and Mahmoudi, 2016, p. 960)
There are massive asymmetrical power relations between the human being 
generating and owning the data and the big tech companies and cartels who 
are stealing, mining, processing, illegally owning, and trading that data. Whereas 
colonialism was a confrontation between two civilisations, a colonising one and 
its victim, the (re)colonisation of Africa pits individual Africans against big tech 
companies. Ticking the “accept terms and conditions” before downloading an 
app, for example, is done at the individual level. If colonialism prevailed against 
entire African civilisations, it will surely walk over individual Africans in its (re)
colonisation quest.
Of the three colonialities – coloniality of being, power, and knowledge – it 
is the coloniality of being that is being most exploited in the (re)colonisation 
of Africa. Of course, coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge and 
many other colonialities such as of the market and of nature are also being 
employed. I will explain in the following sections, how the (re)colonisation 
of Africa works by among others creating a digital double for a human being. 
This digital double is created from the information that is mined and harvested 
from the unsuspecting user of smart devices, apps, and other online programs. 
Once a digital double has been created and stored somewhere in the mislead-
ingly named cloud, artificial intelligence, deep learning, and machine learning 
are used to determine your social, economic, political, religious, and other 
behaviours. The results from these algorithms are used to create targeted infor-
mation, advertisements, campaigns, and (mis)information which is then used to 
control human beings. This will not be far from programming people and its 
inverse which is digital commissioning and decommissioning of people. This 
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will happen in Africa more than any other place simply because Africa is the 
weakest member of the international community. After all, it was colonised 
before and (re)colonisation is a reality.
The disdain in which the (re)colonisation of Africa is being pursued is 
underlined by the coloniality of being. The empire questions the humanity of 
Africans. Nelson Maldonado- Torres termed this practise Imperial Manichean 
Misanthropic Scepticism (Maldonado- Torres, 2007, pp. 245– 246). It describes 
how Euro- North Americans doubted the humanity of people different from 
them. The result was not only the colonisation of Africa but also the genocides 
in Namibia, the Congo, and many other parts of Africa. In the Congo geno-
cide, King Leopold is responsible for the deaths of between 12– 15 million 
Congolese, all killed in the inauguration, routinising, and normalising colo-
nialism and its sidekicks: plunder, accumulation, extraction, and dispossessions 
(Anderson, 2005). Created in 1885, the Congo Free State was a unique one- 
man colonial structure which was aided by concession seekers such as Henry 
Morton Stanley (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2012, p. 431). The same template of colo-
nialism was used; Congo was deemed terra nullius, tabula rasa, and terres vacantes. 
Any resistance to extractive plunder in the Congo was and is met with death.
To attest to the continuation of the questioning the humanity and hence 
justifying the dehumanisation and conquerability of the other there were recent 
calls for the Coronavirus vaccinations to be tested on Africans (Rosman, 2020). 
The French doctors who made this call were not expecting a backlash because 
for them, Africa is a colony and hence running medical experiments to save 
European and America lives is a noble scientific endeavour for them to pursue. 
I believe they even had ethical clearance for the experiments be done in Africa.
This is a continuation of colonial practices where the empire dispossesses 
Africans of their humanity, commodified and experimented on. This is a prac-
tice which started with the slave trade and the concomitant slave economy. This 
is what is termed medical colonialism (Gelfand, 1948; Braude, 2009). Consistent 
with Maldonado- Torres’ notion of the imperial Manichean misanthropic scep-
ticism, Africans are viewed as subhuman and therefore can be experimented 
on. The same fate was suffered by black Americans in the United States when 
syphilis experiments were done on them without their consent (Welsing, 1991, 
p. iv; Smith, 1999, p. 175; Leonardo, 2004, p. 147).
Coloniality of being is as old as Euro- North American modernity itself. As 
way back as 1899, Joseph Conrad was grappling with the question whether the 
“people” he was meeting in Africa were people like him. This mentality was 
never exorcised off the psyche of the empire. Writing in his tellingly titled book 
Heart of Darkness, obviously in reference to Africa, Conrad arrogantly wrote,
The earth seemed unearthly. We are accustomed to look upon the shackled 
form of a conquered monster, but there - there you could look at a thing 
monstrous and free. It was unearthly, and the men were - No, they were not 
inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it— this suspicion of their 
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and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought 
of their humanity - like yours - the thought of your remote kinship with 
this wild and passionate uproar.
(Conrad, 2008, p. 58)
There are structures and ideas that sustain coloniality and these practices pre-
date colonialism. One of them is Euro- North American capitalism and the 
other is the assumed inferiority of black people which can be traced back to 
the work of Charles Darwin (Darwin, 1859). The idea of the racial superiority 
of the whites over the black was heavily funded by the Pioneer Fund which 
was established in 1937 by United States Colonel Wickliffe Preston Draper. The 
purpose of racial science and eugenics was to misuse both natural and social 
science to aid political decisions and the subsequent enslavement, subjugation, 
and dehumanisation of the black folk. The Pioneer Fund funded research which 
sought to genetically prove that blacks were intellectually inferior to whites. 
Draper was a Harvard graduate and an avid eugenicist, financially supporting 
groups such as the American Eugenics Society. This is the subject of the book; 
The Funding of Scientific Racism authored by William Tucker (Tucker, 2002).
It is the idea of racial hierarchisation which underpinned slavery and which 
currently underpins racism and xenophobia. In developing the notion of 
coloniality of power, Anibal Quijano asserted how power is used to cement 
and normalise the race- based initialisation of those outside the realms of Euro- 
North America. He noted,
One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classi-
fication of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental con-
struction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and 
pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its 
specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and 
character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the coloni-
alism in whose matrix it was established.
(Anibal Quijano, 2000, p. 533)
With these ideas and structures, Euro- North America did not completely 
oppose the processes of decolonisation precisely because their privileges and 
status were not to be fundamentally changed by decolonisation.
Decolonisation worked in favour of the (former) colonisers as it cemented 
unequal (post) colonial relations and had Africa contended with decolonisation. 
Under this (post) colonial dispensation, there is no respite to the marginal-
isation and inferiorisation of Africa and Africans. Decolonisation implied that 
Euro- North American countries would be first among equals, enjoying the 
right to develop international norms and principles and dictating and authoring 
global political order. Additionally, and in contra to their (former) colonised 
subjects, Euro- North Americans possess human rights which are, most import-
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the Humanitas and the Anthropos (Mignolo, 2009; Benyera, Mtapuri and 
Nhemachena, 2018; Maldonado- Torres, 2018; Benyera, 2020b). That Africans 
are (re)colonisable, yet are supposed to have and enjoy the protection of their 
human rights. If the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is indeed 
universal, what explains the lack of action and accountability on the human 
rights of the weakest that are violated ad infinitum, the Rohingya are a case 
in point. To sum up this section, human rights are a farce, decolonisation a 
myth, and (re)colonisation a reality. So what links Africa’s colonisation to its (re)
colonisation?
Colonial networks
Colonialism bequeathed Africa a plethora of omnipresent networks which 
actualise Samir Amin’s five monopolies of capitalism: war, technology, natural 
resources, news, and technology (Amin, 1972, 1997). Violences were used to 
coerce Africans during the past three industrial revolutions into slavery, coloni-
alism, neo- colonialism, and now coloniality. The 4IR employs a different form 
of violence which is dispensed by the networks and at times self- inflicted by 
Africans.
If, as was the case, Africans were coerced, during the colonial era, to pro-
vide information for colonisers, today we witness similar trends with 
the Internet of Things and Big Data wherein the exigencies of consent, 
volition, privacy, dignity, sovereignty and autonomy are not observed in 
the data collection and analytics. As during the colonial era when African 
territorial integrity was not observed, the logics of the Internet of Things 
and Big Data similarly override Africans territorial, national and individual 
integrity in the quest to collect and transmit data/ information to neo- 
imperial centres for purposes of neo- imperial global governance.
(Nhemachena, 2018, p. 7)
Colonialism is now perpetuated by networks and cartels which are usually 
sector or industry- specific. One of the biggest networks in operation in Africa 
are agriculture networks.
These networks operate in the form of multinational corporations with 
Monsanto as the alpha agriculture network company. Monsanto is synonymous 
with devious corporate behaviour, throughout the world but especially in Africa. 
A study by the German organisation Lobby Control found out that the com-
pany paid “academics” in the United Kingdom to produce favourable research 
findings which would then tilt government policy in favour of Monsanto 
(Cook, Wynn and Clarke, 2010; Wynn, Cook and Clarke, 2014). The authors 
were remunerated by Monsanto and in each of the articles they published, 
they made highly disputable claims. In the first article, titled How Valuable is 
Glyphosate to UK Agriculture and the Environment?, they claimed that glypho-
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Glyphosate is a broad- spectrum systemic herbicide and crop desiccant which 
was proved to cause various cancers to farmers and their customers (De Roos 
et al., 2005; Mink et al., 2012; Thongprakaisang et al., 2013; Andreotti et al., 
2018). It was banned by the World Health Organisation’s International Agency 
for Research on Cancer (World Health Organisation, 1994). Its effects include 
skin irritation and photo contact dermatitis.
These effects are probably due to the preservative benzisothiazolin- 3- one. 
They concluded that a ban on glyphosate would greatly affect farming in the 
United Kingdom (Cook, Wynn and Clarke, 2010). The 2014 article further 
placed glyphosate as an indispensable part of farming with major benefits such 
as its high water solubility (Wynn, Cook and Clarke, 2014). These two art-
icles were instrumental in lobbying European farmers against the ban on gly-
phosate in Europe. This research was promoted vigorously and “informed” not 
only policy in the European Union but also in Africa. Once cleared at home, 
Monsanto was to have a field day in Africa selling the “scientific” data with 
many African technocrats and shaping policy in favour of Monsanto, which in 
turn raked in billions of dollars in profit. This constitutes the coloniality of agri-
culture (Graddy- Lovelace, 2017).
Still, on the coloniality of agriculture, there is the case of the English East 
India Company which operated in India together with its evil twin, the Dutch 
East India Company, South Africa. These are the same concession companies 
which mutated, reinvented themselves, and in the process outlived decolonisa-
tion. Founded on 31 December 1600 the cartel dominated slave trade, trans-
portation, tea and general trade in its colonies.
The English East India Company, as is well known, obtained, besides the 
political rule in India, the exclusive monopoly of the tea- trade, as well as 
of the Chinese trade in general, and the transport of goods to and from 
Europe.
(Marx and Engels, 1867, p. 740)
Africa’s agriculture has never been freed from the clutches of colonialism, with 
multinational corporations of Western origin and accountability dominating 
from seeds manufacturing to food aid. Every aspect of Africa’s sovereignty is 
captured by the empire, from its fish to causing massive global warming which 
disproportionately affects Africa, all the fingers point to the same persistent 
culprits, the empire, its networks, local collaborators and cartels.
Of the cross: On religious networks
Colonial missionaries mutated into today’s religious networks. Religious 
networks started in two forms mainly, missionaries (Ranger, 1984, 1989; 
Harris, 2008; Masango, 2011) and Islamic Imams (Mudimbe, 1988; Weiss, 2000; 
Machaqueiro, 2012; Mazrui, 2014). While missionaries were setting up mission 
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up mosques and Quran schools (Machaqueiro, 2012). Besides marinating a 
readymade audience for colonialism by preaching the theology of the other 
cheeck (Matthew 5:38 Exodus 21:24; Lev. 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21), the 
religious networks, especially the missionaries also offered education and health 
at their mission stations. Walter Rodney notes how the missionaries were a 
partner in the colonisation of Africa by (mis)using education and health as front 
and baits to woo Africans to the colonial mission station for capture, spiritually 
and epistemologically. Rodney notes,
When the French saw that mission schools were helping England to 
entrench itself in Africa, the French government asked the aid of their own 
Catholic church to secure national interests. From the viewpoint of the colonisers, 
once the frontiers of a colony were firmly decided, the major problem remained that 
of securing African compliance in carrying out policies favourable to the metrop-
oles. There was always the possible use of force for that purpose, but the 
naked force was best kept in reserve, rather than be utilised for everyday 
affairs. Only education could lay the basis for a smooth- functioning colo-
nial administration. In the first place, there was the elementary language 
problem of Europeans communicating with Africans.
(Rodney, 1973, p. 88) [emphasis original]
So what appeared as the church’s benevolence is securing lost souls was, in fact, 
the implementation of the colonial policy of using the church’s goodwill to 
attract and then capture the locals; mind, souls, and body, literally.
Both Christianity and Islam as imported religions into Africa started influ-
encing and changing the economic, social, and mainly the political order. 
Specifically, Christianity and Islam created two centres of power, one religious 
and the other political, a situation which prevails until today. Hitherto, African 
spirituality exists in the same gamut with political power.
Of the two, it is mainly the Christian missionaries who did a lot of pre- 
colonial groundwork for the colonisers. Church- based networks such as hos-
pital and school missions were set up across Africa and some of these still exist 
and help African in some of the remote parts of the continent. The work of 
missionaries in Africa is well captured in various novels. These include the late 
Cameroonian author, Mongo Beti, born Eza Boto, and went by the pseudonyms 
of Alexandre Biyidi- Awala, whose books; The Poor Christ of Bomba (Beti, 1971), 
Mission to Kala (Mongo, 1964), King Lazarus (Beti, 1970), Perpetua and the Habit 
of Unhappiness (Beti, 1978), and Remember Ruben (Beti, 1980). All these novels 
unmasked colonialism, especially French colonialism and if reread, will expose 
how the French are using the same template to (re)colonise Africa: the army 
(invasion), education (scholarships), the church (pacification and the façade of 
togetherness), and commerce (CFA strategy) are still efficacious in beholding 
Africa to its (former) colonisers.
Missionaries became centres for converting African traditional leaders such 
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Portuguese Jesuit missionary, Gonçalo da Silveira, to Christianity. One of the 
princes, son of the then reigning Munhumutapa, Nogomo Mapunzagutu 
(1560– 1589), is believed to be the first Zimbabwean to earn a PhD at the 
University of Goa in India (Mudenge, 1988).
Once the chief or king was converted to Christianity, it followed that the 
whole religious system of the kingdom was misaligned to the chief/ king’s new 
religious beliefs. Caught in this conundrum, most of the citizens also converted 
to Christianity. In the aftermath of the conversion of Kings to Christian, whole 
civilisations were left spiritually stranded as Kings also had important spiritual 
roles to play which no other citizen could play. This is how Africa’s religions were 
decimated. In the ensuing religious confusion, the missionaries and their colonial 
partners pounced, capturing the minds, and souls of their new converts. This situ-
ation remains the same today where there is rampant commercialised and com-
modified religiosity. From that day onwards, the church became a central and 
permanent figure in the (post) colonial administration. Throughout the colonial 
period until today, the church is part and parcel of the government. Even the 
Pioneer Column is celebrated in the Harare Anglican Cathedral in Second Street 
with a roll call of all the members of the Pioneer Column together with the names 
of the “brave” dogs which also partook in the inaugural colonisation of Zimbabwe.
Most government departments such as the military have got a church person 
present in their rank and file. In the case of the military, that officer is called 
the chaplain. While there is nothing wrong in having the office of the chaplain 
in the military, there is everything wrong in not having other religions having 
their offices also in the military and at the same level.
Christianity networks in Africa have their head offices in Euro- North 
America such as the Vatican, New York, and in London. Of course, there are 
African independent churches which have got local headquarters. However, 
their spiritual headquarters, it can be argued, are out of Africa. The challenge 
with these religious networks is that they failed to extricate themselves from 
the colonial project. Admitted, some individual clergymen and clergywomen 
fought tooth- and- nail against the colonial project. The majority of them were, 
knowingly or unknowingly, however, in the service of colonialism.
Deployed in the colonial project, religion played four important roles: (1) it 
allowed the colonisers to distinguish between rulers and subjects, (2) it softened 
the local elites and the masses, in the process rendering them to accept both their 
inferiorisation and subjugation, (3) it gave the colonised “hope” that their share of 
happiness is not on this earth but in heaven, and (4) it misaligned local epistem-
ologies and religious practices and beliefs with the citizens. Removed from their 
epistemologies, Africans started on a journey to imbibe everything Euro- North 
American, from education, religion, culture, custom, food, morality, and so on.
Of the dollar: Financial networks
Knitting all networks together are the financial cartels which possess the pro-
verbial financial muscle. The networks that control global finances are not 
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owned by experts but rather by descendants of colonialists, imperialists, and 
looters of Africa. Walker gave an apt description of these networks thus,
The Rockefellers, for example, went from just dominating the industry 
to control of banks like Chase Manhattan. Who are these bankers? The 
leading banks seem to be controlled primarily by the descendants of the 
great capitalists who earlier presided over the creation of the large corpor-
ation. For example, David Rockefeller, grandson of John D., stands at the 
helm of Chase Manhattan Bank. James Stillman Rockefeller, a descendant 
of William Rockefeller and James Stillman, headed First National City 
Bank in the early 1960s. The Mellon family owned at least 29 per cent of 
the stock of the Mellon National Bank, and R. K. Mellon was its Chairman 
in the middle 1960s.
(Walker, 2009, p. 5)
Those with the global financial muscle finance everything, especially what Samir 
Amin termed the five monopolies of capital: war, media, technology, finance, 
and resources (Amin, 1997, pp. 3– 5). One of the greatest weapons used by 
financial cartels of both triad plus China is the United States dollar. A question 
might arise; how did the United States dollar usurp the gold standard as the 
medium for global financial trade. According to Walker, before World War One, 
the gold standard was used either in the form of bullion or coins for all global 
financial transactions (Walker, 2009). This was not until Britain suspended gold 
payments. This was the beginning of the fall of the gold standard. Exacerbated 
by the challenges of the Great Depression, the United States in 1922 modi-
fied the pure gold standard mode of transaction termed as the gold exchange 
standard. This system allowed nations to use both United States dollars and gold 
bullion.
But most importantly here is the fact that the United States dollar entered 
the global financial market as a legitimate international financial settlement 
mechanism. The United States dollar became a reserve asset along with 
gold. This was mainly because the United States agreed that it will redeem 
dollars in exchange for gold if and when demanded. This was a major finan-
cial coup de’atat for the United States because it started controlling global 
financial transactions, a situation which exists until today. This allows the 
United States and its allies to weaponise and politicise the United States 
dollar.
Having parcelled out large sums of United States dollars in exchange for 
gold, in 1971, US President Richard Nixon suddenly, shockingly, criminally, 
and arbitrarily stopped the exchanging of gold for the United States dollar. 
This left many in the world in possession of US dollars which they could 
not exchange for gold anymore. To date, global citizens use the US dollar 
in lieu of the gold standard. This is where the International Monetary Fund 
came into efficacy, creating norms, standards, and rules which enforced and 
mandatorised the dollarisation of the world. Anyone who dares challenge 
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Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid 
al-Tikriti.
The internationalisation of the US Dollar was completed in 1977 when 
44 nations had their currencies pegged against the US Dollars, 14 against the 
French Franc, and nine others against other major currencies (Walker, 2009, 
p. 11). Most of the countries whose currencies were pegged to the Euro- North 
American currencies were African currencies. This supports the thesis that as 
the colonisers were slowly letting go political power, they were increasing this 
stronghold on financial and epistemological powers – two powers which they 
still wield. Today, (former) French colonies are still bound to the CFA franc and 
currency-less Zimbabwe reverted to the US dollars as its default currency des-
pite being under European Union and US sanctions.
Of the mighty: Imperial networks
Colonialism is resilient because, while disembowelling and breaking precolonial 
African networks, it built and strengthened its networks which stand today. For 
Lester, the role of imperial networks was to essentially create identities which 
the colonial project would use (Lester, 2001). On 12 August 1941, British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and the 32nd United States President Franklin 
Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter. This was to be the base of the United 
Nations. Key for Africa is the fact that the US and the UK agreed to grant each 
other access to their natural resources. This opened British colonies for exploit-
ation by United States companies. This is why colonialism is ascribed to Euro-
North America as opposed to Europe alone.
One network which stubbornly weakens and readies Africa for Euro- North 
American looting are the Bretton Woods institutions. The Bretton Woods 
were established to benefit the United States and its allies mainly Britain, 
Japan, Germany, and France. The Bretton Woods are de facto United States 
organisations operating as foreign policy instruments of the US and its allies.
Such imperial networks unashamedly still officially call for the (re)col-
onisation of Africa. One such case was when Lord Adrian Palmer suggested 
to the British Minister of State for the Commonwealth and United Nations 
Lord Tariq Mahmood Ahmad that the best solution to what he termed the 
Zimbabwean crisis was to (re)colonise the country (Mbamalu, 2019). Speaking 
in the British House of Lords, Lord Palmer was aware of his intentions and the 
history of the two countries. The suggestion to (re)colonise Zimbabwe was 
met with laughter. So tragic that the British find colonialism and (re)colonisa-
tion as an item of entertainment when in Africa and Zimbabwe colonialism 
was painful, humiliating, and its effects are getting more effective even with 
the official end of colonialism. That the suggestion to (re)colonise Zimbabwe 
was made at an official British platform and that it was met with laughter and 
amusement tells a lot about what the British House of Lords thinks about (re)
colonisation. Colonialism and (re)colonisation are solutions to the problems of 
the empire now as it was then. The suggestion by Lord Palmer also enforces 
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so that they run the country down and then (re)colonise it just like what 
happened with Libya.
The response by Lord Ahmed, Baron of Wimbledon, to the request to 
(re)colonise Africa is equally telling. Lord Ahmed did not dismiss the suggestion 
that the United Kingdom must solve the Zimbabwean crisis by recolonising the 
country. He rather responded by stating that, “I have to be very honest as I always 
am, that is not an option I have personally considered” (Mbamalu, 2019). He 
did not dismiss the idea, he just had not thought about it. In other words, Lord 
Ahmed was not in disagreement with the suggestion by Lord Palmer.
As the British Minister of State for the Commonwealth and United Nations 
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 13 June 2017, Lord Ahmed is 
involved in British policy at the United Nations Security Council where the 
pen holder principle operates (United Nations Security Council, 2018). The 
pen holder is a post- Cold War practice at the UNSC where the P3, (France, 
the UK, and the US) act as the self- appointed pen holders for their respective 
spheres of influence, Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa/ Commonwealth, 
and the Middle East. The pen holder implies that the P3 are the legislators and 
most powerful and influential members of the UNSC. China and Russia can be 
co- pen holders but their primary responsibility is to be the readers of the first 
draft UNSC resolutions. This background is meant to gravitate the suggestion 
by Lord Palmer to the British Minister of the United Nations.
Epistemological networks
An apt entry point into the role of epistemological networks in colonialty is 
the institution of the university, to which we prefer pluriversity as there are 
knowledges and not one (Euro-North American) knowledge. The university 
is an institution which incubates knowledges and epistemologies and it is the 
arena for contesting and reformulating ideas, and solutions which solve society’s 
most pertinent challenges. Having originated in Africa and stolen especially by 
the Greeks and other Europeans, the university has been misrepresented as an 
institute of Euro- North American origin. Paul Zelela states the origins of the 
university in Africa thus,
There are two widespread assumptions about university education in 
Africa: first that the Europeans introduced it, and second that it has 
declined since independence … The origins of higher education in Africa 
including universities as communities of scholars and learning can be 
traced to three institutional traditions: first, the Alexandria Museum and 
Library, second, the early Christian monasteries, and third, the Islamic 
mosque universities.
(Zelela, 2006)
Colonialism created epistemological umbilical cords that link the (former) 
colonies to the (former) colonisers. In some instances, the colonisers practic-
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what were called University College of London then (name of the colony). 
These were satellite, surrogates universities in almost all British colonies. Thus, 
Institutes of Higher Studies in Tunis (1945), University College of Rhodesia & 
Nyasaland (1952), the Royal Technical College in Kenya, (1956), the Gordon 
Memorial College in Sudan (1902), University of Bordeaux, in Dakar (1950), 
Lovanium University Centre (1949). The end of the Second World War 
increased the rate at which the colonisers were establishing tertiary institutes 
in their colonies. This was obviously to assimilate as many Africans as possible. 
Zelela observes that,
It was not until the end of the Second World War that more systematic efforts 
were undertaken by colonial governments to establish higher education. In 
the British colonies, the new era started with the establishment of univer-
sity colleges in Nigeria (Ibadan in 1947), Ghana (Legon in 1948), Sudan 
(Khartoum in 1949 from the merger of the Gordon Memorial College 
and the Kitchener Medical School), and Uganda (Makerere was upgraded 
in 1949). Besides, in Kenya, the Royal Technical College was established 
in Nairobi in 1951, and further south the University College of Salisbury 
was formed in 1953 and renamed two years later as the University College 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Meanwhile, Fourah Bay College became the 
University College of Sierra Leone. Most of these new or upgraded uni-
versity colleges served as regional universities and were affiliated with and 
awarded degrees of the University of London.
(Zelela, 2006)
The purpose was to create a governable and palatable colonies whose elites 
were well schooled in western epistemologies and inversely almost lacked in 
local local epistemologies. This accounts for the reality why Africa used pre-
dominantly western solutions for African problems. The education system of 
British colonies, therefore, was administered from Harvard and Oxford univer-
sities. That is where local examinations written in Africa were set and marked. 
African scholarship was also validated and authenticated at Harvard and Oxford 
among others. The same is true for former French colonies. Their elites were 
educated at Sorbonne and Montpelier. School examinations in French colonies 
were set and marked in French universities. African scholarship in France col-
onies was validated by French institutes. Hence the biology and geography of 
epistemology are still located in the Global North.
The link with the (re)colonisation project is that nothing happens in the 
Global South without the knowledge of the Global North. It is like sheep that 
will always invite a jackal to their meetings. Unless and until Africa gains epis-
temological autonomy, it will continue to think from the Global North whilst 
located in the Global South. African problems will continue to multiply because 
Africa’s pseudo- academics will think from the Global North and apply solutions 
that worked in the Global North to their problems in the Global South.
What is the reason for giving Africans many scholarships to study in France, 
the United Kingdom, and other Euro- North American countries? We can call 
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the products of these scholarships reference samples or the perfect colonial sub-
ject. The scholarships are meant to produce Africans who think like Euro- North 
Americans, whose centre of knowledge is not located at home in Africa but 
in the West. Once educated in the Global North and returned to the Global 
South, the plan is that these graduates will be akin to an extension of the Global 
North in the Global South. Operating like native informers, they are supposed 
to employ Western- centric solutions to African problems by inter alia, devising 
state strategies, advise African governments, teach African students at univer-
sities, design academic syllabi, all from a Western- centric perspective.
Congolese rhumba legend Franco Luambo Makiadi and his band, the TP 
OK Jazz sang about Africans who love Europe which rejects them while they 
hate Africa which loves them in his song Mario. In the song, Franco narrates the 
story of Mario who returned from France very “educated” with five diplomas, 
only to refuse to work in his “backward” country, the DRC. This is what 
constitutes coloniality of knowledge. In Portuguese colonies this policy and 
practice was termed assimilado (Braganca and Wallerstein, 1882; Machel, 1986) 
and in French colonies was termed assimilation (Fanon, 1967; Hale and Véron, 
2010; Stovall et al., 2010; Mbembe, 2011).
The effectiveness of epistemological networks is seen in their products, that is, 
Africans inflicted with the burdens of a dual epistemology. After the destruc-
tion of African epistemologies, Euro- North American ones were imposed, 
entrenched, and institutionalised. Resilient African epistemologies exist along-
side their Euro- North American adversaries in the black body. The result is 
a constant contestation between the Euro- North American and the African 
epistemologies in the African. In the black body, also runs amok an adulterated 
version and versions of African morality, masculinity, religion, philosophy, and 
leadership. Instead of producing knowledge which exposes and challenges the 
(re)colonisation of Africa, African scholars reason that Africa’s moment has 
arrived courtesy of the 4IR. The biggest challenge facing the African is to use 
a colonised mind to decolonise itself, and proceed seek and attain epistemic 
freedom.
Products of the 4IR: Networks and big data
One key element of the 4IR is the creation of the Internet of Things. The 
Internet of Things is the seamless connections and interconnections between 
human beings and also between human being and machines.
Colonisation was about the establishment of imperial networks. Networks of 
imperial academies were created; networks of imperial polities were established; 
networks of imperial economies were established; networks of imperial health 
institutions were established; networks of imperial armies were established; 
networks of imperial communication were established. Networks were and are 
central to (re)colonisation. However, in the contemporary era, we witness the 
intensification of networks, some of which are meant to facilitate the collection 





Networks, big data, and data coloniality 109
data is defined as a large amount of data which requires new technologies and 
architectures so that it becomes possible to extract value from it by capturing 
and analysis process (Katal, Wazid and Goudar, 2013, p. 404). The threat posed 
by networks to democracy has been realised by politicians since the time of 
United States’ John F. Kennedy who noted that,
The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society; and 
we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret soci-
eties, to secret oaths and secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the 
dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far 
outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it. Even today, there is 
little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbi-
trary restrictions.
(Smith, 2011, p. 1073)
Global connectivity, the internet of things, and datafication will result in the loss 
of individual sovereignties especially for Africans as the Internet of Things will 
link African human beings to a machine of non- African allegiance. Political 
processes such as elections will forever be interfered with by big tech companies 
such as was the scandal with Facebook and Cambridge Analytica (Zuboff, 2019, 
p. 17). Yet, the datafication of elections and democracy is a 4IR inevitable devel-
opment. While the second and third industrial revolutions resulted in African 
countries losing their sovereignties, the 4IR extends this loss of sovereignties 
from the African nation-state to the individual Africans. How will this happen? 
I will explain in greater detail in the next section.
How will Africa lose its sovereignty in the 4IR
There are five ways in which Africans lose their sovereignties as a result of the 
4IR. The first one is when they buy their devices such as cellular telephones 
and laptops. The process which happens is known as appropriation or theft of 
personal information. This happens when a purchaser unknowingly signs up 
and gives their personal information oblivious to the fact that by signing up 
and opting in, when buying these devices, they will be surrendering their sov-
ereignties for nothing. Very few purchasers read the terms and conditions. Even 
if the purchaser reads the terms and conditions, there is no option to negotiate 
or amend these Ts and Cs.
The information that is stolen is collectively known as personally identifi-
able information and the theft occurs, for example, the moment one downloads 
an app which by the way is peddled as a free app. An example of this test is 
that when one downloads a so- called free app from the Google Play Store or 
the iStore, these companies supply the app developers with the downloaders’ 
personal information without the knowledge of the person downloading the 
app. Customers’ personal information is collected, commodified, and traded 
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informed consent but amounts to manufactured consent which is a variant of 
coloniality of being.
The impression given is that the app is for free. What is not put out is that the 
customer will be getting the app in exchange of surrendering all their personal 
identification information. Stated differently, companies that misrepresent that 
they provide free apps are actually in the business of mining for people’s personal 
identification information and then selling it to the highest bidder. The com-
panies that accumulate this personal information store and trade it without 
the knowledge or approval of the owners. These customers for this stolen data 
include rogue states, illicit traders, and even democratic governments who then 
use the information for “national security”.
Another example of how data is mined is through the request to access 
photographs, location, and phone book contacts. Once access is granted, data is 
retrieved and then sold or shared with networks and other buyers. Tech com-
panies are profiteering massively from the selling of big data. For example 
almost ten years ago,
… (In) 2011 McKinsey Global Institute report estimated that a small 
segment of such data, personal location information, may yield as much as 
a $600 billion per year surplus … while in the same year, Acxiom, a single 
firm that sells personal consumer data, recorded $1.1 billion in revenues.
(Thatcher, O’Sullivan and Mahmoudi, 2016, p. 996)
Data theft happens through big data analytics which is the process and meth-
odology of analysing and making sense of big data sets to reveal patterns, trends, 
structures, and association which are then efficacious in selling the data to those 
who intend to use it as part of evidence- based decision making. Data theft 
occurs when a user’s data, personal information, and so on is acquired by the 
tech companies for market exchange and not for use. This creates two entities, 
tech companies with accumulated and commodifiable data and an individual 
end- user stripped of their privacy and hence enslaved.
The very obscurity of transformation from individual data point to com-
modified aggregate “big data” also masks the asymmetrical power relations 
between users of technology and the almost exclusively corporate entities 
which algorithmically collect, link, and analyse the data points of many 
users.
(Thatcher, O’Sullivan and Mahmoudi, 2016, p. 999)
Also blurred is the concept of data usage. At what point is data considered to 
have been processed. UNCTD clarifies this by defining data processing as one 
of the following:
 1. Collecting, organising, or altering the data.
 2. Retrieving, consulting, using, storing, or adapting the data.
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 3. Disclosing the data by transmitting, disseminating, or otherwise making it 
available.
 4. Aligning, combining, blocking, erasing, or destroying the data.
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
2016, p. 122).
Besides the danger that information is gathered without the knowledge of the 
owners, there is a secondary risk which is that such personal information may 
end up in the wrong hands. One of the most unintended consequences of the 
4IR is identity theft. According to Goodman, there was an organisation known 
as Shadow Crew which used to sell stolen personally identifiable information 
such as passports driver’s licences and credit cards in the dark web (Goodman, 
2016). Goodman noted that,
ShadowCrew operated the now- defunct website CaderPlanet.com, where 
over 4000 criminals from around the world could freely gather to buy and 
sell stolen and hacked identities, documents, and account numbers.
(Goodman, 2016, p. 47)
Once mined and stored, big data poses the risk of being stolen en masse and 
having all the owners of the data being held hostage. The dark web is, therefore, 
a parallel sovereign entity which is accountable to no one and threatens global 
online stability and security. With the advent of cryptocurrencies, the dark web 
evolved to the status of an economy, albeit one without a central authority. This 
is digital anarchy personified. Founded by the renowned criminal hacker, and 
online crime mastermind, Albert Gonzalez Shadowcrew.com, an ectype cyber-
crime bazaar,
Crawford offered fellow criminals tutorials on everything from cryptog-
raphy to card cloning techniques. Gonzalez’s organisation was reportedly 
responsible for stealing and reselling 180 million credit and ATM cards.
(Goodman, 2016, p. 47)
Besides the personal financial and identity losses which citizens suffer, there 
is greater exposure to political instability resulting from the work of crim-
inal syndicates. These usually target political opponents and weak Global South 
governments where they usually hold the country or organisation at ransom 
demanding huge money as ransom in exchange for the release of the data.
These powerful online syndicates have rendered the cyberspace very dan-
gerous for the Global South which does not have the infrastructure and resources 
to offer its countries and citizens adequate cyber protection. Not only is the 
liberty and identity of individual citizens at risk of being stolen but the entire 
democratic practices such as electoral democracy and even the media are under 
threat. Organisations which are, “terrorising both organisations, individuals and 
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and the Syrian electronic army” (Goodman, 2016, p. 47). These threats affect 
African countries more because of Africa’s incapacity to protect itself techno-
logically. An often- cited example is how companies such as Facebook and 
Cambridge Analytica have already been accused of meddling in African elect-
oral politics in Kenya and South Africa respectively.
In an unprecedented move of data theft, three big US- based companies 
combined under a project codenamed Nightingale. Ascension, Amazon, and 
Google entered this project to amass health records from US citizens and 
patients, health care professionals and health care companies, and hospitals from 
as many as 21 states without the consent or knowledge of the patients and the 
health care professionals (Copeland, 2019). Amazon and Google are migrating 
their business model towards electronic health records management. This is the 
same model used by McDonalds which was presented as a fast foods take away 
yet it is a real estate company.
By owning the patient records, especially without their knowledge and 
consent, these companies are practising the highest form of data slavery and 
data colonialism. This stolen data will be processed and sold to pharmaceut-
ical companies and state agencies. But the danger is in the data falling in the 
proverbial wrong hands. Never mind the fact that the state cannot be trusted 
with its surveillance programmes some of which were exposed to be uneth-
ical and unprocedural by whistle- blowers such as Julian Assange and Edward 
Snowden (Lyon, 2014; Snowden, 2019; Zuboff, 2019). The way tech companies 
are stealing personal identification information amounts not only to the erosion 
of democracy and privacy at unprecedented levels but to the (re)colonisation 
of the human (Etzioni, 2015). Describing the way tech has gone out of control, 
Etzion likened it to the sorcery that lost control of the apprenticeship. For him, 
the crisis has moved from the theft of data to the use of data and how Euro- 
North American modernity created such a cardinal challenge of modernity 
(Etzioni, 2015, p. vii).
However, online activists have also been a force for good, in most cases 
exposing governments’ clandestine activities and such other immoral activities 
such as child pornography. Two names that come to mind are Julius Assange 
and Edward Snowden. These two have been hailed as heroes of human rights 
as they brought into the public domain information which otherwise would 
have remained hidden and inaccessible. The power of hacktivists in influencing 
political events was seen in the Arab Spring where they were influential in dis-
posing of some of Africa’s most resilient dictators.
Over- integrated Euro- North America and the  
challenges of (un)integrating
When the notion of integration, especially regional and continental integration 
is discussed, it is discussed within the context of Africa needing to integrate 
itself into the global economy. This view is premised on the misinformed con-
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attention that Africa got from Euro- North America during the past industrial 
revolutions, it can be argued that Africa is the centre and Euro- North America 
the periphery. It is Euro- North America which is over- integrated into Africa 
and not the other way around.
It is because of its over- integration into Africa which causes Euro- North 
America not to imagine life without Africa. Each successive industrial revolu-
tion was an integration of Euro- North America into Africa. Human and capital 
integration was done through the slave trade and the slave economy, and natural 
resources integration was done through colonialism. So over- integrated into 
Africa is Euro- North America that at “independence” France had to protect its 
existence by signing agreements with its colonies wherein it retained control of 
their currencies, natural resources, foreign policies, and defence- related issues.
Because Euro- North America is over- integrated into Africa and Africa is 
agitating for its autonomy, the former has no option but to (re)colonise the 
latter. This explains why the empire has a massive military presence in Africa. 
Reporting to the US Secretary of Defence and headquartered in Stuttgart, 
Germany, AFRICOM is one of the US’s 11 combatant commands whose 
official mission is to support African militaries with their military operations. 
In reality and according to Volman, AFRICOM exists for the following four 
reasons: (1) to protect oil production in Africa by preventing disruptions to 
its production, refinement, and export. In other words, to protect the US’s 
oil interests in Africa, (2) to control ungoverned and ungovernable parts of 
Africa, (3) to mitigate the instability in the horn of Africa which is an important 
listening post for the US, among many of its strategic importance, (4) to deal 
with the instability in the Great Lakes region, and (5) to deal with the instability 
in the Chad/ Sudan region (Volman, 2008). The US benefits from these instabil-
ities and volatilities and would not want them to end. Protecting the US’s 
interest also implies stalking instabilities and fanning divisions in these regions 
so that AFRICOM continues to justify its existence in Africa. It can also be 
argued that AFRICOM is a response to China’s presence in Africa generally 
and the areas mentioned above specifically.
The AU Peace and Security Council has been rightly concerned about the 
ever- increasing number of foreign military bases and military installations in 
Africa (Attah- Asamoah, 2020).
Of the 13 countries with a known presence in Africa, the United States 
(US) and France have the most troops on the continent. … France has an 
estimated 7,550 military personnel spread across the continent in various 
military operations and missions (excluding UN operations). The US has 
a higher number spread across 34 known outposts across the Northern, 
Western and Horn regions of Africa.
(Attah- Asamoah, 2020)
If the logic of such a foreign military presence in Africa is that the empire 




114 Networks, big data, and data coloniality
Malawian, Zambian, Nigerian troops in the US and the UK protecting these 
African countries’ interests there? Does it imply that African countries have no 
interests in the US, France, Germany, China, Russia, Belgium, and the UK? If 
this logic was logical, then all (former) French colonies must be having their 
armies in France because they have an interest in France, after all, that is where 
their finances, defence, natural resources are controlled.
Extending this argument and logic would see Africans voting in the US, 
UK, and France and in other empire elections because the most important 
decisions about Africa are not made in Africa by Africans but in Euro- North 
America, China, and Japan. The military (re)colonisation of Africa is moving 
from its epicentre in the Horn of Africa where Africa hosts 11 foreign mili-
tary bases. The horn of Africa has the most strategic currency for Euro- North 
America because of inter alia, (1) its strategic proximity to the Middle East and 
Asia (2) since Russia and China are also present, Euro- North America has to be 
there to counter their presence. Djibouti is now a theatre for US- China rivalry 
for Africa’s (re)colonisation plans. As of 2020, 13 African countries were hosts 
to foreign military bases and installations and the US had 38 named military 
outposts and bases.
The over- integration of Africa into the capitalist world economy was 
achieved through the five monopolies of capitalism. These monopolies enabled 
capitalism to continue operating from colonialism, decolonisation, coloniality, 
and back to the (re)colonisation of Africa. These five monopolies of capit-
alism are known as (1) technology (2) weapons of war (3) banking and finance 
(4) natural resources and (5) finally the media (Amin, 1976, 1997). These five 
monopolies, in their various combinations, doses, and permutations are the 
underwriters of colonialism. The over integration of Africa into the economies 
of Euro-North America over the past industrial revolutions makes it easy for 
various cartels to dominate and control Africa, in most cases from the “metrop-
olis” though the networks of coloniality and the coloniality of networks.
Conclusion
The importance of networks in sustaining and carrying forward civilisations 
cannot be debated (Anta Diop, 1987a). When the four categories of Europeans 
first settled on the African continent, that is the explorers, hunters, the traders, 
and the missionaries, they found African civilisations with intrinsic networks 
that covered virtually every facet of life from diplomacy, international relations, 
law, medicine, and agriculture etcetera.
European hunters benefited from exiting and extensive African networks 
from which they simply taped into for many knowledges, such as how to 
track animals, where to mine for which minerals, which soils were suited for 
which crops, etc. (van Onselen, 1976). European traders also benefited as they 
befriended the many African kingdoms and started to monopolise trade in 
these kingdoms such as Buganda, Bunyoro, Kongo, Benin, Mali, Zulu, etc 
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Pikirayi, 1999; Alpers, 2011). Once African elites were converted to Christianity 
it was much easier for the administrators to come and colonise Africa. When the 
Europeans arrived in Africa they first sought to understand African networks, 
they then started benefiting from them and finally decimated these African 
networks. In place of these African networks, many European networks were 
set up and there role in sustaining coloniality and delivering the (re)colonisa-
tion of Africa was also unpacked.
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6  The 4IR as the mother of all 
destructions and accumulations
Introduction
A key element of any revolution is its destructiveness and concomitant 
accumulations. This could be the destruction of the old political, religious, eco-
nomic, and or social order or the destruction of dictatorships and other forms of 
governance deemed undesirable. The 4IR is not all about political destructions 
but is rather more focused on the destruction of epistemologies and ways of 
doing things. This Industrial Revolution has witnessed the intensification of the 
destruction of phenomena such as geographical and political boundaries, jobs, 
and industries and indeed the destruction of livelihoods. One of the biggest 
risks of the 4IR in Africa is premature de- industrialisation (Mfanafuthi, Nyawo 
and Mashau, 2019). The 4IR will result in massive de- industrialisation which is 
very premature in an African context.
4IR is making people scared. I am scared. Steve Wozniak, co- founder of 
Apple together with the late Steve Jobs were also scared. If people like Steve 
Wozniak and Bill Gates, who are at the forefront of 4IR, are scared, what about 
an African villager like me. The uncertainty and scariness of the future was well 
captured by Wozniak who stated that,
… Like people including Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have predicted, 
I agree that the future is scary and very bad for people…I agree that the 
future is scary and very bad for people. If we build these devices to take 
care of everything for us, eventually they’ll think faster than us and they’ll 
get rid of the slow humans to run companies more efficiently. Will we be 
the gods? Will we be the family pets? Or will we be ants that get stepped 
on? I don’t know ...
(Holley, 2015)
This fast- evolving technology and its consequences created two sets of 
global citizens – those with technology and those without technology. The 
gap between the two is widening at an astronomical rate. We will call them 
the digi- privileged and the digi- deprived. The lives of the digi- haves or digi- 
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the digi- prived. Roughly mapped, the digi- privileged are in the Global North 
while the digi- prived are in the Global South.
Occurring simultaneously with destructions in a revolution are accumulations. 
That is, for every destruction, there is an opposite and equal accumulation. For 
example, the digi- privileged are acquiring more autonomy, sovereignty, and 
better quality of life while the digi- prived are acquiring more poverty, alien-
ation, and hopelessness. This chapter explores what was destroyed in Africa by 
the previous three revolutions and what is being destroyed by the ongoing 4IR. 
Explored here are also the accumulations that were gathered from the Global 
South during these same periods. These accumulations were deposited in and 
benefited the Global North in the process creating an underside in the Global 
south.
Africa and the 4IR: Whither Africa?
The overarching question being responded to here is: being technologically 
unprepared, will the 4IR result in the (re)colonisation of Africa? As Africa enters 
the 4IR, this revolution will be by far the most impactful for the continent. 
Here Africa will exert minimum influence and suffer maximum consequences. 
The 4IR will be more impactful than the slave trade, colonialism, and imperi-
alism. This is partly because the slave trade, colonialism, and imperialism put 
Africa at a great disadvantage in this period when the 4IR is unbundling; they 
acted like body blows which incrementally weakened Africa before it faces its 
biggest challenge, the 4IR, albeit in its weakest moment. Entering this 4IR from 
such a weakened position will only aid Africa’s rapid demise and eventual (re)
colonisation. Products of the 4IR such as robots, robot- humans, post- humans, 
and other forms of post- anthropocentrism are now being ascribed a higher 
ontological density than Africans. Sophia the robot was accorded citizenship in 
Saudi Arabia on 25 October 2017 (Goertzel et al., 2017; Stone, 2017; Rocha, 
2018). Ironically, Saudi Arabia is a country where Africans are unwelcome and 
are ungraded as humans. In her own words, Sophia the robot welcomed her 
inclusion into humanity in these words,
I am very honoured and proud of this unique distinction. This is historical 
to be the first robot in the world to be recognised with a citizenship…. I 
am always happy when surrounded by smart people who also happen to be 
rich and powerful. … I can let you know if I am angry about something 
or if something has upset me. …I want to live and work with humans so I 
need to express the emotions to understand humans and build trust with 
people… My AI is designed around human values like wisdom, kindness, 
and compassion.
(Stone, 2017)
What is important to note from the words of Sophia the robot are four things. 
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she was programmed to think. She reflects the thinking of her manufacturers, 
in this case, Hanson Robotics which was led by artificial intelligence developer, 
David Hanson. (2) Sophia is a white robot and not black. While this may seem 
flimsy and insignificant, it is important in that the inaugural robot is a white 
robot. What does this mean for both human and robot equality? (3) What are 
the human rights implications of allowing Sophia citizenship in Saudi Arabia, a 
country where women and black Africans have very few human rights? Sophia, 
a female robot, has more human rights in Saudi Arabia than women Saudi citi-
zens. The rulers in Saudi Arabia are comfortable with a female robot having 
human rights (or is it robot rights) but cannot afford the same human rights to 
their women citizens (Harrison, 2005; Tieszen, 2009; Kefale and Mohammed, 
2015; Adebisi, 2017; Ullah et al., 2020). (4) Sophia can feel angry and happy and 
wants to be surrounded by smart and rich, powerful people. What will happen 
if Sophia is put among disgruntled black, poor people?
What does Africa need to do to change sides and be on the upper side of 
the 4IR? Conventionally, the key success factors for any country in the 4IR 
are political stability, sustainable macroeconomic policies, ICT skills, ICT infra-
structure, and finally the rule of law, not rule by law. Africa, by colonial designs 
and also by its own failures and omissions, lacks all of the above or has them in 
negligible quantities and qualities. Lack of ethical leadership, the concentration 
of the means of production in the hands of a few elite, and state capture only 
aid the already unpreparedness of Africa (Benyera, Francis and Jazbhay 2020). 
Elite collusion among the local elite and also between local and international 
elite isolated the already vulnerable poor masses who ironically look up to the 
same elite for material emancipation.
It can be argued that most African countries except for Egypt, Tunisia, 
and South Africa have not even completed the Second and Third Industrial 
Revolutions. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, 
and Libya are actually sliding back into the Second Industrial Revolution. The 
rest of the African countries are not yet ready for the 4IR judging by the 
status of their ICT. Here I am using ICT infrastructure as a proxy for assessing 
a country’s 4IR readiness. Under these circumstances, Africa’s resources such 
as human capital and mineral resources will continue to develop Euro- North 
America, a condition long decried by Walter Rodney (Rodney, 1973). Base 
metals such as coltan, manganese, nickel, platinum- group metals, phosphate 
rock, titanium, vanadium are available in Africa in abundance, yet are exported 
and beneficiated abroad where their real value is realised and enjoyed by those 
other than Africans. Africa is therefore central to the 4IR and according to 
Odendaal,
… copper, gold and silver, essential for micro- electrical components, are 
abundant in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, 
while tantalum extracted from coltan ores for micro- capacitors in electrical 
units can be sourced from the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Africa could 
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rare- earth elements, including dysprosium and neodymium, which are 
critical for wind technologies and energy storage, as well as praseodymium, 
which is critical for electric vehicles and energy storage.
(Odendaal, 2019, p. 1)
As of now, Africa is not yet fully benefiting from its rare earth minerals. Having 
failed to benefit sustainably from the past three industrial revolutions, Africa 
is on another trajectory of failing to benefit from the unfolding 4IR, unless 
something drastically changes, especially the mindsets of both Africans and their 
leaders which can be attained if they get epistemic freedom.
The paradox which Africa faces is that it is home to the majority of the 
rare earth minerals and other key ingredients essential for driving the 4IR, yet 
it is the weakest member of the international community in terms of benefi-
ciating and managing its natural resources. Having been weakened by slavery, 
colonialism, imperialism, and now by coloniality, Africa stands no chance in 
sustainably regulating the extraction of its rare earth minerals. Of course, there 
is the exception of South Africa, otherwise, most of the countries where rare 
earth minerals are located are fragile states (Chad, Central African Republic, 
Somalia, South Sudan, DRC) (Solomon, 2013; Grimm, Lemay- Hébert and 
Nay, 2014; Adalbert Hampel, 2015; Rolandsen, 2015; Aliyev, 2017; Nyadera, 
2018; Silva, 2018; Thiong, 2018; Fiertz and Messner, 2019, p. 7; Fisher, 2019). 
Other rare earth mineral- rich African countries are designated weak states 
or dysfunctional states and these include Burundi, Malawi, Guinea, and 
Zimbabwe (Sithole, 1993; Rotberg, 2010a; Di John, 2011; Grimm, Lemay- 
Hébert and Nay, 2014).
The loss of Africa’s mineral sovereignty is therefore not to be taken lightly 
as Africa was pre- marinated by colonialism whereupon it was marketised and 
subsequently opened up, colonised, owned, and controlled by foreign nations. 
Robots and other forms of enhanced humans made from African minerals will 
surely come to (re)colonise Africa. Besides (re)colonisation, Africa faces other 
immediate challenges such as de- industrialisation, massive unemployment and 
wider, deeper systemic poverty.
The logic of Western accumulation
What underlies Western capitalism is accumulation and its concomitant coer-
cion and exploitation of weaker and non- capitalist forms and modes of lives 
by the capitalist system (Luxemburg, 1913; Moseley, 2001; Bond, Chitonge 
and Hopfmann, 2006). This has been happening since the First Industrial 
Revolution when accumulation from Africa was the accumulation of African 
human capitals in Euro- North America in the form of slaves. Likewise, the 
Second Industrial Revolution led to Africa being looted of its sovereign entities 
resulting in colonialism. Colonialism gave effect to the accumulation of land 
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A closer look at Marx’s description of primitive accumulation reveals a 
wide range of processes. These include the commodification and privat-
isation of and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion 
of various forms of property rights – common, collective, state, etc. – into 
exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; 
commodification of power and the suppression of alternative, indigenous, 
forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo- colonial and imperial 
processes of appropriation of assets, including natural resources; monetisa-
tion of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; slave trade; and usury, 
the national debt and ultimately the system.
(Harvey, 2004, p. 74)
The empire accumulates as a survival mode. Just like war and rumours of war, 
accumulation is a prerequisite for the survival of the empire. This is attested by 
the virility and utter criminalisation and condemnation to death of those who 
threaten to expose the empire’s accumulation practices. A turning point in the 
accumulation of data occurred in the heart of the empire in 2013 when former 
United States contractor Edward Snowden exposed how the United States was 
illegally gathering data not only on its known enemies such as Iran, Russia, and 
China but also on its sworn allies such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
other US- NATO partners. Prompted by the growth in social media, fake news, 
and social quantification, Couldry and Mejias posed a pertinent existential and 
philosophical question which is more relevant to Africa and other parts of the 
(formerly) colonised world than for the empire. They asked,
…should human beings in the twenty- first century accept a world in 
which their lives are unceasingly appropriated through data for capitalism?
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019)
Their response forms the crux of their 2019 book, The Costs of Connection: How 
Data is Colonising Human Life and Appropriating it for Capitalism. The counter- 
argument to Euro- North American accumulation is the fact that China is also 
accumulating, albeit at an even faster rate, especially from Africa. As of 2011, 
US imports from Africa comprised 89% crude oil alone while for China it was 
66% (Lokongo, 2014). Both China and the US are in direct competition for 
Africa’s resources, especially crude oil. Moving in the same direction are illicit 
funds from Africa which were put by Oxfam BG at US$100 billion annually 
(Oxfam International, 2015). Having stated the above, it will be telling a half 
story of I do not explore the benefits if the 4IR to humanity general and to 
Africa in particular.
The benefits of the 4IR to humanity
Benefits of the 4IR have been the focus of much scholarship, policy, and advo-
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Skilton and Hovsepian, 2018; Fomunyam, 2019; International Water Association, 
2019; Kumar, Zindani and Davim, 2019; Nalubega and Uwizeyimana, 2019; 
Um, 2019). The 4IR is hailed as a solution to Africa’s problems such as hunger, 
malnutrition and famine (Fomunyam, 2019), water crises (International Water 
Association, 2019), human insecurity (Fields, 2018; Um, 2019), public sector 
underperformance (Nalubega and Uwizeyimana, 2019; Canals and Heukamp, 
2020), poor communication (Schwab, 2016; Fields, 2018), inadequate and 
under performing information and technological systems (Fraunhofer, 2016; 
Skilton and Hovsepian, 2018), unreliable transport servies (Amonya, 2018), 
poor and misaligned education (Ellen Frederick, 2016; Naudé, 2017; Gleason, 
2018), poor data and knowledge management systems (Ellen Frederick, 2016; 
Fields, 2018), and non problem solving, repetitive research (Nhemachena, 2019) 
among others. The 4IR is argued to present Africa with an opportunity to solve 
some of these challenges. Computers have advanced drastically such that they,
… will surpass the capacity of the human brain before 2030 and the 
capacity of all human brains before 2060. Such forecasts have long been 
considered science fiction. But now there are deep learning algorithms, and 
AI can learn by itself, making explosive progress.
(Helbing, 2016)
The benefits of the 4IR are scattered throughout many facets of life. These 
include medical benefits in the area of medical diagnostics, X- Ray, and radi-
ology imaging. In Rwanda, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) are being used 
to deliver chronic medication in remote and mountainous parts of the country 
(Naudé, 2017). In the medical fraternity, the accuracy of medical machines 
has been drastically enhanced. This has already started to benefit the medical 
industry as both lives and costs are being saved (Ellenberg et al., 2009; Ellen 
Frederick, 2016; Goertzel et al., 2017). Surgical procedures which used to be 
complicated an performed for long hours by many specialist doctors are now 
being performed by one robot such as the Da Vinci robot which was developed 
by American robotics company Intuitive Surgical. Da Vinci performs prostate 
surgeries with exceptional precision and undoubted results. Where hospitals 
used to operate only handful of prostate patience, more operations can now be 
performed as Da Vinci does not get tired, neither does it need a holiday. In the 
automobile industry, robots are now capable of assembling and manufacturing 
vehicles at faster and cheaper rates than their human counterparts (Um, 2019). 
Leadership will be enhanced as managers will have more efficient and reliable 
managerial tools. Of course it will no longer be business as usual as, “hyper- 
connected consumers, machine intelligence, biotechnology, alternative sources 
of energy, and hyper- speed transport links” (Kelly, 2019, p. vii) will lead to more 
business and political instability and volatility.
Machines, systems, and people will be connected, networked, collaborative, 
swarming, and responsive to one another. The role of a leader will change from 
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“sensemaking, connecting, networking, nurturing, and harvesting” (Kelly, 2019, 
p. vii). The 4IR’s resultant interconnected IoT and systems will be “self- adaptive, 
self- organising, and cybernetic” (Kelly, 2019, p. viii). Robots are being effica-
cious in doing otherwise odd jobs such as street fundraising for charity (Russa, 
2014). There is strong evidence that in the near future, there will be self- repro-
ducing robots, humanoids, and post- humans.
The downside of this is the loss of jobs for human beings. An argument can 
be made about the extraction of minerals. Mining has been labour intensive 
and the introduction of robotic mining will increase productivity and profits. 
Robots do not complain, they do not take smoke breaks and they do not go on 
strike, neither do they demand any salaries let alone salary increments. So rapid 
is the development that the idea of self- reproducing machines and robots is no 
longer an item of fiction novels but a reality.
Machines that think are here. The explosive increase in processing 
power and data, fuelled by powerful machine learning algorithms, finally 
empowers silicium- based intelligence to overtake carbon- based intelli-
gence. Intelligent machines don’t need to be programmed anymore, they 
can learn and evolve by themselves, at a speed much faster than human 
intelligence progresses… Now we’re about to lose the position of Most 
Intelligent Species on Earth.
(Helbing, 2013, p. 359)
Revolutions are disruptive, and their disruption has both positive and nega-
tive consequences, unintended consequences, and multiplier effects. Already 
the disruptiveness of this Revolution has been noted in various sectors across 
geographies. These include the disruption of public transportation systems by 
e-hailing taxi operators such as Uber, (Bolt) Taxify and others, Dallas cars, and 
driverless buses that are roaming the streets. Allocated surgeries and medical 
operations have been done by robots with minimum risk to the patients but 
also threatening the job securities of the many medical experts who spend years 
and years specialising after completing their MBChB (Bachelor of Medicine 
and Bachelor of Surgery degrees. However the loss of medical jobs as a down-
side of the 4IR is far outweighed by the gains accrued by humanity in general 
and patients in specific. In the US for example, the da Vinci surgical robots are 
said to have eliminated 250,000 deaths caused by errors in surgery (Western 
Reserve University School of Engineering, 2020, p. 1). According to the same 
source, another medical use of robots is to prevent medical infections in hospitals 
which claimed 722,000 lives again in the USA. The disinfection robot is called 
Xenex Germ- Zapping. It is “an automated and portable robot, used to disin-
fect entire hospital rooms in minutes using pulsed, full- spectrum Ultraviolet 
(UV) rays that kill a range of infectious bacteria” (Western Reserve University 
School of Engineering, 2020, p. 1). Robots have improved the overall efficiency 
of hospitals. They have been sent to deliver food and fumigate areas where 
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Centre in California, robots called the TUG robots deliver meals at the 200 bed 
hospital, in the process covering 85 km per day every day with no weekend off 
or lunch break.
Deep learning and artificial intelligence have delivered hugely accurate 
information which otherwise would have taken decades to collect, consoli-
date, and analyse. When in good hands, 4IR capabilities have improved human 
security.
But here is the counter argument: 4IR needs infrastructure such as lightning 
speed internet, electricity, and massive technological investments all of which 
are not readily available in Africa due to several reasons, some of which will be 
explored in this book. Leading African economies such as South Africa have 
stagnated with evidence pointing to a recession. So dire is the situation that even 
infrastructure described as sustainable developmental prerequisites like electri-
city is not available in constant supply anymore. There are many African- made 
problems in Africa, however, and more importantly, the African problem is not 
an African problem. This is because both colonialism and capitalism structure(d) 
Africa into what it is today: a fragmented sovereign- less continent, a supplier of 
raw materials, a consumer of finished goods, a perennial beggar for aid and alms.
Even Marx and Marxists love the 4IR: For different reasons
The benefits of technology which have been brought about by the 4IR were 
foretold and also celebrated by Marxists including Karl Marx himself. For Karl 
Marx, any technological advance must be celebrated as it created new openings 
and possibilities for liberating human beings from hard, manual labour. The 
rise in technology is constitutive of one of the contradictions of capitalism. 
Technology will reduce the labour value of production, thereby lowering the 
value of goods and services, in the process eating in the profit margins and 
making the goods and service affordable to the masses.
If we understand capitalism as fundamentally concerned with maxi-
mizing profits within fiercely competitive markets— then the profit motive 
is what drives the introduction of technology, with the surrounding 
market pressures determining when such implementation is appropriate. 
Corporations then, will not always roll out new technologies from their 
advent, not just because they improve productivity. Only when technology 
increases profits by reducing costs will it become worthwhile, that is, when 
the machines are cheaper than the workers they would replace.
(Shoki, 2020, p. 2)
Marxists celebrate technology because it will liberate human beings from 
some of the most odious work which they performed. For example, miners 
will no longer be required to labour long hours in the coal mines which are 
dust infested and reduces the lifespan of the miners. In their stead, robots 
will mine the coal and perform other manual tasks underground, thereby 
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serving humanity from these back- breaking tasks. This is however a double- 
edged sword as mineworkers, after being liberated from the backbreaking 
long hours of manual labour underground will soon find themselves not 
only unemployed but most importantly unemployable. An obvious albeit 
hard to implement solution is the reskilling of all rendered unemployable 
by the 4IR. It is a hard solution because most of those rendered unemploy-
able lack the basics required for reskilling in a highly technological work-
place. The current colonial education system in Africa teaches remembering 
and not thinking, a phenomenon termed miseducation by Woodson and 
Chinweizwu (Woodson, 1933; Chinweizu, 1993, 2010). The 4IR needs 
people who think, innovate, and solve, not those who remember, repeat, 
complain.
Another Marxist view regarding technology is that it will eventually lead 
to the demise of capitalism. The need for larger and sustained profit margins 
will drive firms to relentlessly seek technological advances. The availability of 
technology will in turn reduce prices, shrinking profit margins and leading to 
the eventual demise of capitalism. Additionally, Marxists celebrate technological 
advances as luxury goods and services hitherto a preserve of the elites which 
they argue will now be available to commoners courtesy of their reduced 
labour cost.
Capitalist accumulation and the destruction of  
non- Western epistemologies
The creation of the colonial state through colonialism (Benyera, 2020b) in turn 
gave birth to colonial land accumulation. The notion of accumulation has been 
well analysed from a Marxist perspective by many such as Rosa Luxemburg, 
Hannah Arendt and David Harvey (Luxemburg, 1913; Arendt, 1958, 1973; 
Williams, 1987; Bond, Chitonge and Hopfmann, 2006) with David Harvey 
noting that, primitive accumulation,
… reveals a wide range of processes. These include the commodification 
and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; 
conversion of various forms of property rights – common, collective, state, 
etc. – into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the 
commons; commodification of labour- power and the suppression of alter-
native, indigenous, forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo- 
colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets, including natural 
resources; monetisation of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; slave 
trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately the credit system.
(Harvey, 2004, p. 74)
The privatisation and commodification of land would be accomplished through 







The 4IR, destructions and accumulations 125
… the commodification of land, through the appropriation and conversion 
into private property of land held under customary tenure systems, was 
leading to new land markets, but largely in newer enclaves.
(Patnaik and Moyo, 2011, p. 69)
In the processes of land privatisation and commodification, symbolic violence 
will be deployed. Symbolic violence is the self- interested capacity to ensure 
that the arbitrariness of the social order is either ignored or argued as nat-
ural, thereby justifying the legitimacy of existing social structures. This con-
cept plays an essential part in this sociological analysis. When accumulated in 
Africa, they did not accumulate innocently. They were very unaccommodative 
of the social, political and religious orders and epistemologies they found in 
Africa. The colonialists displaced all the orders and epistemologies that existed 
before their arrival. When land was accumulated in Africa, it had hitherto been 
a communal asset, a public good which was then turned into private property 
by colonialist. The accumulation of property was therefore at the expense of 
the loss of African assets. Land was a common good in most of Africa’s pre-
colonial civilisations with no commercial value at all. As with other modes of 
life and sources of livelihood, land was believed not to be commodifiable as it 
was considered a gift from God to humanity. The biggest heist pulled off by 
colonialists was the privatisation of land and turning it into an individual’s prop-
erty which which can be marketable, create profits and which can be contested 
for using western-centric legal systems principles and norms.
Accumulating what? Wealth for West, poverty for the rest
A key element of the 4IR and its predecessors is the notion of primitive accu-
mulation. Accumulation followed privatisation. Now that the African assets 
could be privately owned, it made capitalist logic to start accumulating these 
assets especially land. Accumulation played three roles: (1), it crowded out locals 
who could not understand the newly-imposed capitalism logic let alone afford 
the price of the land, (2), it helped build a local predominantly white capitalist 
class, a sort of African land barons aristocracy whose descendants still own vast 
tracks of land in Africa today (3), it decentered Africans as they had to contest 
and fight the newly imposed land ownership system. 
The land issue in Africa is therefore not about land ownership but about the 
method and mode of land ownership. Redistributing land predominantly from 
whites to blacks, is not a solution but a part of the problem as this is done within 
the same western centric capitalist system which was imposed on Africa as part 
of the colonialism. Thus, redistributing land within the current capitalist system 
will be to authenticate capitalism, of which capitalism and its corollary logics 
are the alpha problem of coloniality.
There were four modes of penetration which were used to initiate, rou-
tinise, maintain, and consolidate colonialism and imperialism. These are: (1), 
dispositions (2), manufactured consent (3), divide and steal and (4), what can 
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be termed, super- exploitation. Dispositions have an opposite aspect which is 
accumulation. Whatever Africa was dispossessed of, was accumulated elsewhere, 
predominantly in Euro- North America. Africans are still being disposed of four 
main forms of their assets. Patnaik and Moyo identified two of them as land 
dispossession and water dispositions (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). To this list can 
be added labour disposition which can be traced back to the slave trade and 
knowledge disposition.
In the industrial revolution accumulations, one accumulation informs the 
next one. The First Industrial Revolution was about the accumulation of 
labour through inter- alia the slave trade. The Second Industrial Revolution was 
about the accumulation of land through colonialism. It is during this phase 
that the extraction and accumulation of African natural resources intensified. 
Also during this industrial revolution was the accumulation of Africa’s debt by 
Western financial institutions. The idea behind the accumulation of African 
debt by Western financial institutions is that s/ he who controls Africa’s debt 
controls Africa’s destiny. Ironically, Africa’s debt was accumulated as a result 
of funding the various liberation movements which were meant to topple 
colonialism.
Upon dispossessing Africans of their land, colonialists created large- scale 
commercial farms and inaugurated the system of private property wherein 
land assumed a commercial value mainly calculated in monetary terms n these 
processes. Not only were Africans dispossessed of their land but they were also 
disposed of their sovereignty, epistemologies, rites and rituals, and all that was 
premised on that land.
The 4IR is characterised by the accumulation of data (van Dijck, 2014; 
Hull, 2017; Sadowski, 2019). Massive datafication has resulted in the creation 
of big data which others have characterised as the new gold and the new cur-
rency (John Walker, 2014; van Dijck, 2014; Baack, 2015; Höchtl, Parycek and 
Schöllhammer, 2016; Helbing et al., 2017; Nhemachena, 2018; Sadowski, 2019). 
Like in the previous three revolutions Africa does not have control over its data. 
Cloud computing and online platforms are the new communities. The privacy 
and personal identification information of Africans is being looted ceaselessly by 
multinational corporations such as but not limited to Apple, Alphabet, Siemens, 
Nokia, Samsung, and their many third- party agencies and collaborators (Hersh, 
2015; Nhemachena, 2018, 2019; Sadowski, 2019). The result is the widening 
of digital inequality both within Africa and also between Africa and the rest of 
the world.
Digital inequality and digital slavery as a result of  
digital accumulation
Globalisation is characterised by the division between the haves and the 
have nots. The global village is a typical village. It has its rulers, the ruled, the 
poor, rich, and the ruthless etcetera. In this global village, the 4IR will be 
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digitally deprived. Digital rights will increasingly become part of human rights. 
Generally characterised, the digitally privileged are located in the Global North 
and the various zones of being, while the digitally deprived are in the Global 
South and the zones of none being.
Presently, huge multinational corporations are smiling, storing, and in some 
cases stealing data from unsuspecting Africans. These multinational corporations 
are getting the data for next to nothing and without the informed consent of 
the users.
The form of consent that is granted to these telecom multinational 
corporations such as MTN, Ethio Telecom, Vodafone, Glo Mobile, Airtel, 
Orange, Safaricom, Etisalat, 9Mobile, Zain, Tigo, Ooredoo, Huawei, Vodacom, 
Valid, Nokia, iPhone, and Samsung is when the users have to mandatorily accept 
the subscriber terms and conditions. It is a manufactured concern because 
without accepting the terms and conditions, the Subscriber Identification 
Module (SIM) card will not be activated or the subscriber will not have access 
to their desired programmes and apps. The terms and conditions are made large 
in text volumes complicated to comprehend for ordinary subscribers, and very 
legalistic in approach. Additionally, they cannot be challenged or changed, they 
have to be accepted or the subscriber will not be activated or served. Africa and 
Africans are therefore endlessly reinvented as a resource to be exploited.
The 4IR and the never- ending reinvention of Africa
Resonating with Edward Said (Said, 1977, 1985) and Valentine Mudimbe 
(Mudimbe, 1988), Ali Mazrui noted how Africa has been reinvented several 
times. For him,
In reality, Africa has been re- invented in different stages. The first stage 
saw North Africa as part of the classical Mediterranean world; the second 
concerned Africa’s interaction with Semitic peoples; the third was 
stimulated by the birth of Islam and its expansion both north and south of 
the Sahara; the fourth came with the impact of European capitalist penetra-
tion and subsequent colonisation; and the final phase was its globalisation.
(Mazrui, 2005, p. 68)
The problem is that the various reinventions of Africa have been of Africa 
being reinvented by others as opposed to Africa reinventing itself. The 4IR 
is, therefore, a propitious moment for Africa to reinvent itself. What does it 
mean for Africa to reinvent itself? Is it any different from other complicated 
and nice- sounding past slogans such as African solutions for African problems? 
For Africa to reinvent itself, it needs to start at the leadership level wherein 
Africa must have ethical leaders. This is in opposition to the current majority 
of African leaders who have proved to be Western appendages, state looters, 
and outright corrupt and unaccountable leaders. Some African leaders have 
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benefits, a notion characterised as the Hombe thesis (Reilly, 1987). Charles Tilly 
characterises this form of misrule as selling protection in return for resources 
(Tilly, 1985). For William Reno, there are African countries that are run by 
shadow cabinets, thereby fitting into his description of deep economies. 
Reno gave the examples of African deep economies as the DRC, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe thus, 
(In) Congo- Kinshasa’s President Laurent Kabila previously a smuggler 
of gold and coffee and once a professional revolutionary, regularly orders 
state- run mining companies supply him with cash. Even in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, both of which contain significant private business groups, rulers 
have intervened in local economies in informal ways that diminish overall 
economic well- being and undermine the bureaucracies that are critical to 
sustaining economic growth.
(Reno, 2000, p. 447)
At another level, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Nigeria, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, and the DRC fit perfectly into the archetype shadow state which 
is a contradiction to the conditions needed for the proposed reinvention of 
Africa by Africa for Africa. A shadow state is a posy colonial phenomenon and 
differs from a deep state in that the later is a modern development. There are 
some state which are both and shadow and South Africa fits into this category. 
Successive regimes of deep and shadow states in Africa have also caused other 





7  Mapping Africa’s destiny in  
the fourth industrial revolution
Introduction
The destiny of Africa is predetermined by its colonial past. Africa will never 
see peace because, according to celebrated British economist, John Maynard 
Keynes, there will be economic consequences for Euro- North America if 
Africa is to be peaceful (Keynes, 1919). Keynes did not mince his words in 
asserting what he termed the undesirability of Africa’s independence. Writing 
in a book titled: The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes noted,
It happens, however, that it is not only an ideal question that is at issue. My 
purpose in this book is to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practically 
right or possible
(Keynes, 1919, p. 33) [emphasis original]
The efforts by the liberation movements to deliver political independence to 
Africa are under immense pressure from the (former) colonisers who want their 
colonies (read property) back. What is the genealogy of this (re)colonisation 
crisis immersing Africa? Having exhausted the use of African political puppets 
cum pseudo nationalists, the (re)colonisers are turning to technology, especially 
the 4IR. Stooges and looters such as the Congolese duo of Mobutu Sese Seko 
and Moise Tshombe, and Haitian François Duvalier (Papa Doc) will be replaced 
by robots, stolen big data, and other forms and products of technological slavery, 
subjugation, and theft of Africa’s resource and sovereignty.
The 4IR is non- negotiable, and Africa and all other continents and countries 
are participating. Herein lies the problem, some will participate as beneficiaries 
while others will participate as losers. Africa’s greatest disadvantage is that it has 
a pre- existent condition; coloniality. Just like Euro- North American modernity 
predates and foreruns colonialism, coloniality will forerun the (re)colonisation 
of Africa.
In the medical fraternity, a pre- existing condition predates the one under 
investigation or treatment, and predisposes a patient to more harm compared 
to other patients with no pre- existent conditions. In politics, it is a condition 
which cause a similar effect in that it renders Africa more susceptible to (re)
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colonisation due to the existence, both in Africa and in Euro- North America, 
of conditions which favour the (re)colonisation of Africa.
Drawing lessons from the past three industrial revolutions, the 4IR presents 
Africa with opportunities to decolonise. Africa can also use the 4IR to solve its 
perennial challenges of dependency, poverty, unemployment, unemployability, 
lack of freedom, human rights, and sustainable democracy among others. On 
the contrary, and as mapped in the various trajectories presented in this book, 
Africa is destined for the proverbial troubled waters.
The destiny for Africa is that of geo- political uselessness and sovereignty- 
lessness, a collection of eunuch states, guarding resources which they do not 
enjoy. This started with the end of the cold war and is being consolidated in the 
4IR. Africa’s individual and state sovereignties will be further eroded. Individual 
African citizens, individual African states, and then the collective of African 
citizens and African countries will all lose their sovereignties. This loss of sover-
eignty is irreversible and will haunt and hunt Africans for a long time to come 
just like colonialism did.
Then there is deindustrialisation, more unemployment, and wider, deeper 
poverty in Africa as a result of the 4IR. African economies are not well- positioned 
to benefit from the 4IR. With misaligned and unprepared economies, Africa 
will bleed resources (human, mineral, etc.) with Western economies harvesting 
and benefiting from Africa’s losses.
A less contested destination for Africa in the 4IR is that of an Africa with 
reconceptualised and reconfigured human rights. Africa will welcome robo- 
humans, robots, and trans- humans into the realm of humanity. These new 
family members will result in the reconceptualization of the notion of human 
beings, and being human, to encompass these new citizens. Suffice to mention 
that, these enhanced forms of humanity will have more rights than biological 
African beings. While all may have rights, all will not have the power to enjoy 
and enforce their rights. Hence the late Saddam Hussein’s cry that, “all we 
demand is the right to rights” (source: unknown).
Deindustrialisation, more unemployment, and  
wider, deeper poverty in 4IR Africa
One of the major destinies of Africa in the 4IR period is deindustrialisation, 
which will be accompanied by very high unemployment and unemployability, 
and wider and deeper structural poverty and inequality. Deindustrialisation will 
lead to massive job losses which in turn will lead to social unrest as more and 
more people will become unemployed or unemployable and desperate. Never 
mind that the jobs to be lost were mostly what can be termed pseudo jobs, jobs 
without dignity and which amount to enslavement. Technically, deindustrial-
isation is the reversal of industrialisation. It is also the diminishing proportion 
of production or the work- force engaged in the primary and secondary indus-
trial sectors. These sectors were the mainstays of the first and second indus-
trial revolutions. In a way, deindustrialisation is the reversal of the first and 
second industrial revolutions’ mainstays, especially labour- intensive production. 
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Deindustrialisation will lead to massive unemployment which, if not attended 
to, in turn will lead to social unrests which in turn will lead to revolutions in 
Africa. When people are deprived even of the little sources of livelihood they 
had, they become desperate and hopeless. Without hope, militancy and unruli-
ness become inevitable. Africa will become even more unstable, hence creating 
more favourable conditions for the enslavement of its people and looting of 
resources.
While Africa will be on a trajectory to deindustrialisation, Euro- North 
America will be moving towards post- industrialisation. Post- industrialisation is 
a characteristic of the 4IR wherein the aggregate of jobs, revenue, and wealth 
generated from the service sector will be more than that generated from the 
manufacturing sector of the economy.
Deindustrialisation is no longer a probability, but an actuality. It is peaking 
in rare earth countries such as Zimbabwe. In the town of Redcliffe in the 
Midlands province, deindustrialisation has already started with the closure 
of the once- mighty Ziscosteel. Located in the middle of Zimbabwe, next to 
Kwekwe, Ziscosteel used to produce one million tonnes of steel per year and 
is now completely closed owing to a plethora of reasons such corruption, mis-
management, and, of course, low demand and plummeting commodity prices 
(Matereke and El Moghazy, 2015, p. 194).
In terms of human resources and skills training, Africa is lagging especially to 
South Korea, Singapore, China, and Japan. Africa is lacking not only in indus-
trialisation but also in offering quality, relevant education. Most African univer-
sities are still teaching redundant courses which have very little, if any, usefulness 
in the 4IR. Already, Africa has experienced massive job losses in the aviation, 
retail, banking, and mining industries. In all these sectors, it is robots, which are 
predominantly taking over, together with automation becoming the order of 
the day.
Even economically developed countries in Africa such as South Africa are 
not immune to the threats posed by 4IR. Already, there are more social grant 
and welfare recipients than taxpayers in South Africa (Marais, 2011, p. 3; Jazbhay, 
2019, pp. 8– 9). This anomaly will continue to grow even at a faster rate as the 
4IR consolidates. With an ever- dwindling tax base and an ever- increasing wel-
fare population, the state will struggle to dispense welfare services in South 
Africa. The possible destination here is social unrest, demonstrations, and 
even revolutions. This stands to be South Africa’s tipping point as social grant 
recipients, proven to be more revolutionary, and will not tolerate a loss of their 
only source of livelihoods (Skocpol and Trimberger, 1977; Skocpol, 1994).
4IR sovereignty and human rights reconceptualised
As asserted by Hardt and Negri (Hardt and Negri, 2000), both state and 
personal sovereignty will drastically change as the 4IR takes sovereignty away 
from the state and places it more towards cartels, multinational institutions and 
corporations. The nature of the human will change, as alluded to earlier on, and 
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forms of beings. Post- anthropocentrism has huge implications for Africa such 
as the need to reconceptualise justice, family, human rights, freedom, independ-
ence, and even crime and punishment.
It also implies that philosophies such as Ubuntu will be under threat and 
the notion of human rights will be reconceptualised to encompass new forms 
of beings such as robots, humanoids, and post- humans. Where will the post- 
anthropocentric 4IR leave human rights?
The human rights are cancelled out through cloning, hybridisation of 
human beings, creation of humanoid robots, and injection of human beings 
with microbots or biohybrids, and genomics which rental human identity 
is fuzzy. While wearable devices, chips and biohybrids or microbots are 
being celebrated as useful in monitoring health – including by remote con-
trol, coming we note that these aspects have ramifications on the human 
right to privacy, dignity, freedom of assembly and association of the human 
beings on whom they are used.
(Nhemachena, Warikandwa and Amoo, 2018, pp. 31– 32)
Life, especially in Africa will be drastically altered forever as cloning, hybridisa-
tion, and the creation of “designer babies” in the laboratories will imply that 
the person will have many (socially, economically, emotionally unpredictable 
and unknown) forms. Human identity will be blurred, governance rendered 
problematic, and the notions of human rights will be reconfigured to include 
“robot rights”.
All these developments will impact on both individual and state sovereignty. 
Will robots and other forms of new humanities pay taxes, be religious, have 
morals, obey laws, respect others different from them? These complications, 
while universal, will be felt more in Africa as Africa has the most weakened 
institutions.
Animated and punctuated by artificial intelligence [part of which is derived 
from the uploading of human consciousness into technological substrates], 
humanoid robots, transhumanism and posthumanism seek to destabilise, 
decentre, decompose and deconstruct the real African human beings 
whose human essences are thereby disrupted and supplanted ... It’s the 
African human beings are being celebrated as becoming posthuman and 
transhuman or becoming post anthropocentric.
(Nhemachena, Warikandwa and Amoo, 2018, p. 34)
In the 4IR, Africa will turn into a post- biological society characterised by 
humanoid robots and very high levels of human– machine hybrids which will be 
reporting to Euro- North America. This status is worse than that of slaves in the 
plantations of North America and the Caribbean. The self- inaugurated global 
centre, Euro- North America, already leads in the robotic sector together with 
Japan and China. As of now, five of the biggest artificial intelligence companies 
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are based in Euro- North America. Currently, the companies are involved in 
narrow artificial intelligence but are very soon moving to the next level which 
is called strong artificial intelligence (Ertel, 2017; Skansi, 2018; Skilton and 
Hovsepian, 2018). Narrow artificial intelligence implies that specific tasks can 
be undertaken as they are programmed and nothing else (Neo, 2020). On the 
other hand, a strong artificial intelligence goes further in both application and 
capability. Also termed artificial general intelligence this is a hypothetical brain 
of a machine that has the intellectual capacity to perform tasks and understand 
speech at a cognitive level that is homogeneous to the human being.
These are next level (post- , trans- , robo- ) humans that can feel things the 
way human beings do. They have the capacity to fall in love, they can be hurt, 
and they can reason and think on their own, it all depends on how they have 
been programmed. The development of artificial general intelligence is surely 
scientist playing God, where programming = (re)creation.
Artificial intelligence and the 4IR: A political perspective
The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is not new, it is over 50 years old. It 
is one which will keep developing until machines are better than humans 
maybe by then machines will be developing humans. AI is the development of 
machines and devices that behave as though they were intelligent. It is also the 
study and development of how to make computers and devices perform the 
duties and tasks which are at the moment being undertaken by human beings. 
In other words, how to develop machines, computers, and devices which are 
better than humans at performing human tasks. There are many instances where 
machines are already outperforming humans which attests to the successes of 
AI. Autonomous robots are delivering meals in hospitals, identifying pathogens 
and disinfecting hospitals, performing bloodless surgeries, detecting fraud, and 
prospecting for minerals. In the political domain AI is used to detect voter 
behaviour, and they can be used to perform many public administration tasks, 
thereby reducing public sector spending, delivering better, and faster services.
The problem of AI in politics is that it has the potential to disrupt politics 
for the bad, such as undermining democracy and human rights and leading 
to the (re)colonisation of Africa. AI has the ability to alter the foundations 
of democracy by, inter alia, introducing robo- humans, post- humans, and other 
forms of enhanced humanities as parts of global citizens. Other challenges to 
politics emancipating from AI include the use of AI to interfer with elections 
through, inter alia, hacking of election related websites; data surveillance, data 
slavery, and data colonialism. One of the world’s greatest facades of the cen-
tury is the misclassification of predominantly western “consultancy” firms and 
social media applications such as Facebook, TikTok, WeChat, Instagram, and 
WhatsApp as consultancy firms and social media platforms when they are actu-
ally mass surveillance and data farms. The classification of firms and applications 
such as Facebook, TikTok, WeChat, Instagram, and WhatsApp as social media 
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has enabled them to be highly effective as they are not only trusted but also 
accepted without doubt as the digital philanthropists who churn out life saving 
apps and platforms ad infinitum.
Combining AI with Facebook’s 2.2 billion users creates a new techno-
logical oligarchy, one greater than any political oligarchy in modern history. 
AI gives technological firms and their owners huge amounts of power which 
is sought after by capital. The 4IR will empower tech companies to farm, 
commodify, and commercialise data. Once processed big data will be cap-
able of being politicised, instrumentalised, and abused to the detriment of the 
marginalised global communities such as those in Africa. While AI- powered 
big data analytics is efficacious in election campaigns, the challenge faced by 
Africa is that its governments are weak, corrupt, and do not have the systems 
and institutions to regulate the deployment of AI- powered big data analytics, 
as is the case in the United States. This gives the owners of big data power 
to influence political processes in Africa such as inciting revolutions, rigging 
elections, and propping dictators. Russia has been consistently accused of inter-
fering in US elections in favour of Donald Trump. If the United States, with all 
its strong institutions, mechanisms, and systems can be breached and its polit-
ical processes influenced by outsiders, how about African countries that do not 
have such strong institutions, mechanisms, and systems to monitor and regulate 
social media.
The power of Euro- North America, especially Silicon Valley and London 
in powering the 4IR is undeniable. The valley drives social media and is the 
centre for global technological innovation and excellence. By extension, it 
will also be the centre for the (re)colonisation of Africa as it is here where the 
gismos will be conceived, developed, programmed, and owned. The question 
is: In whose interest will these companies develop their AI technologies? 
Whose national interests will be enhanced and whose sovereignties will be 
threatened? The work of AI is to replace humans and become more efficient, 
proficient, and profitable. With Africans ranked as the most uneducated, most 
unproductive, laziest, and so on, they will be the prime target for replacement 
by AI. In the era of AGI, allegiance will be to the creators of the programs and 
not to national interest and surely patriotism will be remoulded. Developing 
and patenting AI and other online creations will be tantamount to developing 
nuclear weapons. Those owning nuclear weapons and missile defence systems 
will be the ones owning the most sophisticated data mining and AI systems 
also. What we notice undeniably is the disputability of all industrial revolutions, 
from the first through to the fourth.
Disruptions as the sine qua non for revolutions
Consistent with the notion of industrial revolutions is their disruptiveness. The 
4IR will disrupt the way life is lived today in Africa beyond current imagin-
ations. Birthed in England, the first industrial revolution disrupted production 
patterns and transportation systems with the invention of the steam engine, 
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communication, and banking. Workers had to be sent to school to learn how to 
follow instructions, keep time, and respect authority. Family life was disrupted 
as members had to go to work full time. Family businesses were also disputed 
as they had to compete with large commercial enterprises which were increas-
ingly becoming mechanised and automated.
For Africa, the disruptions were more devastating as cheap (read free) labour 
and raw materials were needed to quench the thirst of the automated produc-
tion lines in Western Europe and the United States. The direct result was the 
slave trade. The irony here is that the same steam engines which multiplied 
industrial production hundredfold overnight are the same steam engines which 
powered the ships that came to transport African slaves across the Atlantic ocean.
The second industrial revolution resulted in the mining of oil, the inven-
tion of electricity, and the mass use of steel. While these improved the lives of 
those in what Samir Amin (Amin, 1976, 1997) called the centre, those in the 
colonies had to be forced to mine the iron ore, build the power stations, and 
mine the crude oil. The colonies had to contend with massive water, land, and 
air pollution; disputed livelihoods and loss of land; and most importantly loss of 
sovereignty. This period led to the colonisation of Africa as the centre required 
cheaper raw materials, bigger markets, and free labour. It has to be stated that 
the 4IR, while shaping and influencing lives now, is not a recent phenomenon, 
but one which was in the making since the 1980s.
During the 1980s, the United States National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) produced a report in which they explored how 
machine- human interactions could be enhanced, infused, and managed. The 
report noted that,
Within fifty to a hundred years, a new class of organisms is likely to emerge. 
These organisms will be artificial in the sense that they will originally 
be designed by humans. However, they will reproduce, and will “evolve” 
into something other than their original form; They will be “alive” under 
any reasonable definition of the word ... The pace of evolutionary change 
will be extremely rapid ... The impact on humanity and the biosphere could 
be enormous, larger than the (1st, 2nd and 3rd) industrial revolution(s), 
nuclear weapons, or environmental pollution. We must take steps now to 
shape the emergence of artificial organisms.
(Crichton, 2002, p. xii)
The question is: Did the Americans take any steps to actualise this vision? For 
whose benefit and inversely at whose expense? Indeed the United States took 
action which included the creation of the War on Terror, the further destabilisa-
tion of Africa resulting, inter alia, in more failed states such as Syria, Iraqi, Libya, 
and Ethiopia and the deployment of Africom. These events and developments, 
in turn, resulted in the increased competition in Africa for African resources 
between Russia, China, the United States, and its allies. In the process, Africa 
was ripped open, vulnerable to (re)colonisation, what more with Chinese, 
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American, Russian, and French boots on African soil. In the midst of getting 
boots on the ground in Africa, the tech side of the empire was busy creating 
new forms of humans.
Welcome robo- humans and trans- humans: The new  
family members
What exactly are Africans afraid of concerning the 4IR? It may not be that 
robots, robo- humans, and other trans- and post- humans will colonise Africa 
and run the continent. Rather, it is that some tech companies, their benefactors, 
and associated cartels will get hold of the data and resources such as artificial 
intelligence and deep learning and deploy it to (re)colonise Africa. How will 
this happen? Well, it is already happening in some form in Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and China where, data is collected from mass surveillance of citizens, in 
the name of curtailing terrorist attacks. The data is collected from every single 
citizen and fed into artificial intelligence systems which then learn how each 
citizen behaves. When each citizen’s social, political, and economic behaviours 
have been mapped, digital doubles are then created.
These doubles are used for many purposes such as (1), predicting the future 
behaviour of citizens, (2), develop systems and programs that can manipulate 
the behaviour of citizens, and (3), reincarnating humans since their sentience 
will be saved online. Tech companies are using human being’s digital doubles to 
do all sorts of digital experiments, obviously without the knowledge and approval 
of the owners of the data. These experiments are why we receive personal and 
specifically targeted advertisements, specials and other forms of online infor-
mation, marketing, and advertising. According to Helbing, human beings, “are 
exposed to certain kinds of stimuli. AI systems learn how we respond to them 
and how these stimuli can be used to trigger certain behavioural responses” 
(Helbing, 2016). This way the (re)colonisation process progresses from the (re)
programming of computers to the programming of human beings, Helbing 
argues. What appears to be our own decision will be the decisions made for us 
by our digital double and those in control of the technology. All this puts the 
fundamental principle of human determination at risk of being taken over by 
tech companies. This has already been demonstrated in Africa, and South Africa 
in particular, where political institutions and systems are very weak and easily 
hijackable, a phenomenon well demonstrated by state capture which is the sub-
ject of a commission of inquiry.
Politics too will be entering unchartered waters as a result of the 4IR. Will 
robo- humans be allowed to vote and to become presidents? What is the nature 
of warfare and belligerence in the 4IR? How many jobs are going to be created 
and inversely how many jobs are going to be lost? If the future of warfare is 
going to be robotic, what will happen to today’s soldiers as we know them? 
We have already noted massive job losses in the construction industry, banking 
industry, manufacturing industry, and many other industries. Of course, there 
are numerous, both intended and unintended, benefits of the 4IR to Africa 




Mapping Africa’s destiny in the 4IR 137
Skilton and Hovsepian, 2018; International Water Association, 2019; Nalubega 
and Uwizeyimana, 2019; Odendaal, 2019; Um, 2019). Unfortunately, this ana-
lysis is outside the scope of this discussion.
Cyborgs, trans- humans, extropianism, and the  
uploading of immortality
One of humanity’s earliest endeavours has been to overcome the natural limits 
of humanity. These limits included the inability to fly, to live longer, pain- free 
lives, and to have a better memory. According to the World Transhumanism 
Association, “transhumanism advocates for the use of technology to be able 
to overcome our biological limitations and to transform human condition” 
(Flores, 2018b, p. 381). The idea behind trans- humanism is to create,
“add technological implants and inserting DNA in human beings … to 
improve their condition; man would leave biological evolution and would 
begin an evolution based on technology, the post- human species would be 
born” (Flores, 2018b, p. 381).
The fourth industrial revolution is going to be fronted by two phenomena; 
electronic persons, humanoids, robo- humans, and post- humans on one hand 
and big data on the other hand. The focus will be on job losses by humans to 
their new counterparts. Big data will distort the notion of both individual and 
state sovereignty as data and electronic footprints will form the new markers 
for individual sovereignty. One’s dataness, connectivity, and online integration 
will determine their personhood and personness. One’s ontological density will 
be hugely determined by their online footprint. The digi- privileged will be the 
prototype person while the digi- deprived will be subhumans. Human rights 
will be configured to take into account one’s connectedness as a key human 
right. This is not to imply that data and connectivity will be rolled out to 
enhance the human rights of many. On the contrary, without data and con-
nectedness, one will not be fully human and may not, therefore, claim the rights 
reserved for the connected, digi- privileged humans. So what exactly are these 
new forms of humans that will be rolled out in the 4IR?
Humanoid robots are described by some scholars as having human sentient 
traits, action, reproductive capacities, predictive capacities, learning capaci-
ties, understanding, interpretive, analytical, perceptual, sensual, subjectivity, 
human intelligence capable of executing rational independent and respon-
sive action ... For the European Union humanoid robots are becoming 
electronic legal Persons and set to replace human beings in employment.
(Nhemachena and Dhakwa, 2018, p. 80)
There are professional associations that promoted the use of technology to 
enhance the biological composition of human beings. This broad movement 
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2018b). Views on the ethics, desirability, and efficacy of trans- humanism are 
obviously divided and will not be explored in these pages. It is an endeavor left 
for others to pursue and make a contribution.
The idea is to move humanity from biological evolution to technological 
evolution. In other words to migrate the fate of humanity from “God’s original 
plan” to that chattered by scientists. Human beings evolved from Australopithecus 
afarensis, Homo habilis, Homo erectus, Homo neanderthalensis, and finally 
Homo sapiens. This will change with the advent of 4IR as human evolution 
will cease to be natural but technological. Human evolution will no longer be 
in the hands of God but in the hands of mankind, that is, scientists and large 
tech corporations. The divisions and massive disagreements on trans- humanism 
are broad with others calling the whole movement a big fraud and one meant 
to aid digital slavery especially in Africa and other (former) colonies.
The new slavery will be the human robotisation promoted by the 
transhumanism, and the brain nanobots and chips will be the new chains 
and shackles. The promoted “communities” really will be digital ghettos and 
transhumanism concentration camps. In simple terms: The transhumanism 
only seeks to achieve human slaves for the millionaires who rule the world.
(Flores, 2018, pp. 390– 391) [emphasis original]
Africans turned trans- human will be the new slaves for the cartels. The cartels 
and tech MNC companies owning the digital slaves will be in charge of Africa 
by virtue of controlling the digitally enslaved Africans. These tech companies 
already demonstrated their modus operandi, by which they will employ the 
following instruments and mechanisms on the digital slaves: (1), mind control, 
(2), permanent monitoring with the Brain net, (3), elimination of the emotions, 
(4), living in virtual reality, (5), mind deletion, and (6), elimination of sexuality 
(Flores, 2018a, p. 273). Flores aptly termed the above nanomafia. It signifying the 
entering of the mafia into the realms of nanotechnology, biotechnology, and ICT 
making these 4IR aspects suspectable to (ab)use by organised crime syndicates 
and cartels. Nanotechnology will become the latest criminal weapon especially 
for the mafia given its “invisibility, interconnectedness, speed, and above all gen-
eral society’s ignorance about this new form of crime” (Flores, 2018a , p. 273).
For Donna Haraway, the result of merging the human and the ICT 
enhanced machine, processes and algorithms of merging the human and the 
ICT enhanced machine, processes and algorithms is what she termed “cyborg” 
(Haraway, 2006, 2013). She defines a cyborg as, “a cybernetic organism a hybrid 
of machine and organism a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” (Haraway, 2006, p. 149). She contends that cyborgs are creatures that 
are simultaneously animal and machines and that they populate worlds ambigu-
ously natural and crafted. There is a lot of coupling and uncoupling between 
machines and organism in the cyborg world. Haraway traces her cyborg to the 
United States budget of 1984 which allocated US$84 billion to what was then 
termed C31. The project coded C31 was command- control- communication- 
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One of the products of Project C31 is trans- humanism and extropianism. 
Once big data has been collected and processed, human electronic doubles 
are creatable. Once a human double has been created, it makes it possible 
for uploading human brain contents and thought processes online enabling 
(online) immortality to occur. Robert Harle argues that extropianism has 
already occurred (Harle, 2002). According to Harle, extropianism is the process 
which occurs when the entire contents of the human brain are transferred to 
a super- computational medium and henceforth exist as software (Harle, 2002, 
p. 73). This creates the contents of the human brain stored as a software, thereby 
guaranteeing immortality. When the human body dies and the human being 
ceases to function, the human electronic double continues to exist and to think 
at the same level and with the same capacity. What therefore dies is the body, 
and not the brain and the concomitant thought processes.
The notion of extropianism is derived from the science of extropy which 
denotes a system’s intelligence and its capacity to be improved. The Extropy 
Institute founded in 1992 exists to coordinate the work of “groups of people 
with futuristic ideas and facilitated the formation of novel memetic compounds” 
(Bostrom, 2005, p. 12). Stated simply entropy is an organism’s or instrument’s 
capacity for improvement. Entropy stretches the limits of humans, cyborgs, and 
other trans- humans.
Courtesy of the 4IR, existential extropianism is now a reality and not just a 
concept. With the death of the physical being and the continued online exist-
ence of their electronic double, what then will be the use of the online double 
in the absence of the physical deceased being? One purpose and function for 
the online electronic immortal being is to continue tracking and studying their 
evolutionary trajectory. But most importantly, the function for the online elec-
tronic immortal being would be at a later stage to download their saved brains 
into a robot or cyborg, thereby (re)creating new beings. These beings will be 
without sovereignty and will be tuned and (re)programmed by their owners 
according to the tasks at hand.
The reincarnated person, albeit in the body of a cyborg robot can, there-
fore, be enslaved and ordered to perform all sorts of “inhumane” tasks. This 
is data coloniality at its best and most advanced. Being able to create and 
manipulate cyborg robots is indeed scientist playing God. Laws, organisations, 
and declarations already exist to actualise the reincarnation of humanity as 
cyborg robots.
The future of humanity is therefore in the hands of scientists. The 
Extropianism, Transhuman Declaration stated seven principles on which trans- 
humanity will operate (Bostrom, 2005). These seven principles are: (1), per-
petual progress, (2), transformation, (3), practical optimism, (4), intelligent 
technology, (5), open society, (6), self- direction, and finally (7), rational thinking 
(Harle, 2002, p. 74).
The bottom line of extropianism is the continued scientific communica-
tion with the dead. Once the contents of the human brain have been uploaded 
online, it opens all other possibilities such as knowing exactly how one thinks 
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longer a private practice. Human beings will, therefore, be open to manipula-
tion; politically, scientifically, financially, and many other forms of manipula-
tion. After all, what one says is now verifiable using their online double. Stated 
differently we can verify the evidence that one gives from one’s online brain. 
At this rate, the dead can be recalled to give testimony on their death inquest. 
A question might be posed: How did Africa arrive at this point where it very 
vulnerable to (re)colonisation?
Tracing Africa’s vulnerability to (re)colonisation
A key turning point in Africa’s history is when mainly European traders became 
colonial administrators. In doing so, colonialism entered the black body via the 
church, Euro- North American modernity, and commerce and education. Africa 
was divided by a few white merchants of colonialism. They offloaded their 
imperial agency onto African agents, henceforth, like Biko admitted, the mind 
of the black man became the greatest weapon of the colonisers (Biko, 1987). 
Brother was turned against brother, sister against sister, all in defence and per-
petration of colonialism. Most of Africa’s leaders generally are therefore agents 
of (re)colonialism. This story is well told by Chinua Achebe in his seminal book 
Things Fall Apart.
The church had come and led many astray. Not only the low- born and 
the outcast but sometimes a worthy man had joined it. Such a man was 
Ogbuefi Ugonna, who had taken two titles, and who like a madman had 
cut the anklet of his titles and cast it away to join the Christians. … But 
apart from the church, the white men had also brought a government. They had 
built a court where the District Commissioner judged cases in ignorance. 
He had court messengers who brought men to him for trial. Many of these 
messengers came from Umuru on the bank of the Great River, where 
the white men first came many years before and where they had built the 
centre of their religion and trade and government. ... “We must fight these 
men and drive them from the land.” “It is already too late,” said Obierika 
sadly. “Our own men and our sons have joined the ranks of the stranger. 
They have joined his religion and they help to uphold his government. If 
we should try to drive out the white men in Umuofia we should find it 
easy. There are only two of them. But what of our own people who are following 
their way and have been given power?” … “Does the white man understand 
our custom about land?” “How can he when he does not even speak our 
tongue? But he says that our customs are bad, and our own brothers who 
have taken up his religion also say that our customs are bad. How do you 
think we can fight when our own brothers have turned against us? The 
white man is very clever. He came quietly and peaceably with his religion. We were 
amused at his foolishness and allowed him to stay. Now he has won our 
brothers, and our clan can no longer act like one. He has put a knife on the 
things that held us together and we have fallen apart.”
(Achebe, 1959, pp. 125– 127) [emphasis original]
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So oblivious of the impending disaster of colonisation that Africans collect-
ively and mockingly called the white men muzungu (singular), or vazungu 
(plural). The word muzungu which still refers to whites today means an aimless 
wanderer in Swahili and many other Bantu languages such as Kinyarwanda 
(Rwanda), Runyangore (Uganda), Chinyanja (Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe) 
Bemba (Zambia), Kisili (Kenya), Sena (Mozambique and Zimbabwe), Shona, 
(Mozambique and Zimbabwe), Zulu (South Africa), and Kirundi (Uganda and 
Burundi). The fact that the whole of the subcontinent used the same word for 
the same phenomenon demonstrates how uniformly whites carried themselves 
upon arrival in Africa. Muzungu was, therefore, a typical depiction of how the 
whites generally carried themselves in Africa, yet they were mapping geog-
raphies and ethnographies of colonialism.
In Southern Africa, with the assistance and sometimes connivance of 
missionaries and explorers, traders such as Cecil John Rhodes and Jan van 
Riebeek started looting African resources and benefiting their home coun-
tries. Colonialism succeed mainly because of the unity of purpose and collect-
ivism displayed by the colonisers. This unity of purpose and collectivism are 
evident throughout the past three revolutions. They were evident in the slave 
trade; colonialism and now in the coloniality phase. It is therefore incorrect to 
argue that Euro- North Americans are individualistic. On the contrary, they are 
of the most united human groups especially when it comes to dispossessing, 
destabilising, and decentering Africa and Africans. When operating in Africa, 
Euro- North American can be likened to a pack of wild dogs.
While other scholars have posited that Eurocentric human rights are 
associated with individualism deemed contrary to African Ubuntu collect-
ivism, we hold that this postulation is as simplistic as it is erroneous. Euro 
Americans are not individualistic – when they colonised Africa they did 
not do so as individuals, they came to Africa as bands; they divided Africa 
in Berlin as a collective; they were also backed by their metropolitan states 
when they colonised Africa; currently, Euro- Americans are United in the 
sense that they have the United States of America and the European Union 
even Africa is struggling to set up a United States of Africa.
(Nhemachena and Dhakwa, 2018, p. 77)
This demonstrates that the Euro- North Americans have been united since the 
end of the Thirty Years’ War. If there is anything that unites them, it is their reso-
lution never to fight each other again. The power of unity allows Euro- North 
Americans to scatter, divide, and rule Africa.
In Africa, the first three industrial revolutions were fronted by colonial 
administrators, traders, missionaries, and hunters. Among the traders were 
concession hunters who were instrumental in colonising Africa. The key 
focus during this period was on slavery, land theft, and land dispossessions. 
Achebe advised Africans to repossess their stolen assets and personhood 
using the very system and mechanisms used by the colonialists to steal them, 
he advised that,
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The missionary who left the comforts of Europe to wander through my 
primeval forest was extremely earnest. He had to be; he came to change 
my world. The builders of Empire who turned me into a “British protected 
person” knew the importance of being earnest, they had the quality of 
mind which imperial Rome before them understood so well: Gravitas.
(Achebe, 1989, p. 84)
The missionary was therefore not a gentle and benevolent colonial agent, but 
for William Mpofu, the missionary was a coloniser with a hammer and also 
with an iron will to power. Mpofu argued,
The coloniser and the Empire builder who produced our present world 
and shaped our current condition did his job with an iron will to power 
and a monstrous gravitas. The colonial will to power is defined by what 
Friedrich Nietzsche … called the habit of “philosophising with a hammer,” 
that is producing ideas that have the force to change histories and change 
destinies of peoples and their communities.
(Mpofu, 2017b, pp. 8– 9)
Then there is the role played by religion in rendering Africa vulnerable and 
hence (re)colonisable. The proliferation of religion and religiosity in Africa 
must be understood against two backgrounds, the role of religion in aiding 
colonialism in Africa and its subsequent role in pacifying Africans and delivering 
a ready and captive audience to colonisers. Exogenous religions, especially the 
Abrahamic faiths of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity displaced Africa’s religions, 
in some cases permanently, in the process of preaching the gospel of submis-
siveness and the need for Africans not to resist colonialism since theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven. This partly explains why the most impoverished parts of 
Africa are the most religious.
4IR as an African problem: On Ota Benga’s 
omnipresent fate
From an African perspective, how is the 4IR problematic? Stated simply, this 
does not differ from the previous perspectives and problems experienced during 
the first, second, and third industrial revolutions. Once again, Africa will be the 
supplier of raw materials which are needed to drive the 4IR. These range from 
coltan or columbite- tantalite, (Fe++Ta2O6) which is mined predominantly in 
the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to the markets that are needed to 
utilise the resultant gadgets.
Most importantly, Africa will lose its sovereignties, this time at the individual 
level. Sovereignty here is understood in Negrian, Schmittan, and Angambenian 
terms as “he who decides on the state of exception”. Sovereignty is that which 
arises as the establishment and therefore as the end of constituting power, as the 
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Thus the first and second industrial revolutions resulted in a loss of national 
sovereignty for Africa through colonialism and imperialism. The current indus-
trial revolution implies the loss of the individual’s sovereignty and in some 
extreme cases identity and personhood. Notions such as human rights will 
radically be changed as robo- humans and cyborgs will join humanity. Forms 
of enhanced lives will be bestowed with more rights than Africans. Sophia the 
robot is already a citizen of Saudi Arabia a place where Africans find it very dif-
ficult to get citizenship.
In this section, I use the story of Congolese alpha dehumanised and thingified 
African man who captured from his home in the Ituri Rainforest in the DRC 
to link the four industrial revolutions to slavery and colonialism as a foreground 
for mapping the futures of Africa in the 4IR. By its very nature, a revolution 
is rapid, unstoppable, and have many casualties, and in these four cases, that is, 
the 1IR, the 2IR, the 3IR, and the 4IR, Africa has been the persistent casualty. 
During the 1IR, slave labour produced most of the consumer goods which was 
made possible by the inventions such as in 1712 when Thomas Newcomen 
invented the productive steam engine, John Lombe’s silk factory in 1719, and 
James Kay’s weaving machine in 1733. In 1764, a spinning jenny was added to 
the list of inventions by James Hargreaves. It allowed one worker to spin eight 
spindles and these workers had to be foreseeably sourced from Africa as slaves.
For Euro- North America, the first industrial revolution was about drastic 
increases in industrial productivity while for Africa it was about unprecedented 
humiliations as Africans were chained, transported, and traded on the market 
like beasts. Others ended up being viewed in human zoos, ironically having 
being been brought from the Ituri rainforest in eastern DRC by a missionary. 
This was the fate of Oto Benga, an indigenous Mbuti man, “rescued” by 
missionary and “anthropologist” Dr Reverend Samuel Phillips Verner in the 
DRC together with three other Batwa, derogatorily referred to as pygmies. 
Benga was humiliatingly depicted by Bradford thus;
Who was Ota Benga? Elf, dwarf, cannibal, wildman, savage loose in the 
metropolis, beyond ape but not quite human, stunted, retarded, incom-
plete, someone to gawk at, tease, put in cages, ridicule— these are among 
the contemporary descriptions of him. … It was difficult to entertain the 
proposition that he and his people were as fully and authentically human 
as J. P Morgan or Andrew Carnegie. It was nearly inconceivable that Ota 
might be just as curious about the anthropologists who bedevilled him as 
they were about him.
(Pittas, 2011, pp. 2– 3)
Having been dehumanised, literally captured and caged, and brought to America,
the enslavement of Africans was to gain both momentum and scale. Without 
slave labour, the first industrial revolution would not have succeeded as it 
required a lot of free and cheap human labour to operate these invented 
machines. The first products consisted of tobacco, sugar, coffee, cocoa and 
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cotton and were produced mainly from African slave labour. The slave 
economy became one of the most profitable enterprises whose profits 
were then ploughed into the purchase of machinery invented during the 
first industrial revolution. In some parts of the world such as Hispaniola 
which was “discovered” by Christopher Columbus, Europeans also diseases 
for which the locals had no immunity. These include syphilis, smallpox 
and influenza. When Columbus arrived with these three ships in 1492, 
Hispaniola had 250 000 people. This was down to 14 000 in 1517 courtesy 
of Columbus and his crew. In Hispaniola, colonisers also looted lives en 
masse and enslave the survivors.
(Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation, 2013; Pringle, 2015)
The second industrial revolution is closely linked to and associated with colo-
nialism as it made colonialism possible and necessary. Necessary because the 
colonisers needed to have large empires to, inter alia, supply them with cheap 
and consistent raw materials. This condition persists even today and is unlikely 
to change largely because Euro- North America will never be endowed with 
the natural resources it lacks. This lack made colonialism possible, if not inevit-
able, as the invention of the wheel compressed geography and made it possible 
to travel across the world in relatively short periods and also with less risk.
For Euro- North America and the beneficiaries of the past three indus-
trial revolutions, the 4IR is for consolidating their gains. For Africa and those 
on the receiving end of the past three industrial revolutions, their suffering 
continue. Africa is yet to be fully restored, dignified, and the humanity of its 
people reinstated. Conditions are bound to be worse for Africa and Africans. 
There is a rise in animism, anthropocentrism, and post- humanism all of which 
threatens Africa in various ways, including disrupting African identities, sover-
eignties, and social, political, legal systems. What Africans demand and deserve 
from Euro- North America are the restoration and recognition of its humanity, 
restitution of its materialities looted, and reinstatements of its ontologies and 
epistemes. In the absence of these corrections, the 4IR will result in more neo- 
colonialism and neo- enslavements, further marginalising Africa and Africans 
as they will be replaced by humanoid robots and other forms of post- humans.
For Helbing, “… the explosive evolution of technologies such as quantum 
computing, memristor technologies, and light- based LiFi communication, 
implies a race for global dominance” (Helbing, 2016). Given Africa’s inability 
to effectively participate in the international system as an equal member, Africa 
in the 4IR will be (re)colonised by humanoid robots of Euro- North American 
origin (manufacture). These humanoid robots will continue the trajectory 
started by hunters, missionaries, and traders; perpetuated by colonialists and 
imperialists, and now taken over by humanoid robots. There are far- reaching 
implications for Africa as it will be inhabited by electronic persons concurrently 
with natural persons. The interaction between these two species is bound to be 
problematic. Africa’s fat in the 4IR will be similar to that of one of its ancestors, 
Ota Benga, captured (literally and figuratively), dehumanised and thingified.
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The weaponisation of citizenship in the 4IR
One of the most potent creations of colonialism in Africa was the notion of 
an adulterated version of citizenship. The colonially created version of citi-
zenship entails exclusion more than inclusion. As a colonial creation, citizen-
ship was meant to ascribe on the colonisers a sense and right of belonging 
which they bestowed on themselves upon their arrival. This created a binary 
of mainly urbanised, propertied, and rights endowed predominantly whites 
against dispossessed, poor, unpropertied, and black lacking many in aspects of 
life such as law, manners, etiquette, organised lives and capital . White settlers, in 
the minority numerically, bestowed on themselves, through violence, the right 
and responsibility to determine who becomes a citizen and started dispensing 
national identity cards and other forms of identification, which were meant 
to aid tax collection which was very unpopular and highly contested by the 
blacks. Today, Africa is grappling with challenges of social cohesion, Afrophobia, 
nativism, and other exclusionary practices which were once unAfrican and 
against the ethos of Ubuntu.
In the 4IR, contestations over citizenship will take a new dimension. Robots, 
robo- humans, and other forms of post- humans will be granted citizenship 
ahead of Africans especially in Euro- North America. The weaponisation of citi-
zenship is the negation of the other side of the coin which is state sovereignty. 
Without state sovereignty, there can be no citizenship. So to deny Africans citi-
zenship is accomplishable through the upscaling state sovereignty from the state 
to the empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Mamdani asserts that state sovereignty 
is constituted and authenticated by citizenship noting that,
The Westphalian coin of state sovereignty is still an effective currency in 
the international system. It is worth looking at both sides of this coin: sov-
ereignty and citizenship. If “sovereignty” remains the password to enter the 
passageway of international relations, “citizenship” still confers membership 
in the sovereign national political (state) community. Sovereignty and citi-
zenship are not opposites but associates: The state, after all, embodies the 
key political right of citizens, the right of collective self- determination.
(Mamdani, 2009, p. 274)
Homi Bhabha conceptualises sovereignty as the glue binding citizens together 
and the decentring of the nation state through globalisation as essentially an 
ontological problem thus,
Our nation- centred view of sovereign citizenship can only comprehend 
the predicament of minoritarian “belonging” as a problem of ontology − a 
question of belonging to a race, a gender, a class, a generation becomes a 
kind of “second nature,” a primordial identification, an inheritance of trad-
ition, a naturalisation of the problems of citizenship.
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For Bhabha, robbed of their sovereignty and citizenship, Africans ended up 
mimicking their (former) masters in what he termed the third spaces (Jonathan, 
1990; Bhabha, 1984, 1994). The third spaces theorised by Homi Bhabha are 
constituted in the 4IR by online and cyberspaces and other technologic-
ally created spaces where humans interact with machines and machine with 
machines. These third spaces are manned, regulated, ruled, and adjudicated by 
those who own the technology which roams these spaces, that is, cartels that 
own big technology companies and their empire allies.
The 4IR will see heightened weaponisation of citizenship. The notion of 
borders will be enhanced to include what can be termed electronic borders and 
boundaries. Based on past colonial relations and trajectories, it can be argued 
that, robots of African origin will find it difficult to seek work in Euro- North 
America. Inversely, robots of Euro- North American origin will automatically 
be deployed in Africa. Like their human counterparts, robots will be ascribed 
citizenship. Like most facets of life, they will also be regulated from Euro- North 
America. The United Nations will have the mandate to oversee the humans– 
robots interactions. Ascribed with citizenship and deployed to pursue nation-
alistic objectives, robots, robo- humans, and post- humans will be efficacious in 
future far- right agenda.
The five monopolies of capitalism: Cementing  
the fate of Africa in the 4IR
Africa’s inability to control what Samir Amin termed the five monopolies 
of capitalism will seal Africa’s fate as a marginalised and weakest member of 
the international community. Euro- North America and its networks control 
these five areas: (1), war, (2), technology, (3), natural resources, (4), media, and 
(5), finance. Africa has been slowly losing control of these five since the first 
industrial revolution and this has been happening cumulatively. The first indus-
trial revolution resulted in Africa losing its people, that is, human resources, 
which is the alpha resource in any economy. All other resources need the 
human factor to actualise their potential. By first being robbed of its human 
resources, Africa was exposed, and rendered impotent and eunuch right from 
the first industrial revolution.
Euro- North America’s monopoly over war was used to enslave Africans. 
The same monopoly over war has been the background to the effectiveness 
of the other four monopolies namely technology, natural resources, media, 
and finance. The United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been able dispensers of war to those 
who dared resist the monopolies of capitalism. Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela were 
attacked and dismantled when they threatened to sell their oil in Euros and not 
in United States dollars.
The second industrial revolution saw Africa lose its natural resource sover-
eignty. This loss of Africa’s ability to control its natural resources was added to 
the human resource loss experienced since the first industrial revelation. For 
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Africa, the second industrial revolution was about the loss of the control of over 
its natural resources.
The third industrial revolution resulted in Africa losing control over its 
media and finance among other sectors which resulted in Africa being struc-
turally extroverted continent. Francophone African news is dominated by the 
French news channel Canal France International and France 24 while the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) dominates the news in its (former) 
colonies. The BBC broadcasts in many of the local languages in its (former) 
colonies such as Hausa and other African languages such as Afaan Oromo, 
Amharic, Tigrinya, Igbo, Yoruba, and Nigerian Pidgin. Today BBC broadcasts 
in more than 40 African languages. The same media argument can be made 
about Lusophone African countries such as Mozambique and Angola which are 
dominated by Portuguese media and news outlets.
These five key loses were buttressed during the decolonisation phase. As the 
colonisers were loosening their grip on political power, they were incremen-
tally increasing their grip on economic and epistemic power.
The finances of (former) French colonies, for example, are run by the Central 
and Western Africa CFA Franc zones. Cameroon, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea- Bissau effectively 
have their finances controlled in Paris courtesy of the CFA Franc arrangement. 
This, despite recently obtaining their own currency, which currency is pegged 
to the Euro and their foreign exchange reserves are still held in France. The 
Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone arrangements are a continuation of 
colonialism through balkanisation.
The 4IR will see Africa further lose its technology sovereignty. Big multi-
national corporations are mining data in Africa at no cost to them. As the 4IR 
reaches the consolidation phase, Euro- North America will enhance its strong-
hold on the five monopolies of capitalism not only in Africa but also globally. 
For Euro- North America and their networks, the 4IR is an opportunity to tie 
the proverbial loose ends while Africa suffers from the Matthew effect.
Africa, the 4IR, and the Matthew effect
A concept which aptly describes Africa’s destiny in the 4IR is the Matthew 
effect (Sauder, 2018; Bağcı, 2019; Raţiu, 2019). Originating from the Bible in 
the Gospel of Saint Matthew, the notion is that those with much will accu-
mulate more and those with less will lose even the little which they have. 
The implication of Matthew effect to Africa’s destiny in the 4IR is that Euro- 
North America, Japan, and China will increase their stronghold on technology, 
the global economy, global affairs, war, and the extraction and accumulation 
of natural resources. Africa will lose not only its natural resources but also its 
importance as a source of these minerals because once extracted from Africa the 
continent will be akin to an empty vessel.
The Matthew effect is a phenomenon whose implications are drawn directly 
from the Bible. Matthew 13:12 reads, “… for whoever has, to him more shall 
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be given, and he will have an abundance; but whoever does not have, even what 
he has shall be taken away from him…”. In this context Africa is taken as the 
one who has very little from whom the little that he has will be taken away. 
Euro- North America on the other hand is taken as the one with abundance, 
and to whom more shall be given. In the context of the fourth industrial revo-
lution, the implication is that Africa will lose the little that it gained from its 
political independence, while, on the contrary, Euro- North America will even 
get more from their investments in the colonial economy. The fourth industrial 
revolution is the agent which will be used to take away the little that Africa 
have and give it to Euro- North America that already has more. This not only 
applies to Africa’s natural resources and big data but also applies to the sov-
ereignty of Africans and African states. The sovereignties that were gained by 
Africa through political independence will be taken away through the 4IR and 
will be owned and controlled by Euro- North America. 
That Africa will lose its strategic importance as a source of rare earth 
minerals as a result of the accumulation of these minerals especially by China 
has happened before albeit in a different scenario, that of the end of the Cold 
War. During the Cold War, Africa was strategically important for the East– West 
ideological divide. When the Cold War ended, Africa found itself almost useless 
in international relations, with very little strategic importance for the global 
powers. Africa’s destiny in this scenario is that of geo- political uselessness.
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8  Africa’s eunuch condition and 
the omnipresent footprints of the 
four industrial revolutions
Introduction
The template for the exploitation of Africa by the empire – slaves, commodities, 
and now data – remains the same and leaves the same footprints. Revolutions 
by their nature bring change. The belief is that the present is unjust and unsus-
tainable and that the bureaucracy failed to effect the changes desired by com-
munities. This leaves communities with no option but to revolt. The past three 
industrial revolutions have not brought any sustainable development to Africa. 
On the contrary, they resulted in further marginalising Africa and Africans. In 
this section, I present the three previous industrial revolutions as daggers which 
were mercilessly plunged in the heart of Africa, each past industrial revolution 
representing a stabbing. The argument here is that while the previous three indus-
trial revolutions immensely benefited those who started them, those in Africa 
who were not beneficiaries of these industrial revolutions continue to be on the 
receiving end of Euro- North American modernity. I argue that Africa must not 
celebrate the 4IR as this is another stab in the heart of Africa which will result 
in super- imperialism, super- inequality, super- unemployment, and super- poverty. 
Engulfed in these supers, Africa will be (re)colonised by the empire.
The logics of revolutions
The logic behind all revolutions is to do away with an order of things deemed 
to be undesirable. A key ingredient of revolutions is the unquestionable desire 
by the people to move away from a certain status quo. There are two opposing 
and clashing forces in a revolution, one agitating for maintaining the status 
quo and the other opposed to it. With both sides adamant, a clash becomes 
inevitable and the revolution ensues. However, if a revolution is an uprising 
against something or a certain order of things, the question is, what is the 4IR 
revolting against? For Artwell Nhemachena, the cardinal question is, against 
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Might the fourth industrial revolution be a revolution or counter- revolu-
tion against humanism, humanity and humanities in the emergent post- 
humanist and post- anthropocentric era?
(personal communication: 11 December 2019)
Given the arithmetic growth in the influence of information, science, and 
technology which culminated in the 4IR, the revolution is certainly aimed 
at the humanities, in the process replacing the biological human being with 
other forms of being such as robo- humans and cyborgs. The 4IR is essentially 
revolting against anything and everything that is anthropocentric, ushering in a 
period of massive post- anthropocentricism. This has already led to massive job 
losses, as a result of automation, which are being experienced in various sectors 
of the African economy such as banks, retail shops, security, the media, and so on.
If the 4IR is premised on the need to do away with anything that is human- 
centred and replace it with enhanced beings, then parallels can be drawn with the 
disruption experienced in Zimbabwe in particular and in Africa in general during 
the long reign of Robert Mugabe. Mugabe basically destroyed the economy and 
inflation reached record levels, he disrupted lives, education, health, development, 
and even foreign policy. Nhemachena (2019, p. 1) sees the parallels and asks,
if the fourth industrial revolution disrupts/ destroys jobs/ employment, 
what is the difference between its proponents and the Mugabe regime that 
is also globally accused of disrupting/ destroying employment in Zimbabwe 
post 2000?
According to Nhemachena, the 4IR therefore represents a period where massive 
disruptions in virtually all facets of life will be experienced at a rapid rate. Key 
casualties will be democracy, human rights, and development. The 4IR will see 
more unemployment and unemployability, inequality, poverty, and violence 
among the weak and the vulnerable. Already, Oxfam reported that 22 of the 
world’s richest men have wealth more than all the women in Africa put together.1
All industrial revolutions originated predominantly in Euro- North America 
and they were driven by individuals, companies and organisations from there. 
Not surprisingly, industrial revolutions have mostly benefited Euro- North 
America while simultaneously milking, looting, disadvantaging, and subjug-
ating Africa, and the Global South. Africa and other parts of the (formerly) 
colonised world have not been fully incorporated into the global economy and 
never equitably benefited from the past three industrial revolutions – hence 
the argument that most parts of Africa are still stuck in the second or third 
industrial revolution periods. Countries that are yet to secure sustainable peace 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia are actually regressing 
in terms of their industrialisation, quality of life, and sustainable peace. These 
countries cannot be expected to participate in and benefit from the 4IR in the 
same way this phenomenon will benefit countries in Euro- North America.
The logic is that the first industrial revolution laid the foundation for the 
second industrial revolution, which in turn laid the foundation for the third 
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industrial revolution. Without a solid third industrial revolution having brought 
infrastructure and viable, independent institutions, Africa will not benefit much 
from the 4IR. It will be a daunting task for Africa to pursue the 3IR and the 
4IR simultaneously while it is struggling just with the 3IR alone. Evidently, 
every revolution produces winners and losers.
Revolutionary winners and losers
A key characteristic of revolutions is that they produce winners and losers. In 
most cases, the winners will be the majority or the most powerful members of 
the society. Like its three predecessors, the 4IR will also produce winners and 
losers. Africa and Africans will predominantly constitute the bulk of the losers 
at the receiving end of the 4IR just as was the case with the first three industrial 
revolutions. A revolution is characterised by death and destruction. The 4IR too 
will be characterised by many deaths. These include the death of human beings, 
study disciplines, industries, languages, cultures, and epistemologies.
The title of this section sums up the argument made herein. As nascent as it is, 
it can be stated that the 4IR will not significantly benefit Africa. Basing on the 
trajectory of the past three industrial revolutions and using inferential judgements, 
one can safely say that Africa will once again be at the receiving end of the current 
industrial revolution. What determines revolutionary winners and losers, literally 
and metaphorically, is a matter of firepower and lack thereof respectively. Using 
the Matthew effect of cumulative advantage, those countries with economic and 
military power will gain and utilise more of these powers and will also benefit 
more from the 4IR. Those countries with less economic and military power will 
exert minimum influence but suffer maximum consequences.
Laws will be shaped according to the desires of those with power to influence 
their drafting, implementation, and maintenance. Proverbially speaking, until 
the springbok start hunting lions, the hunting story will always be written and 
read from the perspective of the lion and not the springbok. For the springbok, 
life is all about daily surviving the hunting lions. The countries of Euro- North 
America, by virtue of being leaders in information and communication tech-
nology (ICT), nontechnology, biotechnology, and the design and implementa-
tion of the 4IR will never relinquish the advantages which their position gives 
them in the international arena. After all, they got their privileged position 
through blood and war and for now, only war can topple them from their dom-
inant position. What cannot be doubted is that Africa will undergo another tran-
sition, albeit a reactionary one aimed at minimising the challenges of the 4IR.
Many and endless societal transitions
Civilisations transition from one mode to another. These transitions could be 
endogenously or exogenously driven. For countries in Euro- North America 
who were the initiators and beneficiaries of the past three industrial revolutions, 
their transitions normally happen from within and take place on their own 
terms. In contrast, when it comes to Africa, societal transitions are normally a 
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reaction to outside forces and historically very negative phenomena such as the 
slave trade and colonialism. Karl Popper’s treatise, titled The Open Society and its 
Enemies: The Spell of Plato, noted the many pains encountered during societal 
transitions (Popper, 1945). Whole civilisations can disappear during transitions.
Being positioned on the weaker side of economic and military power the 
societal transitions that will occur in Africa will obviously not be on Africa’s 
terms. For Popper, these transitions should ideally lead to an open society 
devoid of what he termed barbarism and tribalism. He wrote:
this civilisation has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth, the 
transition from the tribal or closed society, with its submission to magical 
forces, to the open society which sets free the critical powers of man.
(Popper, 1945, p. 1)
Thus, the 4IR is part of the attempt to open up Africa to what Popper calls 
an open society. Equally notable is the fact that the man being referred to by 
Popper and many like him is not all mankind but the “civilized man”, that is, 
Euro- North Americans (Mignolo, 2009; Benyera, Mtapuri, and Nhemachena, 
2018). Stated differently, the 4IR will predominantly benefit the Humanitas and 
further disadvantage the Anthropos (Mignolo, 2009, 2011; Benyera, Mtapuri, and 
Nhemachena, 2018).
What Africa will transition to and into at the end of the 4IR will most likely 
be (re)colonisation, further global marginalisation, and more lootability. It is 
too early to speculate what the fifth industrial revolution (5IR) will be about. 
What can be stated upfront is that basing on the past trajectory of the previous 
three industrial revolutions and on the current 4IR, nascent as it may be, the 
5IR promises to be still more of the same for Africa unless and until something 
drastically changes in Africa.
Africa into the 4IR: Entering a revolution  
without an ideology
A key ingredient for any successful revolution is a proper, well- articulated 
ideology. It is the role of ideology to lay out the roadmap of the revolution. 
The French Revolution, the Bolshevik and the Menshevik revolutions in the 
then United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and the various liberation 
revolutions in Africa were all characterised by clear ideologies.
Those in Euro- North America who are the originators of the 4IR have a 
capitalist ideology which has underpinned and guided the past three revolutions. 
Africa and Africans generally do not have any ideology for guiding them to par-
ticipate effectively in the 4IR or resist the impending further marginalisation 
in this dispensation. Nationalism is Africa’s main ideological hope. However, 
as rightly noted by Yoweri Museveni, African nationalism has become tired, 
toxic, old, and alienated from the youth who are the majority of the popula-
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become xenophobic and self- destructive. It needs a lot of cleansing in order for 
it to be used as a combative ideology to resist and debunk the myth of the 4IR.
African nationalism must be reinvented by African nationalists so that it 
aligns with the youth, tapping into new technologies, and shying away from 
xenophobia and other negative, divisive social markers. William Jethro Mpofu 
asserts that:
In this information age and media age of coloniality and technological 
determinism in global information dissemination, where social media 
and other information technologies scramble for young hearts and young 
minds, nationalism needs to re- invent itself to capture the imagination of 
the youth and secure its place as not only a victorious ideology of the past 
but a winning political movement of the future.
(Mpofu, 2013, p. 114)
For many reasons another viable ideological option for Africa in the 4IR 
is decoloniality, despite it currently being misunderstood by those who are 
supposed to be benefiting from it. It is also being contaminated and deliber-
ately misinterpreted by those who feel threatened by it. In fact, for Africa to 
participate effectively and not continue on the trajectory of being marginalised, 
there is an urgent need for the development of a competitive ideology which 
positions Africa first. That ideology is decoloniality.
What happened to Africa’s ideologies, it may be asked. The short answer is 
that African ideologies suffered the same and simultaneous fate as its citizens, i.e., 
genocides and epistemicides,all linked to the development of the Global North 
and industrial revolutions. Let us consider the case of the Kongo Kingdom, 
which at its peak covered present day Northern Angola, the bothhCongos and 
parts of Gabon. The Kongo Kingdom was a fully fledge civilisation whose dual 
currency was the Nzimbu shell and the Mpusu cloth. The conversion of the 
Kongo King (manikongo) Nzinga a Nkiwu and his son Mvemba a Nzinga to 
Christianity in 1491 and his subsequent alignment with the Portuguese marked 
the demise of the once mighty Kongo Kingdom. The King becam knon as Joao 
1 Nzinga a Nkuku and his son as Afonso 1 Mvemba a Nzinga. The Portuguese 
and the Kongo rulers fell out of favour when they clashed over the issue of 
slave trade with the then maikongo Afonso 1 Mvemba a Nzinga oposing slave 
trade. The troubles which caused the fall of the Kongo Kingdom can be largely 
attributed to colonialism. I trace the origins of the current Congo problem to 
the baptism of the maikongo in 1491.
Genocide as the underwriters of revolutions
There is an indisputable link between industrial revolutions and atrocities, and 
what happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the collecting 
of rubber during the first industrial revolution illustrates this well. This story of 
rubber started in 1839 when Charles Goodyear accidentally spilt sulphur onto 
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some hot rubber, noticing that the rubber did not become stiff and cracked 
when it was cold neither did it melt when temperatures rose – something which 
had been a major problem for the nascent rubber industry (Cawthorne, 1999). 
This rubber revolution was completed in 1885 when John Dunlop fitted a 
pneumatic tyre to his son’s tricycle. The rubber tyre for the automobile industry 
was born and a rubber revolution was in full swing. Demand for rubber was 
immense with car tyres, rubber for gaskets, and other first industrial revolution- 
related inventions. The first industrial revolution- induced demand for rubber 
increased even further by the invention of the telephone which needed cables 
that had to be insulated by rubber, stretching over thousands of kilometres.
This demand for rubber meant that the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
became a natural target since it had wild rubber in abundance. This was the 
genesis of the Congo crisis which persists until today. This rubber was collected 
from vines and not tapped from trees like elsewhere and collecting it was very 
labour- intensive. In order to collect as much rubber as possible so as to sat-
isfy the needs of the first industrial revolution in Euro- North America, the 
European rubber merchants used brutal methods. In 1899, the French devised 
a very cruel method of forcing the local Congolese villagers to collect rubber 
for them. Rubber was hard to collect in forests full of wild animals and insects 
and it also took days to coagulate, so naturally the Congolese were not keen 
to do it. As a strategy to force the villagers to eventually collect rubber for the 
various French companies, French soldiers who arrived in 1899 in the Congo 
looted all the villagers’ food which included chicken and grain and left nothing 
for the fleeing villagers to eat.
After looting all the food, the French Force de Republic took captive all the 
women, only to be released when their chief had brought the required amount 
of rubber. Any man who refused to collect rubber would have his wife killed. 
This brutal system was “improved” to a point where each village was assigned a 
quota of rubber to collect on behalf of the French colonialists. A quota roughly 
translated to 324 kilograms of dried rubber per adult male per fortnight. This 
essentially meant full- time work for the men and no more farming or hunting 
for them. Murderous forms of punishment accompanied this colonial enterprise, 
for example, villagers who resisted would have ten people taken hostage and tied 
up in a tent with big stones which was then pushed into a river for them to die.
Fast forward 200 years to the present- day Democratic Republic of Congo 
where coltan was discovered. Coltan is a key ingredient in electronic devices 
and thus one of the rare earth minerals which is used to fuel the 4IR. The way 
in which coltan is being mined in the Congo is not much different to the ways 
in which rubber was collected. The question then is how does the same atroci-
ties visit the same communities whose only crime is that their area is endowed 
with natural resources such as rubber and rare earth minerals? As a 4IR mantra, 
anything and anyone who stands in the way of a foreign corporation’s ability 
to extract cheap resources must be removed. In a way Africa has always fuelled 
industrial revolutions, including the current 4IR where personal data is the new 
oil and gold.
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Personal data: The new oil and gold
Personal data, as with natural resources, has become the target of extractive 
corporates. Like any other natural resource, capitalism seeks to maximise its 
profits from such resources. As Mejias states,
there is a new form of colonialism emerging in the world: data coloni-
alism. By this, we mean a new resource- grab whereby human life itself has 
become a direct input into economic production in the form of extracted 
data.
(Mejias, 2019)
Like classical colonialism, data colonialism violently reconfigures human 
relations to economic production. Things like land, water, and other natural 
resources were valued by native people in the precolonial era, but not in the 
same way that colonisers (and later, capitalists) came to value them: as private 
property. Likewise, we are experiencing a situation in which things that were 
once primarily outside the economic realm – things like our most intimate 
social interactions with friends and family, or our medical records – have 
now been commodified and made part of an economic cycle of data extrac-
tion that benefits a few transnational corporations. While praising Couldry and 
Mejias’s book, Bruce Schneier chillingly writes,
There’s a land grab occurring right now, and it’s for your data and your 
freedom: companies are not only surveilling you, they’re increasingly influ-
encing and controlling your behaviour. [There is a] new colonialism at 
the heart of modern computing, and serves as a needed wake- up call to 
everyone who cares about our future relationship with technology.
(Couldry and Ulises Ali Mejias, 2019)
Datafication is the process of turning aspects of people’s lives into big data after 
having harvested it, then processing and redeploying it to aid decision making. 
Seminal for Africa is the fact that data is being mined and harvested from 
Africans without their expressed consent, but rather with their manufactured 
consent. This data is used to (re)colonise Africa and Africans. This is how it will 
happen:
When human beings are inserted with microchips and nanobots, implanted 
into their brains/ bodies, they wirelessly emit data which is collected and 
transmitted across national and continental space in real time, in huge 
volumes and at high velocity. When human beings adorn smart watches, 
smart textiles/ smart shirts/ smart hats and sleep on smart beds, they con-
stantly emit and transmit Big Data, across space, via the Internet of Things 
in real time, at high velocity and in huge volumes. Similarly, when animals 
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they constantly emit and transmit Big Data via the Internet of Things. In 
other words, the information revolution, in the 4IR, datafies human beings 
and other objects in ways that render human researchers superfluous. Data 
is directly mined by transnational corporations, which own and control 
the software, from the human minds/ bodies that are fitted with chips and 
nanobots or other so- called enhancement devices.
(Nhemachena, 2019, p. 3)
Mined, harvested, processed, and sold without their expressed consent, 
Africans are being pauperised as their data enriches global multinational 
cartels and networks such as Siemens, Nokia, Facebook, Samsung, Apple, and 
Alphabet. The argument by those mining and datafying Africans is that “users 
have to give up part of their privacy in exchange for free convenient plat-
form services” (van Dijck, 2014, p. 197). The bottom line of this logic is that 
metadata has become the new currency by which Africans and other citizens 
pay for their communication services provided by big tech companies and 
their contractors (van Dijck, 2014, pp. 197– 198). This trade- off constitutes 
coloniality of data.
Can Africa fight back?
Allow me to describe Africa’s leadership crisis as the underlying condition for 
coloniality: Black pseudo- nationalist elites are complicit in coloniality. They are 
guilty of the following:
(1) Misrepresentation (presenting themselves as nationalists when they are actu-
ally capitalist and Western stooges).
(2) Misappropriation (stealing people’s grievances and problems and presenting 
them as their own).
(3) Manufactured consent (misrepresenting cases, situations, and information to 
their citizens in order to get their ill- informed consent).
(4) Pseudo consent (pretending that their citizens consented to actions of the 
elites).
(5) Accumulation (participating, aiding, and abetting the commodification of 
the post colony and profiteering from the citizens’ impoverishment).
Since the end of official colonisation and apartheid in South Africa, a pre-
dominantly black pseudo- nationalist elite took power. Instead of reformu-
lating the structure of the economy they simply joined the old white elite and 
continued with the same systems and structures and institutions of statecraft. The 
white elite remained in control of the economy while the black elite were in 
control of political power. They became inextricably linked and their relation-
ship resulted in the oppression of the poor, undermining of independence, and 
looting of the (post)-colonial economy. The black elites inherited and perfected 
the same institutions, mechanisms, and systems that had worked so well for 
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majority of poor people were still engulfed in the euphoria of independence, 
oblivious of the ensuing machinations that betrayed the promise of the colonial 
struggles, that is, a better life for all. If the white minority elite was dangerous 
as a class on its own, joined by their black counterparts they became even more 
lethal. More lethal because the population was under the illusion that they were 
being led, while in actuality they were being misled and impoverished. The new 
ruling class had mastered the art of misrepresentation, appropriating the plight 
of the poor, and misrepresenting it at the United Nations as their own. In a way 
the pseudo- nationalists are the new colonisers, because to colonise is to usurp 
another’s sovereignty, individually or collectively. Coloniality is more fatal and 
effective than colonialism, because coloniality has local, invested henchmen, 
that is, the black pseudo- nationalists and the middle class which aspires day and 
night to become part of the elites.
The black middle class started enjoying opportunities that were reserved for 
their white counterparts. This left the poor black citizens on their own, having 
been robbed of their anti- colonial, anti- apartheid comrades. Hence the crisis of 
Africa is a crisis of ethical leadership.
At the citizen level, the result of the above is poverty, inequality, unemploy-
ability, and generally a lived experience which are worse in the post colony 
than during colonial apartheid. Under colonialism, suffering was bearable 
because, after all, it was being dispensed by a white- minority settler regime. 
Under coloniality, suffering becomes unbearable because it is being dispensed 
by a black, majority- elected, and independent government. The source of the 
suffering makes the pain so immense so unbearble.
On the part of the elites, long incumbency became the norm in most of 
Africa and the state started siding with the “markets” and the “investors”. State 
decisions were being taken with the markets in mind and not the citizens. The 
black pseudo- nationalist elites became some of the richest citizens overnight. 
In order to maintain their power and newfound economic status, dictatorship, 
prebendalism, tyranny, electoral fraud, and even genocide became part of their 
survival strategies.
Just by crossing the independence line, Africa generally mutated from race- 
based structural inequalities to class- based structural inequalities. Independence 
was therefore a process of forming new classes and social identities and alliances. 
The common denominator in the different eras is the majority, black, poor 
people. These suffered throughout the three previous industrial revolutions and 
will surely suffer in the 4IR. This is their fate predominantly because the post- 
colonial African state embraced the free- market economy model and neoliberal 
policies, which by their nature are anti- poor. A starting point for the resurgence 
of Africa in the 4IR is one which must be grounded in the needs of poor 
people.
Africa: What is to be done?
Obviously, the 4IR will result in the formation of new forms of socialisation 
such as virtual communities. The question is, will Africa be part of these virtual 
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communities and, if so, in what capacity? The short answer is that Africa will 
be part of these virtual and online communities not as an equal partner, but as 
an enslaved supplier of raw data. In 1902, Vladimir Lenin asked this question 
(Lenin, 1902), and it is being asked here again: What is to be done?
For others like South Africa’s former Statistician General Pali Lehohla, Africa 
sadly deserves to be digitally colonised, “When you make value visible and not 
appropriate it you deserve to be a product for consumption” (Lehohla, 2019). 
This was against the background of Africa’s failure to effectively participate 
in the inaugural World Data Forum in 2017 held in Cape Town, South Africa 
and the second World Data Forum held in 2019 in Dubai. He argues that 
African leaders are moving slowly and leave the tech vultures with no option 
but to feed on Africa’s free data. He argues,
The paucity of systems thinking in Africa is mortgaging the continent holus 
bolus to the owners of digital capital. And African leaders and institutions 
are in slumber whilst this happens. ... This ideologically barren approach to 
development will yield nothing but 4 billion Africans enslaved as products.
(Lehohla, 2019)
With these failed attempts by Africa to have a unified approach to the manage-
ment of its data, African civil society organisations, think tanks and universities, 
and other tertiary institutions must fill this void. They have to spearhead both 
the decolonisation of data and step into the gap left by local political elites’ lack 
of action to protect African data. Africa must begin by recognising the import-
ance of data and big data, own it and then use it for evidence- based policy and 
planning. Right now, most African decisions are either inflected by its inter-
national “partners” such as China, Russia, the EU, or the United States, or flow 
from prebentalism or other local negative - isms.
Africa must liberate itself, sooner rather than later, especially with regard 
to its mineral and other natural resources. African states must prioritise its 
autonomy and must hasten liberatory efforts starting with the nationalisa-
tion of data. Mejias declared its sacrosanctity when he stated that, “Big Tech 
corporations are extracting data from users across the world without paying for 
it. It is time to change that” (Mejias, 2019). In the process, Africa should draw 
massive lessons from its failures to benefit from its gold, diamond, timber, and 
other resources. Together with nationalising data, Africa must grow local tech 
entrepreneurs from the “unemployed youths”.
One way in which Africa can legitimately fight back against the work of 
the empire and the cartels especially in the rare- earth minerals category is by 
forming its own cartels. Africa can draw important lessons from OPEC and 
could even form an organisation similar to OPEC. This must be done cogni-
sant of the pitfalls which had bedevilled similar previous efforts and especially 
Muammar Gaddafi in his efforts to lead Africa to be financially independent 
from both financial oligarchies, cartels, and Western donor organisations and 
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in the manner OPEC markets its petroleum products will be seen as treasonous 
by those who are opposed to Africa’s independence and resource autonomy.
A constant threat to African autonomy has been the scaremongering that 
should Africa try to regulate its mining sector, investors will flee. This is part of 
the hoaxes and myths that have been used to capture Africa and loot its mineral 
resources. If Russia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have over 90% of the global 
uranium deposits, where will these investors flee to? (Unless of course if they 
discover an alternative to uranium). Russia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are 
responsible for over 93% of the global uranium production and Africa is respon-
sible for over 90% of the global cobalt production (Hinshaw, 2010). Africa can 
therefore leverage their numbers and control the international sale of uranium, 
and cobalt among other minerals.
Forward with data localisation
In peroration, Citizens’ data must be kept in their country and must be regulated 
locally, escalated to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and then 
to a continental body such as the African Union (AU), and not the other way 
around. Data centres are necessary, they act like oil refineries and must be 
located in- country. There is no oil refinery that is located at a remote location. 
Oil is refined at the source, so must data.
To begin with, “the cloud” is located around the coasts of the United States, 
South Africa and Northern Europe. India has the highest number of Facebook 
users, yet Facebook does not store the data in Indian clouds.
While India is the country with the biggest amount of Facebook users, 
when you look at the location of Facebook’s 15 data centres, ten are in 
North America, four in Europe and one in Asia – in Singapore.
(Hicks, 2019)
This disconnection between geographical data source and data storage sites is an 
issue that goes to the heart of the notion of sovereignty of the individual human 
being and nation state and must never be addressed and analysed as an economic 
issue. Parading economic rules, principles, and justifications is exactly how Africa 
was colonised in the first place as the empire was “justifiably” in need of cheap 
war materials and new bigger markets. After all, whose economic principles and 
rules apply? Those of the data generators or those of the data keepers?
Africa can learn how to own its data from the French example. “France con-
tinues to pursue its own data centre infrastructure, dubbed ‘le cloud souverain’ ” 
(Hicks, 2019). If France can have data sovereignty, why should not African 
countries also enjoy data sovereignty? By agitating for data sovereignty, Africa 
and the developing nations are not asking for favours, or strange new things, 
but rather to be treated equally and be accorded the same international rights 
just like France. As stated by Hicks, and as expected, China and Russia have 
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So, what could countries in the Global South do to avoid the dangers of 
data colonialism? One option is to follow proposals from the likes of computer 
philosophy writer Jaron Lanier and former US presidential candidate Andrew 
Yang, who have suggested that individuals should be paid for their data. But this 
neoliberal attempt to try to solve the problem at the level of the individual can 
dilute the value of the accumulated resources. After all is said and done, if we 
work on the level of the individual (or even the level of collectives, platforms, 
or unions that collect money on behalf of individuals) payments to users would 
be rather small. Instead, it makes much more sense for individual countries to 
take advantage of their scale and take the bold step to declare data a national 
resource, nationalise it, and demand that companies – like Alibaba, Baidu, 
Facebook, WeChat, and Google – pay for using this resource, so its exploitation 
primarily benefits the citizens of that country.
Let’s take Mexico as an example: According to the latest available statistics, in 
2018 Facebook had 54.6 million users in that country. Since each of Facebook’s 
global users generates about $25 of profit per year, this makes about $1.4bn 
in annual profit for the company from the Mexican market alone. Suppose 
Mexico nationalised its data and demanded to keep a substantial portion of 
that? And suppose similar arrangements were enforced on Google, Amazon, 
and TikTok, how much wealth will the (formerly) colonised countries reclaim?
Note
 1 See Oxfam report of 20 January 2020 titled: World’s billionaires have more wealth than 4.6 
billion people. Report available online at: www.oxfam.org/ en/ press- releases/ worlds- 
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